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ABSTRACT 
Economists have learned a great deal about investor behavior over the last two decades with the 
availability of large discount brokerage data sets.  While this has given economists a better 
understanding of the trading patterns that characterize individual investor behavior, less success has 
been achieved in understanding what drives these trading patterns.  Part of the difficulty in this 
endeavor is that it is sometimes difficult to test alternative theories of investor behavior using only 
data from the field.  In particular, the two trading patterns we investigate in this thesis, the 
disposition effect and the repurchase effect, are unlikely driven by standard rational models of 
trading, and alternative theories of their causes are difficult to test using only data from the field, or 
data from behavioral laboratory experiments. 
In order to better understand the causes of the disposition effect and the repurchase effect, we use 
neural data, data collected from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) along with trading 
data to construct empirical tests of different theories.  Chapter 1 uses fMRI data to test a model of 
realization utility, which can readily predict a disposition effect.  In our experiment, we find that 
subjects exhibit strong disposition effects, although they are suboptimal, and the neural data 
strongly supports the realization utility hypothesis.  While Chapter 1 is concerned with the selling 
behavior, we focus on systematic violations of buying behavior in Chapter 2.  We propose a model 
of regret to explain the repurchase effect in the buy-side trading data, for which we find strong 
support in the neural data.  Chapters 3 and 4 study whether the suboptimal trading behavior we find 
in the first two chapters is stable, and we explore what the source of the heterogeneity is.  
Specifically, in Chapter 3 we find that exogenously manipulating the display of information on the 
trading screen can significantly reduce the size of the disposition effect.  Chapter 4 uses an approach 
from behavioral genetics to identify candidate genes that can help explain the cross-sectional 
variation in choice behavior.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Economists have documented several robust empirical facts regarding the behavior of individual 
investors.  Some of this behavior is puzzling from the standpoint of a purely rational model of 
trading, which has led researchers to propose alternative models of trading behavior based on 
different specifications of preferences and/or beliefs.  In this thesis, we aim to provide financial 
economics with a new methodology that can be useful in testing these alternative theories of 
investor behavior.  In particular, we use methods from cognitive neuroscience to collect data from 
the human brain that allows us to construct sharp empirical tests of theories of investor behavior.  
Chapter 1 shows how neural data collected via functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) can 
be useful in understanding why investors exhibit a puzzling behavior known as the disposition 
effect.  We design an experimental stock market and generate disposition effects in the laboratory 
that are strongly suboptimal.  We then use a time series of neural data to test a specific theory of the 
disposition effect, called realization utility, for which we find strong support.  One of the main 
contributions of Chapter 1 is to clearly illustrate the added value of neural data for our 
understanding of economic behavior. 
While Chapter 1 is concerned with understanding systematic violations of the optimal trading 
strategy on the sell-side, in Chapter 2 we investigate the buying behavior of individual subjects.  In 
this chapter, we seek to understand what drives the “repurchase effect”, which is the recently 
documented empirical fact that investors have a great tendency to repurchase stocks that have gone 
down in value since last sale more often than they repurchase stocks that have gone up in value 
since last sale.  We propose that this effect is driven by a regret-devaluation mechanism, and we 
employ empirical tests of this mechanism that cannot be run without neural data.  Our results 
provide support for the regret-devaluation mechanism as we find: 1) stronger regret signals predict a 
higher probability of a repurchase mistake and 2) average regret signals can explain a portion of the 
variation in the size of the repurchase effect across subjects.  Like Chapter 1, this chapter highlights 
the added value of using neural data in testing theories of investor behavior. 
After achieving a better understand of what drives systematic deviations from optimal trading 
behavior on both the sell-side and the buy-side, it is interesting to compare the two behaviors.  
Figure 4 in Chapter 2 shows that the disposition effect and repurchase effect are highly correlated 
across subjects and that there is substantial variation in the size of both effects.  This suggests that 
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there may be a stable and common underlying “factor” that drives buying and selling behavior, but 
that there is heterogeneity in this factor across the population of investors.  We examine these two 
ideas in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, respectively. 
In particular, Chapter 3 examines whether the preference structure that drives the disposition effect 
is stable and fixed, or whether it is malleable and can be manipulated by exogenous changes in the 
display of information about an investor’s portfolio.  We find that by introducing cues on the 
trading screen that shift attention away from realization utility, we can manipulate the size of the 
disposition effect, and therefore, expected final wealth.  We discuss our experimental results in this 
chapter in connection with a recently enacted US government legislation that effectively increases 
the saliency of the cost basis, and may have unintended consequences for investor behavior. 
Chapter 4 is concerned with studying the underlying source of heterogeneity in suboptimal investor 
behavior that we document in the first two chapters.  We use a different task structure in this 
chapter, where subjects are asked to make a series of choices between a risky lottery and a certain 
option.  We then test whether genetic markers can help explain the variation in choice behavior 
across subjects.  We find significant heterogeneity in choice behavior, and subjects with a specific 
genetic polymorphism, MAOA-L, tend to choose the risky option more often than those with 
MAOA-H.  After estimating a computational phenotype, we find that MAOA-L does not affect 
behavior through preferences, but instead through a different channel, known in computational 
neuroscience as the choice comparator.      
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Chapter 1 
Testing Theories of Investor Behavior Using Neural Data 
 
Over the past twenty years, economists have accumulated a large amount of evidence on 
how individual investors manage their financial portfolios over time. Some of this evidence is 
puzzling, in the sense that it is hard to reconcile with the simplest models of rational trading 
(Barberis and Thaler (2003); Campbell (2006)).  Theorists have responded to this challenge by 
constructing new models of investor behavior. Empiricists, in turn, have started testing these 
newly-developed models. 
Most of the empirical work that tests theories of investor behavior uses field data (Barber 
and Odean (2000); Barber and Odean (2001); Choi et al. (2009); Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009)). 
A smaller set of studies uses data from laboratory experiments. The advantage of experimental 
data is that it gives researchers a large degree of control over the trading and information 
environment, which can make it easier to tease theories apart (Plott and Sunder (1988); Camerer 
and Weigelt (1991); Camerer and Weigelt (1993); Weber and Camerer (1998); Bossaerts and 
Plott (2004); Bossaerts et al. (2007)). 
In this paper, we show that another kind of data, namely measures of neural activity 
taken using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while subjects trade in an 
experimental stock market, can also be very useful in testing theories of investing behavior. In 
particular, we show that neural data can be used to test theories designed to explain the 
“disposition effect,” the robust empirical fact that individual investors have a greater propensity 
to sell stocks trading at a gain relative to purchase price, rather than stocks trading at a loss1. 
The disposition effect has attracted considerable attention because it has proven 
challenging to explain using simple rational models of trading behavior. This impasse has 
motivated the development of multiple competing alternative theories, both rational and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See for example, Shefrin and Statman (1985), Odean (1998), Genesove and Mayer (2001), Grinblatt and 
Keloharju (2001), Feng and Seasholes (2005), Frazzini (2006), Jin and Scherbina (2011). 
2 In this paper, we use the word “behavioral” in two different senses. Most of the time, as in the last 
sentence of this paragraph, we take it to mean “pertaining to behavior”. Occasionally, we take it to mean 
“less than fully rational” or “psychological”. It should be clear from the context which of the two meanings 
is intended. 
3 See Hsu et al. (2005), Kable and Glimcher (2007), Knutson et al. (2007), Hare et al. (2008), Kennerley et 
al. (2008), Chib et al. (2009), Hare et al. (2009), Hsu et al. (2009), Kang et al. (2009), Hare et al. (2010), 
Levy et al. (2010), Litt et al. (2010), Kang et al. (2011). 
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behavioral (Shefrin and Statman (1985); Odean (1998); Barberis and Xiong (2009); Kaustia 
(2010)). One such theory, which is the focus of this paper, is the realization utility hypothesis 
(Shefrin and Statman (1985); Barberis and Xiong (2011)). According to this theory, in addition to 
deriving utility from consumption, investors also derive utility directly from realizing gains and 
losses on the sale of risky assets that they own. For example, if an investor realizes a gain (e.g., 
by buying a stock at $20 and selling it at $40), he receives a positive burst of utility proportional 
to the capital gain. In contrast, if he realizes a loss (e.g., by buying a stock at $20 and selling it at 
$10), he receives a negative burst of utility proportional to the size of the realized loss. The 
presence of realization utility is important because, in combination with a sufficiently high time 
discount rate, it leads investors to exhibit a disposition effect (Barberis and Xiong (2011)). 
Testing among competing theories of phenomena like the disposition effect using field or 
experimental data is difficult because these theories often make similar predictions about 
behavior (Weber and Camerer (1998) is an exception). Furthermore, it is extremely difficult, 
using such data alone, to carry out direct tests of the mechanisms driving behavior (e.g., of 
whether or not people actually receive bursts of utility proportional to realized capital gains). On 
the other hand, a combination of neural measurement and careful experimental design allows for 
direct tests of the extent to which the computations made by the brain at the time of decision-
making are consistent with the mechanisms posited by different models. 
In this paper, we describe the results of an fMRI experiment designed to test the 
hypothesis that subjects experience realization utility while trading in an experimental stock 
market, and that this is associated with trading patterns consistent with the disposition effect. The 
experiment allows us to test several behavioral and neural predictions of the realization utility 
hypothesis.2 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In this paper, we use the word “behavioral” in two different senses. Most of the time, as in the last 
sentence of this paragraph, we take it to mean “pertaining to behavior”. Occasionally, we take it to mean 
“less than fully rational” or “psychological”. It should be clear from the context which of the two meanings 
is intended. 
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Behaviorally, we find that the average subject in our experiment exhibits a strong and 
significant disposition effect. This stands in sharp contrast to the prediction of a simple rational 
trading model in which subjects maximize the expected value of final earnings. In particular, our 
experimental design induces positive short-term autocorrelation in stock price changes, which 
implies that a risk-neutral rational trader would sell losing stocks more often than winning stocks, 
thereby exhibiting the opposite of the disposition effect. In contrast, the strong disposition effect 
displayed by our subjects is consistent with the existence of realization utility effects.  
When taken literally as a model of the decision-making process, the realization utility 
model also makes several clear predictions about the pattern of neural activity that should be 
observed at different times in the experiment. We describe these predictions in detail in the main 
body of the paper, but summarize them briefly here.  
First, the realization utility model predicts that, at the moment when a subject is making a 
decision as to whether to sell a stock, neural activity in areas of the brain that are known to 
encode the value of potential actions should be proportional to the capital gain that would be 
realized by the trade (i.e. to the difference between the sale price and the purchase price). This 
prediction follows from the fact that, for an individual who experiences realization utility, the 
value of selling a stock depends on the associated capital gain or loss.  Brain regions that have 
been widely shown to correlate with the value of potential actions include the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and the ventral striatum (vSt)3. 
Second, the realization utility model predicts that, across individuals, the strength of the 
disposition effect should be correlated with the strength of the realization utility signal in decision 
value areas such as the vmPFC or the vSt. This follows from the fact that a subject who is 
strongly influenced by realization utility should exhibit both a strong disposition effect and neural 
activity in decision value areas that is highly responsive to the associated capital gain. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See Hsu et al. (2005), Kable and Glimcher (2007), Knutson et al. (2007), Hare et al. (2008), Kennerley et 
al. (2008), Chib et al. (2009), Hare et al. (2009), Hsu et al. (2009), Kang et al. (2009), Hare et al. (2010), 
Levy et al. (2010), Litt et al. (2010), Kang et al. (2011). 
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Third, the realization utility hypothesis predicts that neural activity in areas that have 
been associated with the encoding of experienced utility (sometimes called “instantaneous 
hedonics”) should increase at the moment that a subject decides to realize a capital gain. Previous 
research in behavioral neuroscience has shown that activity in regions of the vmPFC and the vSt 
also correlates with the reported level of instantaneous experienced utility4. This prediction is 
particularly interesting because it provides the most direct test of the realization utility hypothesis, 
and thus best illustrates the value of neural data for testing theories of financial decision-making.  
Our fMRI measurements reveal patterns of neural activity that are consistent with the 
three neural predictions. This provides novel and strong support for the mechanisms at work in 
the realization utility model, and to our knowledge, provides the first example of how neural 
evidence can be used to test economic models of financial decision-making. We emphasize that 
the results do not imply that realization utility provides a complete description of the forces 
driving investor behavior, even in the context of our experiment. However, the fact that activity in 
the decision-making circuitry corresponds to some of the computations hypothesized by the 
realization utility model provides novel evidence that realization utility plays a significant role in 
the decisions made by our experimental subjects. It further suggests that mechanisms of this kind 
might also be at work in the real-world transactions of individual investors. 
Using neural data to test an economic model is an unusual exercise in the field of 
economics because a common view in the profession is that models make as-if predictions about 
behavior, and are not to be taken as literal descriptions of how decisions are actually made (Gul 
and Pesendorfer (2008); Bernheim (2009)).  In contrast to this view, we adopt a neuroeconomic 
approach which is based on the idea that knowledge about the computational processes that the 
brain uses to make decisions should be of central interest to economists because, since these 
processes describe the actual determinants of observed behavior, they provide valuable insights 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See Blood and Zatorre (2001), De Araujo et al. (2003), Kringelbach et al. (2003), Rolls et al. (2003), 
Small et al. (2003), McClure et al. (2004), Plassmann et al. (2008). 
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into the drivers of economic behavior (Camerer et al. (2005); Camerer (2007); Fehr and Rangel 
(2011)).  
Our study contributes to the nascent field of neurofinance, which seeks to characterize the 
computations undertaken by the brain to make financial decisions, and to understand how these 
computations map to behavior. Several early contributions are worth highlighting.  Lo and Repin 
(2002) investigated the extent to which professional experience affects the emotional arousal of 
traders in stressful situations, where arousal was measured using skin conductance responses and 
changes in blood pressure.  Kuhnen and Knutson (2005) measured neural responses using fMRI 
during a simple investment task and found that activity in brain regions previously associated 
with emotional processing, such as the nucleus accumbens and the insula, predicted subjects’ 
subsequent willingness to take risks.  Knutson et al. (2008)  took these ideas further by showing 
that exogenous emotional cues (e.g., erotic pictures) could be used to affect investment behavior, 
and that these cues increased activity in the same areas that they identified in their previous study. 
More recently, Bruguier et al. (2010) have shown that neural fMRI measurements of the extent to 
which subjects activate brain areas associated with concrete cognitive skills, such as the ability to 
predict others’ state of mind, might be useful in identifying which subjects would be successful 
traders.  
Our paper contributes to this literature by showing, for the first time, that a combination 
of fMRI neural measurements and careful experimental design can be used to test the validity of 
specific economic theories of financial decision making. Our work also contributes more broadly 
to the rapidly growing field of neuroeconomics, which seeks to characterize the computations 
made by the brain in different types of decisions, ranging from simple choices to choices 
involving risk, self-control and complex social interactions. For recent reviews, see Fehr and 
Camerer (2007), Glimcher et al. (2008), Rangel et al. (2008), Bossaerts (2009), Kable and 
Glimcher (2009), Rangel and Hare (2010), and Fehr and Rangel (2011).  
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The paper is organized as follows. Section I presents some background information about 
the disposition effect and realization utility. Section II describes the experimental design and the 
predictions of the realization utility hypothesis. Section III provides a detailed description of how 
the neural predictions can be tested using fMRI. Section IV describes the results. Section V 
briefly concludes. 
 
I. Background: The Disposition Effect and the Realization Utility Model 
  
 Using an argument based on Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory, Shefrin 
and Statman (1985) predict that individual investors will have a greater propensity to sell stocks 
trading at a gain relative to purchase price, rather than stocks trading at a loss. They label this the 
“disposition effect” and provide some evidence for it using records of investor trading. More 
detailed evidence for the effect can be found in Odean (1998), who analyzes the trading activity, 
from 1987 to 1993, of 10,000 households with accounts at a large discount brokerage firm. The 
phenomenon has now been replicated in several other large databases of trading behavior. 
It will be useful to explain Odean’s (1998) methodology in more detail because we will 
adopt a similar methodology in our own analysis. For any day on which an investor in Odean’s 
(1998) sample sells shares of a stock, each stock in his portfolio on that day is placed into one of 
four categories. A stock is counted as a “realized gain” (“realized loss”) if it is sold on that day at 
a price that is higher (lower) than the average price at which the investor purchased the shares. A 
stock is counted as a “paper gain” (“paper loss”) if its price is higher (lower) than its average 
purchase price, but it is not sold on that day. From the total number of realized gains and paper 
gains across all accounts over the entire sample, Odean (1998) computes the Proportion of Gains 
Realized (PGR): 
PGR = # of realized gains# of realized gains + # of paper gains  
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In words, PGR computes the number of gains that were realized as a fraction of the total number 
of gains that could have been realized. A similar ratio, PLR, is computed for losses: 
PLR = # of realized losses# of realized losses + # of paper losses  
The disposition effect is the empirical fact that PGR is significantly greater than PLR. Odean 
(1998) reports PGR = 0.148 and PLR =  0.098. 
 While the disposition effect is a robust empirical phenomenon, its causes remain unclear. 
This is due, in large part, to the fact that standard rational models of trading have had trouble 
capturing important features of the data. Consider, for example, an information model in which 
investors sell stocks with paper gains because they have private information that these stocks will 
subsequently do poorly, and hold on to stocks with paper losses because they have private 
information that these stocks will rebound. This hypothesis is inconsistent with Odean’s finding 
that the average return of the prior winners sold by investors is 3.4% higher, over the next year, 
than the average return of the prior losers they hold on to. Another natural model involves taking 
into account the favorable treatment of losses by the tax code. However, this model also fails to 
explain the disposition effect because tax-loss selling predicts a greater propensity to sell stocks 
associated with paper losses. Another model attributes the disposition effect to portfolio 
rebalancing of the kind predicted by a standard framework with power utility preferences and 
i.i.d. returns. However, under this hypothesis, rebalancing is the “smart” thing to do, which 
implies that we should observe a stronger disposition effect for more sophisticated investors. In 
contrast to this prediction, it is less sophisticated investors who exhibit a stronger disposition 
effect (Dhar and Zhu (2006)). 
 Early on, researchers proposed behavioral economics models of the disposition effect, 
which can potentially explain the stylized facts that the rational explanations just described 
cannot explain. One popular model assumes that investors have an irrational belief in mean-
reversion (Odean (1998); Weber and Camerer (1998); Kaustia (2010)). If investors believe that 
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stocks that have recently done well will subsequently do poorly, and that stocks that have recently 
done poorly will subsequently do well, their optimal trading strategy would lead to a disposition 
effect. We label such beliefs “irrational” because they are at odds with Odean’s (1998) finding 
that the winner stocks investors sell subsequently do well, not poorly. While the mean-reversion 
hypothesis is appealing for its simplicity, and is consistent with some evidence from psychology 
on how people form beliefs5, some studies cast doubt on its empirical validity.  Weber and 
Camerer (1998) ask subjects to trade stocks in an experimental stock market, and find that they 
exhibit a disposition effect in their trading. In order to test the mean-reversion hypothesis, they 
add a condition in which subjects’ holdings are exogenously liquidated at full value at random 
times, after which subjects are asked to reinvest the proceeds across stocks in any way they like. 
Note that if subjects are holding on to stocks with paper losses because of a belief in mean-
reversion, we would expect them to re-establish their positions in these stocks, but in fact, they do 
not.6 
Another popular behavioral economics model posits that the disposition effect results 
from prospect theoretic preferences (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)). Prospect theory is a 
prominent theory of decision-making under risk which assumes that individuals make decisions 
by computing the utility of potential gains and losses measured relative to a reference point that is 
often assumed to be the status quo, and that utility is concave over gains and convex over losses. 
At first sight, it appears that prospect theory preferences may be helpful for understanding the 
disposition effect. If an investor is holding a stock that has risen in value, he may think of it as 
trading at a gain. Moreover, if the concavity of the value function over gains induces risk 
aversion, this may lead him to sell the stock. Conversely, if the convexity of the value function 
over losses induces risk-seeking, he may be inclined to hold on to a stock that has dropped in 
value. Contrary to this intuition, Barberis and Xiong (2009) have recently shown that it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  For a review, see Rabin (2002).	  
6 Odean (1998) and Kaustia (2010) provide additional evidence that is inconsistent with the mean-reversion 
hypothesis.	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surprisingly difficult to derive behavior consistent with the disposition effect using this model. In 
fact, they show that an investor who derives prospect theory utility from the annual trading profit 
on each stock that he owns will often exhibit the opposite of the disposition effect. Further 
theoretical arguments against this model have been provided by Kaustia (2010), who has shown 
that it predicts that investors’ propensity to sell a stock depends on the magnitude of the 
embedded paper gain in a way that is inconsistent with the empirical evidence. 
 Another behavioral model of the disposition effect is based on the realization utility 
hypothesis (Shefrin and Statman (1985); Barberis and Xiong (2011)). The central assumption of 
this model is that investors derive direct utility from realizing capital gains and losses on risky 
assets that they own: they experience a positive burst of utility when they sell an asset at a gain 
relative to purchase price, where the amount of utility depends on the size of the realized gain; 
and a negative burst when they sell an asset at a loss relative to purchase price, where the amount 
of disutility again depends on the size of the loss realized. Importantly, this hypothesis states that 
trades have a direct utility impact on investors, not just an indirect one through their effect on 
lifetime wealth and consumption.7	   Barberis and Xiong (2011)	  show that linear realization utility, 
combined with a sufficiently high time discount rate, leads to a disposition effect. The intuition is 
simple. If an investor derives pleasure from realizing capital gains and, moreover, is impatient, he 
will be very keen to sell stocks at a gain. Conversely, if he finds it painful to sell stocks at a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Barberis and Xiong (2011) speculate that realization utility might arise because of the way people think 
about their investing history. Under this view, some investors – in particular, less sophisticated investors -- 
do not think about their investing history in terms of overall portfolio return, but rather as a series of 
investing “episodes,” each of which is characterized by three things: the identity of the asset, the purchase 
price, and the sale price. “I bought GE at $40 and sold it at $70” might be one such episode, for example. 
According to this view, an investor who sells a stock at a gain feels a burst of positive utility right then 
because, through the act of selling, he is creating a positive new investing episode. Similarly, if he sells a 
stock at a loss, he experiences a burst of disutility: by selling, he is creating a negative investing episode.  	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capital loss and also discounts future utility at a high rate, he will delay selling losing stocks for 
as long as possible.8  
While the realization utility hypothesis makes predictions about behavior that are 
consistent with the disposition effect, as well as with other empirical patterns 9, it is based on 
assumptions that depart significantly from those of traditional models. In particular, its 
predictions rely on the assumption that utility depends not only on consumption, but also on 
capital gains and losses realized from the sale of specific assets. Given the unusual nature of this 
assumption, it seems especially important to carry out direct tests of the extent to which the 
hypothesized source of utility is actually computed by subjects and affects their decisions. In the 
rest of the paper we show how this can be done using a combination of fMRI measures of neural 
activity and careful experimental design. 
    
II. Experimental Design and Predictions 
 
In this section, we first describe the experimental stock market that we set up to test the 
realization utility model. We then lay out the specific behavioral and neural predictions of the 
theory that we test. 
 
A. Design 
The design of the experimental stock market builds directly on an earlier non-neural 
experiment conducted by Weber and Camerer (1998). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Time discounting is not a critical part of the realization utility hypothesis. The disposition effect also 
follows from realization utility combined with an S-shaped value function, as in prospect theory (Barberis 
and Xiong, 2009). Adopting this interpretation of the realization utility hypothesis would not significantly 
affect the analysis that follows.	  9	   Barberis and Xiong (2011) show that realization utility can shed light on many empirical phenomena, not 
just on the disposition effect. Some of the other applications they discuss are the poor trading performance 
of individual investors, the greater volume of trading in bull markets than in bear markets, the individual 
investor preference for volatile stocks, and the low average return of volatile stocks. 	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Subjects are given the opportunity to trade three stocks – stock A, stock B, and stock C – 
in an experimental market. The experiment consists of two identical sessions separated by a one-
minute break. Each session lasts approximately 16 minutes and consists of 108 trials. We use t to 
index the trials within a session.10 
 At the beginning of each session, each subject is given $350 in experimental currency 
and is required to buy one share of each stock. The initial share price for each stock is $100; after 
the initial purchase, each subject is therefore left with $50. Every trial t > 9 consists of two parts: 
a price update and a trading decision, each of which corresponds to a separate screen that the 
subject sees (Figure 1). In the price update part, one of the three stocks is chosen at random and 
the subject is shown a price change for this stock. Note that stock prices only evolve during the 
price update screens; as a result, subjects see the entire price path for each stock. In the trading 
part, one of the three stocks is again chosen at random and the subject is asked whether he wants 
to trade the stock. Note that no new information is revealed during this part.  
We split each trial into two parts so as to temporally separate different computations 
associated with decision-making. At the price update screen, subjects are provided with 
information about a change in the price of one of the three stocks, but do not have to compute the 
value of buying or selling the stock, both because they are not allowed to make decisions at this 
stage, and also because they do not know which of the three assets will be selected for trading in 
the next screen. At the trading screen the opposite situation holds: subjects need to compute the 
value of buying or selling a stock, but do not need to update their beliefs about the price process 
since no new information about prices is provided.  
Trials 1 through 9 consist only of a price update stage; i.e., subjects are not given the 
opportunity to buy or sell during these trials. We designed the experiment in this way so that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  We split our experiment into two sessions in order to avoid running the fMRI machine for too long 
without a break, as this could lead to potential medical risks for the subjects.	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subjects can accumulate some information about the three stocks before having to make any 
trading decisions. 
 Each subject is allowed to hold a maximum of one share and a minimum of zero shares 
of each stock at any point in time. In particular, short-selling is not allowed. The trading decision 
is therefore reduced to deciding whether to sell a stock (conditional on holding it), or deciding 
whether to buy it (conditional on not holding it). The price at which a subject can buy or sell a 
stock is given by the current market price of the stock. 
 The price path of each stock is governed by a two-state Markov chain with a good state 
and a bad state. The Markov chain for each stock is independent of the Markov chains for the 
other two stocks. Suppose that, in trial t, there is a price update for stock i. If stock i is in the good 
state at that time, its price increases with probability 0.55 and decreases with probability 0.45. 
Conversely, if it is in the bad state at that time, its price increases with probability 0.45 and 
decreases with probability 0.55. The magnitude of the price change is drawn uniformly from {$5, 
$10, $15}, independently of the direction of the price change. 
 The state of each stock changes over time in the following way. Before trial 1, we 
randomly assign a state to each stock. If the price update in trial t >1 is not about stock i, then the 
state of stock i in trial t remains the same as its state in the previous trial, t-1. If the price update in 
trial t >1 is about stock i, then the state of stock i in this trial remains the same as in trial t-1 with 
probability 0.8, but switches with probability 0.2. In mathematical terms, if is 
the state of stock i in trial t, then  if the time t price update is not about stock i, whereas 
if the time t price update is about stock i, the state switches as follows: 
 
si,t ! {good, bad}
si,t = si,t!1
! si,t+1=good! si,t+1=bad!
si,t=good! "#$! "#%!
si,t=bad! "#%! "#$!!
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The states of the stocks are never revealed to the subjects: they have to infer them from the 
observed price paths. To ease comparison of trading performance across subjects, the same set of 
realized prices is used for all subjects. 
A key aspect of our design is that, conditional on the information available to subjects, 
each of the stocks exhibits positive short-term autocorrelation in its price changes. If a stock 
performed well on the last price update, it was probably in a good state for that price update. 
Since it is highly likely (probability 0.8) to remain in the same state for its next price update, its 
next price change is likely to also be positive. 
 At the end of each session, we liquidate subjects’ holdings of the three stocks and record 
the cash value of their position. We give subjects a financial incentive to maximize the final value 
of their portfolio at the end of each session. Specifically, if the total value of a subject’s cash and 
risky asset holdings at the end of session 1 is $X, in experimental currency, and the total value of 
his cash and risky asset holdings at the end of session 2 is $Y, again in experimental currency, 
then his take-home pay in actual dollars is 15 + (X+Y)/24.11 Subjects’ earnings ranged from 
$43.05 to $57.33 with a mean of $52.57 and a standard deviation of $3.35. 
 In order to avoid liquidity constraints, we allow subjects to carry a negative cash balance 
in order to purchase a stock if they do not have sufficient cash to do so at the time of a decision. If 
a subject ends the experiment with a negative cash balance, this amount is subtracted from the 
terminal value of his portfolio. The large cash endowment, together with the constraint that 
subjects can hold at most one unit of each stock at any moment, was sufficient to guarantee that 
no one ended the experiment with a negative portfolio value, or was unable to buy a stock 
because of a shortage of cash during the experiment. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 In other words, we average X and Y to get (X+Y)/2, convert the experimental currency to actual dollars 
using a 12:1 exchange rate, and add a $15 show-up fee. 
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N=28 Caltech subjects participated in the experiment (22 male, age range 18 – 60).12 All 
subjects were right-handed and had no history of psychiatric illness, and none were taking 
medications that interfere with fMRI. The exact instructions given to subjects at the beginning of 
the experiment are included in the Appendix. The instructions carefully describe the stochastic 
structure of the price process, as well as all other details of the experiment. Before entering the 
scanner, the subjects underwent a practice session of 25 trials to ensure familiarity with the 
market software. 
Finally, note that, in our experiment, there is a straightforward way to measure the extent 
to which a subject exhibits a disposition effect in his trading. We simply adapt Odean’s (1998) 
methodology, described in Section I, in the following way. Every time a subject faces a decision 
about selling a stock, we classify his eventual action as a paper gain (loss) if the stock’s current 
price is above (below) the purchase price and he chooses not to sell; and as a realized gain (loss) 
if the stock’s current price is above (below) the purchase price and he chooses to sell. We then 
count up the number of paper gains, paper losses, realized gains, and realized losses over all 
selling decisions faced by the subject and compute the PGR and PLR measures described earlier. 
We assign the subject a disposition effect measure of PGR-PLR. When this measure is positive 
(negative), the subject exhibits (the opposite of) a disposition effect. 
 
B. Optimal trading strategy 
 We now characterize the optimal trading strategy for a risk-neutral Bayesian investor 
who is maximizing the expected value of his take-home earnings – from now on, we refer to such 
an investor as an “expected value” investor.  The optimal strategy of such an investor is to sell (or 
not buy) a stock when he believes that it is more likely to be in the bad state than in the good 
state; and to buy (or hold) the stock when he believes that it is more likely to be in the good state.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 One additional subject participated in the experiment but was excluded from further analyses because his 
head motion during the scanning exceeded a pre-specified threshold, thereby interfering with the reliability 
of the neural measurements.	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Formally, let  be the price of stock i in trial t, after any price update about the stock, and let 
 be the probability that a Bayesian investor, after seeing the 
price update in trial t, would assign to stock i being in the good state in trial t. Also, let zt take the 
value 1 if the price update in trial t indicates a price increase for the stock in question; and -1 if 
the price update indicates a price decrease. Then  if the price update in trial t was not 
about stock i; but if the price update in trial t was about stock i, then: 
(1) 
 
 
 
The optimal strategy for an expected value investor is to sell (if holding) or not buy (if not 
holding) stock i in trial t when ; and to hold or buy it otherwise. 
 Note that a trader who follows the optimal strategy described above will exhibit the 
opposite of the disposition effect. If a stock performed well on the last price update, it was 
probably in a good state for that price update. Since it is very likely to remain in the same state 
for its next price update, its next price change is likely to also be positive. The optimal strategy 
therefore involves selling winner stocks relatively rarely, and losing stocks more often, thereby 
generating the reverse of the disposition effect. 
 Of course, it is difficult for subjects to do the exact calculation in equation (1) in real time 
during the experiment. However, it is relatively straightforward for subjects to approximate the 
optimal strategy: they need simply keep track of each stock’s most recent price changes, and then 
hold on to stocks that have recently performed well while selling stocks that have recently 
performed poorly. The fact that a stock’s purchase price is reported on the trading screen makes it 
particularly easy to follow an approximate strategy of this kind: subjects can simply use the 
pi,t
qi,t = Pr(si,t = good | pi,t, pi,t!1,..., pi,1)
qi,t = qi,t!1
qi,t < 0.5
qi,t (qi,t!1, zt ) =
Pr(zt | si,t = good)*Pr(si,t = good | qi,t!1)
qi,t!1 Pr(zt | si,t!1 = good)+ (1! qi,t!1)Pr(zt | si,t!1 = bad)
=
(0.5+ 0.05zt )*[0.8*qi,t!1 + 0.2*(1! qi,t!1)]
qi,t!1[0.8*(0.5+ 0.05zt )+ 0.2*(0.5! 0.05zt )]+ (1! qi,t!1)[0.2*(0.5+ 0.05zt )+ 0.8*(0.5! 0.05zt )]
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difference between the current market price and the purchase price as a proxy for the stock’s 
recent performance.13 
  
C. Behavioral and neural predictions of the realization utility model 
 We now lay out the behavioral and neural predictions of the realization utility model, and 
contrast them with the predictions made by the expected value agent model. 
 Consider the behavioral predictions first. Since the experimental stock prices exhibit 
short-term momentum, an expected value investor will exhibit the opposite of the disposition 
effect: for the actual price process that our subjects see, the value of the PGR-PLR measure of the 
disposition effect under the optimal trading strategy for an expected value investor is -0.76. In 
other words, such an investor will have a much greater propensity to realize losses than to realize 
gains. By contrast, a trader who experiences bursts of realization utility and who discounts future 
utility at a high rate will sell winner stocks more often than the expected value trader and loser 
stocks less often. After all, he is keen to realize capital gains as soon as possible and to postpone 
realizing capital losses as long as possible. This leads to our first prediction. 
 
Prediction 1 (Behavioral): For an expected value investor, the value of the PGR-PLR measure is 
given by -0.76. On the other hand, for a subject who experiences bursts of realization utility, the 
value of PGR-PLR is greater than -0.76. 
 
 We now turn to the neural predictions made by the two models. As noted earlier, a 
maintained assumption here is that the theories are not only making predictions about behavior, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Our rational benchmark assumes risk-neutrality because the monetary risk in our experiment is small. We 
have also considered the case of risk aversion, however, and have concluded that its predictions do not 
differ significantly from those of risk neutrality. In some frameworks, risk aversion can generate a 
disposition effect through rebalancing motives. This is not the case in our experiment, however, because 
the volatility of stock price changes is independent of the level of the stock price. Furthermore, any 
rebalancing motives would be of second-order importance relative to time variation in the mean stock 
return. 
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but are also describing the key computations that subjects have to undertake in order to make 
decisions.  
 The first two neural predictions build on a basic finding from the field of decision 
neuroscience. A sizable number of studies have found evidence consistent with the idea that in 
simple choice situations the brain makes decisions by assigning values (often called “decision 
values”) to the options under consideration, and then comparing them to make a choice14.  These 
value signals are thought to reflect the relative value of taking the action or option under 
consideration (e.g., sell a stock) versus staying with the status quo (e.g., don’t sell it) (De Martino 
et al. (2006); Hutcherson et al. (2011)). A significant body of work, using various neural 
measurement techniques, has shown that activity in regions of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC), and often also the ventral striatum (vSt), correlates with the decision values of options 
across a range of choices. For example, a recent study shows that, when subjects have to make 
purchasing decisions for goods such as monetary lotteries, foods, or DVDs, activity in the vmPFC 
correlates with behavioral measures of their willingness to pay (their “decision value”) taken 
prior to the choice task (Chib et al. (2009)). See Rangel and Hare (2010) for an up-to-date review 
of the evidence. 
 Now consider the decision value signals that would be computed at the time of making a 
selling decision by an individual who makes choices according to the expected value model. In 
the context of our experiment, the decision value of selling a stock is given by the value of selling 
the stock minus the value of holding it. For the expected value investor, the value of selling the 
stock is zero: if he sells it, he will no longer own any shares of it, and so it can no longer generate 
any value for him. In contrast, the value of holding the stock can be approximated by the stock’s 
expected price change on its next price update: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  See, for example, Hsu et al. (2005), Padoa-Schioppa and Assad (2006), Kable and Glimcher (2007), 
Knutson et al. (2007), Tom et al. (2007), Hare et al. (2008), Kennerley et al. (2008), Chib et al. (2009), 
Hare et al. (2009), Hsu et al. (2009), Hare et al. (2010), Levy et al. (2010), Litt et al. (2010), Rangel and 
Hare (2010).	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Et[!pi,t+1 | qi,t,  !pi,t+1 " 0]= 0.6(2qi,t #1).  
        
It follows that the decision value signal at the time of making a selling decision is given by 
0-0.6(2qi,t-1), or 0.6(1-2qi,t); we will refer to this quantity throughout the paper as the net expected 
value of selling, or NEV.  Note that this is only an approximation because the exact value of 
holding a stock is the stock’s expected cumulative price change until the subject decides to sell it. 
However, this approximation has little effect on our later results because the value of holding a 
stock until its next price change is highly correlated with the value of holding the stock until it is 
actually optimal to sell it (the latter quantity can be computed by simulation). 
 Now consider the decision value signal that would be computed at the time of making a 
selling decision by an individual who makes choices according to the realization utility model. In 
particular, consider a simple form of the model in which subjects maximize the sum of expected 
discounted realized capital gains and losses. For such a trader, the value of selling is linearly 
proportional to the capital gain or loss, given by , where c is the purchase price, or cost 
basis. However, the expected impact of holding the stock on realization utility is approximately 
zero, as long as the discount rate is sufficiently high. Thus, for such an investor, the decision 
value of selling should be linearly related to .15   This, together with the fact that decision 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  We say that the value of holding a stock is “approximately” zero for a realization utility investor 
because, in principle, there is some value to holding, namely expected future realization utility flows. 
However, under the realization utility hypothesis, the trader is essentially myopic – he discounts future 
utility flows at a high rate. To a first approximation, then, the value of holding is zero. It may initially seem 
surprising that a subject would discount future utility at a high rate in the context of a 30-minute 
experiment. However, the literature on hyperbolic discounting suggests that discounting can be steep even 
over short intervals, perhaps because people distinguish sharply between rewards available right now, and 
rewards available at all future times. Furthermore, what may be important in our experiment is not so much 
calendar time, as transaction time. A subject who can trade stock B now may view the opportunity to trade 
it in the future as a very distant event -- one that is potentially dozens of screens away – and hence one that 
he discounts heavily. Finally, we note that discounting is not a critical part of our hypothesis. The 
disposition effect also follows from a model that combines realization utility with an S-shaped utility 
function, as in prospect theory. To a first approximation, this model would produce the same decision value 
as the discounting-based model. The reason is that, under an S-shaped utility function, the utility of selling 
a stock at a gain (loss) immediately is significantly higher (lower) than the expected utility of holding on to 
it. 
pi,t ! c
pi,t ! c
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value signals have been found to be reliably encoded in the vmPFC and the vSt, leads to the next 
prediction.  
 
Prediction 2 (Neural): For expected value traders, activity in the regions of the vmPFC and the 
vSt associated with the computation of decision values should be linearly proportional to the 
NEV, 0.6(1-2qi,t), at the time of making selling decisions, and thus independent of the cost basis. 
In contrast, for subjects who experience realization utility proportional to realized capital gains 
and losses, activity in these areas of the vmPFC and the vSt should be linearly related to the 
realizable gain or loss, . 
 
The previous arguments predict that traders who place a large weight on realization utility when 
making decisions should exhibit neural activity in the vmPFC and the vSt that is more strongly 
correlated with the realizable capital gains or losses.  At the same time, subjects with a larger 
weight on realization utility when making decisions should exhibit a stronger disposition effect. It 
follows that the degree to which vmPFC and vSt activity correlates with the realizable capital 
gain should be correlated, across subjects, with the strength of the disposition effect in their 
trading.   
 
Prediction 3 (Neural): The degree to which vmPFC and vSt activity correlates with the realizable 
capital gain should be correlated, across subjects, with the strength of the disposition effect in 
their trading.  
 
The final neural prediction is qualitatively different, in that it seeks to test directly if the 
subject experiences a burst of realization utility at the time of selling a stock that is proportional 
to the realized capital gain. As before, we can test this prediction using fMRI by building on 
pi,t ! c
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previous work in neuroscience which has shown that activity in regions of the vSt and the vmPFC 
correlates reliably with reports of subjective pleasure generated by a wide variety of stimuli – 
including music, paintings, attractive faces, food, and wine.16   It follows that, if realizing a 
capital gain generates a positive burst of experienced utility for the investor, it should increase 
neural activity in these areas precisely at the moment that the decision is made. 
 
Prediction 4 (Neural): Under the realization utility hypothesis, neural activity in areas known to 
encode instantaneous experienced utility, such as the vSt or the vmPFC, should increase at the 
precise moment that individuals decide to realize a capital gain, and decrease at the moment they 
decide to realize a capital loss.  
 
III. fMRI data collection and analysis  
 
In this section, we provide a primer on how fMRI measures of neural activity are 
collected and analyzed. For more details, see Huettel et al. (2004), Ashby (2011), and Poldrack et 
al. (2011). 
 
A. fMRI data collection and measurement 
We collected measures of neural activity over the entire brain using BOLD-fMRI, which 
stands for blood-oxygenated level dependent functional magnetic resonance imaging. BOLD-
fMRI measures changes in local magnetic fields that result from local inflows of oxygenated 
hemoglobin and outflows of de-oxygenated hemoglobin that occur when neurons fire. fMRI 
provides measures of the BOLD response of relatively small “neighborhoods” of brain tissue 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See, for example, Blood and Zatorre (2001), De Araujo et al. (2003), Kringelbach et al. (2003), Rolls et 
al. (2003), Small et al. (2003), McClure et al. (2004), Plassmann et al. (2008) 
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known as voxels, and is thought to measure the sum of the total amount of neural firing into that 
voxel as well as the amount of neuronal firing within the voxel. 17 
One important complication is that the hemoglobin responses measured by BOLD-fMRI 
are slower than the associated neuronal responses. Specifically, although the bulk of the neuronal 
response takes place quickly, subsequent BOLD measurements are affected for up to 24 seconds.  
Figure 2A provides a more detailed illustration of the nature of the BOLD response. In particular, 
it shows the path of the BOLD signal in response to 1 arbitrary unit of neural activity of 
infinitesimal duration at time zero. The function plotted here is called the canonical hemodynamic 
response function (HRF). It is denoted by h(τ), where τ is the amount of elapsed time since the 
neural activity impulse, and has been shown to approximate well the pattern of BOLD responses 
for most subjects, brain areas, and tasks. 
Fortunately, the BOLD response has been shown to combine linearly across multiple 
sources of neural activity (Boynton et al. (1996)).  This property, along with a specific functional 
form of the HRF, allows us to construct a mapping from neural activity to BOLD response so that 
we can control for BOLD responses that are generated by neural activity over the previous 24 
seconds.  In particular, if the level of neural activity at any particular time is given by a(t), then 
the level of BOLD activity at any instant t is well approximated by  
 
   ! ! = ℎ ! ! ! − ! !"!! , 
 
which is the convolution between the HRF and the neural inputs. The integral can be interpreted 
in a straightforward way:  it is simply a lagged sum of all the BOLD responses triggered by 
previous neural activity. This is illustrated in Fig. 2B, which depicts a hypothetical path of neural 
activity, together with the associated BOLD response. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Note that the neural activity measured by fMRI in a 1-mm3 cube (about the size of a grain of salt) 
represents the joint activity of between 5,000 to 40,000 neurons, depending on the area of the brain. 
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 We acquire two types of MRI data during the experiment in a 3.0 Siemens Tesla Trio 
MRI scanner with an eight-channel phased array coil. First, we acquire BOLD-fMRI data while 
the subjects perform the experimental task with a voxel size of 3 mm3.  We acquire data for the 
entire brain (~ 100,000 voxels) every 2.75 seconds.18 We also acquire high-resolution anatomical 
scans that we use mainly for realigning the brains across subjects and for localizing the brain 
activity identified by our analyses.19 
 
B. fMRI data pre-processing 
 
Before the BOLD data can be analyzed to test our hypotheses, it has to be converted into 
a usable format. This requires the following steps, which are fairly standard – see Huettel et al. 
(2004), Ashby (2011), & Poldrack et al. (2011)  – and were implemented using a specialized but 
commonly used software package called SPM5 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, 
Institute of Neurology, London, UK). 
First, images are corrected for slice acquisition time within each voxel. This is necessary 
because the scanner does not collect data on all brain voxels simultaneously. This simple step, 
which involves a non-linear interpolation, temporally realigns the data across all voxels.  
Second, we correct for head motion to ensure that the time series of BOLD measurements 
recorded at a specific spatial location within the scanner was always associated with the same 
brain location throughout the experiment.20   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 More precisely, we acquired gradient echo T2*-weighted echoplanar (EPI) images with BOLD contrast. 
To optimize functional sensitivity in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), a key region of interest, we acquired 
the images in an oblique orientation of 30° to the anterior commissure–posterior commissure line 
(Deichmann et al. (2003)).  Each volume of images had 45 axial slices.  A total of 692 volumes were 
collected over two sessions. The imaging parameters were as follows: echo time, 30 ms; field of view, 192 
mm; in-plane resolution and slice thickness, 3mm; repetition time, 2.75 s. 
19 More precisely, we acquired high-resolution T1-weighted structural scans (1 x 1 x 1 mm) for each 
subject, which were coregistered with their mean EPI images and averaged across subjects to permit 
anatomical localization of the functional activations at the group level. 
 
20 BOLD measurements were corrected for head motion by aligning them to the first full brain scan  and 
normalizing to the Montreal Neurological Institute’s EPI template.  This entails estimating a six-parameter 
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 Third, we realign the BOLD responses for each individual into a common 
neuroanatomical frame (the standard Montreal Neurological Institute EPI template). This step, 
called spatial normalization, is necessary because brains come in different shapes and sizes and, 
as a result, a given spatial location maps to different brain regions in different subjects. Spatial 
normalization involves a non-linear re-shaping of the brain to maximize the match with a target 
template.  Although the transformed data are not perfectly aligned across subjects due to 
remaining neuroanatomical heterogeneity, the process suffices for the purposes of this study. 
Furthermore, any imperfections in the re-alignment process introduce noise that reduces our 
ability to detect neural activity of interest. 
 Fourth, we also spatially smooth the BOLD data for each subject by making BOLD 
responses for each voxel a weighted sum of the responses in neighboring voxels, with the weights 
decreasing with distance.21 This step is necessary to make sure that the error structure of the data 
conforms to the normality assumptions about the error structure of the regression models, 
described below, that we use to test our hypotheses. 
 Finally, we remove low-frequency signals that are unlikely to be associated with neuronal 
responses to individual trials.22   
	  
	  
C. fMRI main data analyses 
 
The key goal of our exercise is to identify regions of the brain, given by collections of 
spatially contiguous voxels, called clusters, where the BOLD response reflects neural activity that 
implements the computations of interest (e.g., realization utility computations). This is 
complicated by the fact that, since every voxel contains thousands of neurons, the BOLD 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
model of the head motion (3 parameters for center movement, and 3 parameters for rotation) for each 
volume, and then removing the motion using these parameters.  For details, see Friston et al. (1996).	  
21 Smoothing was performed using an 8 mm full-width half-maximum Gaussian kernel. 
22 Specifically, we applied a high-pass temporal filter to the BOLD data with a cut-off of 128 seconds.	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responses can be driven by multiple signals. Fortunately, the linear properties of the BOLD signal 
allow for the identification of the neural signals of interest using standard linear regression 
methods. 
 The general procedure is straightforward, and will be familiar to most economists. The 
analysis begins by specifying two types of variables that might affect the BOLD response: target 
computations and additional controls. The target computations reflect the signals that we are 
looking for (e.g., a realization utility signal at the time of selling a stock). They are specified by a 
time series si(t) describing each signal of interest. For each of these signals, let Si(t) denote the 
time series that results from convolving the signal si(t) with the HRF, as described above. The 
additional controls, denoted by cj(t), are other variables that might affect the BOLD time series 
(e.g., residual head movement or time trends). These are introduced to further clean up the noise 
inherent in the BOLD signal, but are not explicitly used in any of our tests. The control variables 
are not convolved with the HRF because they reflect parameters that affect the measured BOLD 
responses, and not neural activity that triggers a hemodynamic response.23 
 The linearity of the BOLD signal implies that the level of BOLD activity in any voxel v 
should be given by !! ! = constant + !!!!!(!)! + !!!!! ! + !(!)! , 
 
where !(!) denotes AR(1) noise. This model is estimated independently in each of the brain’s 
voxels using standard regression methods.  
 Our hypotheses can then be restated as tests about the coefficients of this regression 
model: signal i is said to be associated with activity in voxel v only if !!! is significantly different 
from zero. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 For example, linear trends are often included because the scanner heats up with continuous operation and 
this induces a linear change in the measured BOLD responses. 
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 Two additional considerations apply to most fMRI studies, including the present one.  
First, we are interested in testing hypotheses about the distribution of the signal coefficients in the 
population, and not about individual coefficients. This requires estimating a random effects 
version of the linear model specified above which, given the size of a typical fMRI dataset, is 
computationally intensive. Fortunately, it has been shown that there is a straightforward shortcut 
that provides a good approximation to the full mixed effects analysis (Penny et al. (2006)).  It 
involves estimating the parameters separately for each individual subject, averaging them across 
subjects, and then performing t-tests. This is the approach we follow here. 
 Second, given that these tests are carried out in each of the ~100,000 voxels in the brain, 
there is a serious concern about false-positives, and multiple comparison corrections are 
necessary. Several approaches have been proposed in the fMRI literature to address this problem, 
many of which rely on the idea that purely random activations are unlikely to come in sizable 
clusters.24 Here, we follow a common approach in the literature, which consists of combining a 
sizable statistical threshold for the test in each voxel, given by p<0.001 uncorrected, together with 
a minimal cluster size of 15 voxels.  These two criteria, taken together, severely reduce the 
likelihood of false positives. 
 The analyses described so far involve searching for neural correlates of signals of interest 
across the entire brain and are therefore known as whole brain analyses. Another popular and 
very useful type of exercise, which we use here, is a “region of interest” (ROI) analysis.   Put 
simply, this analysis differs from a whole-brain analysis because it first restricts the set of voxels 
that is being analyzed. The most common types of ROI analyses involve 1) the measurement of 
signal strength in a pre-specified ROI (in other words, in a pre-specified subset of voxels), 2) 
computing the correlation across subjects between measures of signal strength in a particular ROI 
and behavioral or psychological measures, and 3) characterizing the time course of BOLD 
responses in an ROI for a particular event (e.g, selling a stock.)  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 As noted earlier, a cluster is a set of spatially contiguous voxels. 
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 The measurement of signal strength in pre-specified ROIs is a straightforward extension 
of the whole brain analysis. In this case, a general linear model is estimated only for the voxels in 
the ROI, and then a response estimate for the signal of interest is computed for every subject by 
averaging over the estimated coefficients over all of the voxels in the ROI. The distribution of 
average estimates for the group can then be compared across signals of interest using t-tests.  
 The characterization of the time course of BOLD responses in specific ROIs and around 
particular events is a little more complicated, but is needed in order to conduct a test of Prediction 
4. It requires the specification of a version of the GLM described above that uses a series of 
“event-locked” dummy variables. The nature of this model is most easily explained with a 
concrete example. Suppose that we are interested in characterizing the time course of changes in 
BOLD activity that follows the rapid presentation of two types of images to subjects, type A and 
B. We then define a series of dummy variables 
 
! !|!, ! = 1 if  stimulus  x  was  presented  at  ! − !0 otherwise  
 
for x=A,B, n=1,…., T. The general model is then specified as 
 !! ! = constant + !!,!!(!|!, !)!,! + ! ! . 
 
The estimate of the change in the BOLD response n seconds after the presentation of stimulus x is 
then given by !!,!. 
 
IV. Results 
 
A. Behavioral predictions 
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 We begin our test of Prediction 1 by computing the strength of the disposition effect for 
each subject using the PGR-PLR measure described at the end of Section IIA. We find that the 
average PGR and PLR across subjects are .412 and .187, respectively. This implies an average 
PGR-PLR value of 0.225, which is significantly greater than 0 (p<0.001). In other words, not 
only is the average value of PGR-PLR significantly greater than the expected value benchmark of 
-0.76, but it is actually significantly positive. These results reject the hypothesis that our subjects 
are all expected value investors and are consistent with the idea that some of our subjects are 
affected by realization utility. 
 Figure 3 tests the prediction at the individual level. Each bar shows the value of PGR-
PLR for a particular subject. The horizontal dashed line near the bottom of the figure marks the -
0.76 value of PGR-PLR that an expected value investor would exhibit. The figure shows that 
every subject exhibits a disposition effect greater than -0.76. The hypothesis that the average 
disposition effect is not different from -0.76 is rejected with a t-statistic of 16.52. 
The figure also shows that there is significant heterogeneity in the strength of the 
disposition effect across subjects: the value of PGR-PLR ranges from -0.41 to 0.83 and has a 
standard deviation of 0.32. This cross-individual variation is consistent with Dhar and Zhu (2006) 
who, using data on actual trading decisions, also find significant variation in the strength of the 
disposition effect across investors. Interestingly, we find that, while each of PGR and PLR varies 
a good deal across subjects, the two variables have a correlation of only 0.03: subjects who are 
slow to sell losing stocks are not necessarily also quick to sell winning stocks25. This 
independence between selling behavior in the gain domain and in the loss domain is also 
consistent with the empirical findings of Dhar and Zhu (2006). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  The low correlation between PGR and PLR is not inconsistent with realization utility; it simply suggests 
that realization utility is not the only factor driving subjects' trading. For example, if our subjects care to 
varying extents about realization utility but also differ in how much they enjoy trading in general, they may 
exhibit a near-zero correlation between PGR and PLR: the negative correlation between the two variables 
induced by realization utility will be offset by the positive correlation induced by the taste for trading. 
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 Figure 4 provides additional insight into subjects’ selling behavior by showing, for each 
of the four types of decisions that a subject could make – decisions to realize a gain, decisions to 
realize a loss, decisions not to realize a gain, and decisions not to realize a loss -- the fraction of 
the decisions that are optimal, where “optimal” is defined by the expected value benchmark. For 
example, the figure shows that there were a total of 495 occasions in which our subjects realized 
gains, and that most of these decisions were suboptimal. Given that stocks exhibit short-term 
price momentum in the experiment, it is generally better to hold on to a stock that has been 
performing well. This explains why most (77.9%) of subjects’ decisions to hold on to winning 
stocks were optimal, and why most (67.5%) of subjects’ decisions to sell winning stocks were 
suboptimal. Similarly, in the experiment, it is generally better to sell a stock that has been 
performing poorly. This explains why most (79.2%) of subjects’ decisions to sell losing stocks 
were optimal, while most (80.3%) of their decisions to hold these stocks were suboptimal. 
The disposition effect exhibited by our subjects is stronger than that found in empirical 
studies (Odean (1998); Frazzini (2006)). One possible reason for this is that the current price and 
the cost basis of a stock are both prominently displayed on the trading screen.26 If, because of 
realization utility, a subject has a preference for realizing gains and for not realizing losses, the 
fact that we report the purchase price might make it particularly easy for him to cater to this 
preference, and hence to exhibit a disposition effect.27  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  One natural question about our experiment is how much of the realization utility effect that we have 
found depends on the fact that we display the original purchase price on the trading screen in a highly 
salient way. It is important to emphasize that it is unlikely that the presence of a realization utility effect 
depends critically on this aspect of the design.  In follow-up work we have carried out behavioral 
experiments to investigate the impact of the saliency with which the stock purchase price information is 
displayed (Frydman and Rangel (2011)). We find that eliminating the purchase price from the trading 
screen diminishes the size of the disposition effect, but that it is still well above the optimal level that an 
expected value investor would exhibit. This suggests that reporting the purchase price on the trading screen 
is not a critical aspect of our current design.  Moreover, given that most investors in naturally occurring 
financial markets have at least a rough sense of the price at which they purchased a stock, displaying the 
cost basis on the trading screen is likely a better approximation of reality.   	  27	  At the same time, because our experimental design induces a negative correlation between the capital 
gain and the NEV of selling (r= - 0.55), the fact that we report the purchase price also makes it easy for an 
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In summary, the behavioral results indicate that all of our subjects exhibit a strong 
disposition effect, which is inconsistent with the expected value model, but is consistent with the 
realization utility model.  
 
B. Neural Prediction 2 
We now turn to Prediction 2, which states that, for individuals who experience realization 
utility at the time of selling assets, activity in areas of the brain associated with the computation 
of decision values, such as the vmPFC and the vSt, should be correlated with the capital gain 
variable (pt - ct). By contrast, it states that, for expected value subjects, activity in these areas 
should correlate with the NEV variable, but not with the capital gain.  
 We test this hypothesis in two stages. First, we estimate the following general linear 
model (GLM) of BOLD activity for each individual:  
 !! ! = constant +   !!!!!"# ! !! − !! + !!!!!"# ! !"#! + !!!controls + ε(t). 
 
Here, bv (t) denotes BOLD signal at time t in voxel v. Idec,t is an indicator function that equals one 
at the time when the subject is presented with the opportunity to sell a stock at time t. NEVt 
denotes the net expected value from selling the stock being considered at time t, namely 0.6(1-
2qi,t), and (pt - ct) is the realizable capital gain.  Finally, the controls vector includes regressors 
that control for physical movement inside the scanner, session-specific effects, and any changes 
in neural activity that might be due to information processing during the price update screens, 
which is not an activation of interest for the hypothesis being tested. As described in Section III, 
the regressors involving computations of interest (here, the non-constant regressors NEV and p-c) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
expected value subject to trade in a way that is close to his optimal strategy, namely to hold a stock when it 
has a capital gain and to sell it when it has a capital loss. If a subject is an expected value investor, then, we 
do not think that presenting the purchase price on the trading screen should bias him towards exhibiting a 
disposition effect. 	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are convolved with the HRF28. Finally, inferences about the extent to which the signals of interest 
are encoded in a given voxel are made by carrying out a one-sided t-test of the individually 
estimated coefficients (i.e., !!!   and !!!) against zero.  
 Although we can carry out these tests in all of the brain’s voxels, here we limit our search 
to voxels that belong to pre-specified anatomical areas of the vmPFC and the vSt. These areas 
were identified using the AAL digital atlas of the human brain (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al. (2002)). 
Note that these restrictions make our significance threshold of p<.001 uncorrected, together with 
a minimum cluster size of 15 voxels, even less likely to generate false positives than in the 
standard whole brain analyses to which it is typically applied. 
 The results from these tests are consistent with the implications of realization utility 
noted in Prediction 2: we find a cluster of 67 voxels in the vmPFC where !!! > 0.  However, no 
voxels within the vSt exhibit a correlation with the capital gain at our statistical threshold.   The 
location of the vmPFC voxels is depicted in Figure 5. In contrast, there are no clusters that 
significantly relate to the NEV variable at our statistical threshold. In short, the neural data is 
consistent with subjects computing the decision value predicted by realization utility, rather than 
the decision value predicted by the expected value agent model. 
 Because of the high correlation between the NEV variable and the capital gain variable 
(r= -0.55), we run a robustness check to make sure that the above results are not driven by 
spurious collinearity issues. This is done by introducing a single change to the GLM: the capital 
gain variable is orthogonalized (prior to convolution) to the NEV variable, using a standard 
Gram-Schmidt algorithm (Strang (1988)).  Note that this provides an even more stringent test of 
the realization utility hypothesis because any shared variance between the two variables is now 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  The amount of the price change during the price update screen, which represents our control for 
information processing, is convolved with the HRF because this will generate a BOLD response.  Controls 
for physical movement inside the scanner and session-specific effects are not convolved because they do 
not elicit a BOLD response. 	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allocated to the NEV. As before, we find a cluster of 67 voxels in vmPFC that satisfies the 
significance criterion described above.  
We also carry out an ROI analysis designed to test the properties of the vmPFC 
realization utility signals further. The relevant ROI (i.e., the relevant subset of voxels within the 
vmPFC) is defined by estimating the simpler GLM, !! ! = constant +   !!!!!"# ! !! − !! + !!!controls + ε(t), 
and identifying clusters in the vmPFC that are significantly responsive to the capital gain 
regressor. For the rest of the paper we refer to the resulting ROI, which contains 154 voxels, as 
the vmPFCROI. Note that we define this ROI using this additional regression to side-step the 
estimation noise introduced by the high correlation between the capital gain and the NEV 
regressors. 
 We then carry out the ROI analysis by estimating the following GLM for each voxel in 
the newly defined ROI: 
 !! ! = constant +   !!!!!"#(!)!! + !!!!!"# ! !! + !!!controls + ε(t). 
 
This model is interesting because it allows us to compare the strength of the average beta value in 
the ROI separately for the price and cost basis components of the capital gain. Within vmPFCROI, 
β1=0.025 (p<0.001) and β2=-0.023 (p<0.01) and the absolute values of the two coefficients are not 
significantly different (p=0.79). These results demonstrate that the correlation with capital gains 
that we found above is affected by both the price and cost basis components of the capital gain.  
 Finally, we carry out a similar ROI analysis to test if the strength of the capital gain 
signal in vmPFCROI is of similar magnitude in capital gain and capital loss trials. The associated 
GLM is: 
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!! ! =constant +   !!!!!"# !   !!"#.!"#$  (!! − !!) + !!!!!"# !   !!"#.!"##  (!! − !!) + !!!controls + ε(t), 
 
where Icap.gain and Icap.loss are indicator variables for trials involving capital gains and capital losses, 
respectively.  The average values of !!   and  !!  are not significantly different (p=0.69). 
 
C. Neural Prediction 3 
 We now test Prediction 3. Specifically, we check whether, as predicted by the realization 
utility hypothesis, subjects whose neural activity in the vmPFC at the time of a sell decision is 
particularly sensitive to the realizable capital gain exhibit a stronger disposition effect. 
 For every subject, we compute the maximum beta value within the vmPFCROI for the 
capital gain and capital loss regressors29. Consistent with Prediction 3, we find that the correlation 
between !! and PGR is 0.78 (p<0.001), indicating that subjects who exhibit stronger vmPFC 
activation in response to a capital gain do have a greater propensity to realize gains.  Figure 6, 
which is a scatterplot of PGR against !! , illustrates this graphically.  
 In contrast, we do not find a significant correlation between β2 and PLR (p=0.18).  One 
potential post-hoc explanation is that there may be different physiological systems involved in 
making decisions that involve capital gains and capital losses.  Consistent with this hypothesis, 
the cross-subject correlation between the vmPFC (maximum) sensitivities to capital gains and 
losses, β1 and β2, is only -0.01.   
 
D. Neural Prediction 4 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 We use a maximum statistic instead of the average statistic because vmPFCROI is relatively large (154 
voxels) and because of the heterogeneity in anatomical and functional structure of vmPFC across subjects.  
Since we are using this beta value to test for a correlation (instead of testing for a particular value of the 
mean), using the max statistic will not bias our results. 
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 We now test Prediction 4, which constitutes the most direct test of the realization utility 
hypothesis, and the one that, in our view, showcases the value of the neural data most clearly. The 
realization utility hypothesis posits that people experience a positive (negative) hedonic impact 
when they sell a stock at a gain (loss). Since earlier research in neuroscience suggests that activity 
in the areas of the vSt and the vmPFC correlate with such measures of experienced utility, or 
hedonics, we can test the hypothesis by looking at changes in the activity in these two areas at the 
moment that a subject decides to sell a stock, and compare it to changes in the activity in these 
areas at the moment that a subject issues a command to hold a stock.   
 More concretely, we test the hypothesis by carrying out the following ROI analysis in 
specific sub-areas of the vSt and vmPFC that have been shown, in previous studies, to correlate 
with experienced utility.  In particular, we define vmPFCEU-ROI as the set of voxels that are within 
5mm of the voxel whose activity exhibited the highest correlation with experienced utility during 
consumption of wine in Plassman et al. (2008).  Similarly, we define vStEU-ROI as the set of voxels 
that are within 6mm of the two voxels (bilateral) that exhibited the highest correlation with 
stimulus salience in Zink et al. (2003).  Note that the EU subscript in vmPFCEU-ROI emphasizes 
that this is a different ROI from the one described above in the analysis of decision values, as it 
involves a different area of the vmPFC, one that has been previously shown to correlate with 
hedonics. 
 The ROI analysis involves estimating the time course of responses in these two ROIs 
during sell trials involving a capital gain, as a function of whether or not the subject chooses to 
sell. Figure 7A depicts the results of the analysis for the vStEU-ROI. The red line indicates changes 
in the vSt BOLD response for trials in which subjects choose to sell; the blue line shows activity 
in trials in which subjects choose not to sell. Note that t=0 corresponds to the time at which 
subjects indicate their decision by pressing a button on a hand-held button box-- it is not the time 
at which the trading screen becomes visible. Interestingly, the figure shows there is no significant 
difference between the two time series until a decision is made. Afterwards, and consistent with 
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the realization utility hypothesis, activity in the vSt is significantly larger for the next six seconds. 
The average capital gain for stocks that are held is not significantly different from the average 
capital gain for stocks that are sold ($15.77 vs. $18.35). The effect in Figure 7A is therefore not 
due to the fact that the stocks subjects sell have larger capital gains than the stocks they hold 
(p=0.09). 
 Contrary to our expectations, we did not find a similar result in the vmPFCEU-ROI  (Figure 
7B).  One possible explanation is that there might be more heterogeneity across subjects in the 
anatomical and functional structure of the vmPFC, than in the organization of the vSt, which 
would perhaps mean that the region identified as vmPFCEU-ROI  does not really reflect the areas 
where experienced utility is computed in our sample. We emphasize, however, that this is pure 
speculation. 
 
 
E. Tests of the mean-reversion theory of the disposition effect 
As discussed in Section I, one prominent alternative behavioral theory of the disposition 
effect is that investors believe that stock prices mean-revert (Odean (1998); Weber and Camerer 
(1998); Kaustia (2010)). In our setting, such a belief would be irrational: stock prices in our 
experiment exhibit short-term positive autocorrelation.  Nonetheless, if our subjects, for some 
reason, think that the stock prices in our experiment are mean-reverting, this could potentially 
explain why they tend to sell stocks that have recently gone up while holding stocks that have 
recently gone down.   
 To investigate whether a belief in mean-reversion could be driving our subjects’ 
behavior, we estimate the following mixed effects logistic model to test whether recent price 
changes can significantly predict subjects’ decisions to sell or hold a stock:  
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selli,t,s = (! + ai )+"1NEVt,s +"2 (pt,s ! ct,s )+"3"1pt,s +"4"2pt,s +#t       (6) 
 
where selli,t,s =1 if subject i sold stock s at time t and 0 if he held it, ai  denotes a subject-level 
fixed effect, and  denotes the mth most recent price change for stock s (these price changes 
may not have occurred in consecutive trials because price updates in the experiment take place at 
random times).  We find that the capital gain is a significant predictor of the propensity to sell, (t-
stat=10.04), but that none of the other variables are.  In particular, neither β3 nor β4 is 
significantly different from zero (p=.164 and p=0.160, respectively). In other words, contrary to 
the mean-reversion hypothesis, recent price changes do not significantly predict the decision to 
sell.   
 The neural data can also be used to test some aspects of the mean-reversion hypothesis. 
In particular, we test if neural activity in either the vmPFC or the vSt is correlated with recent 
price changes.  This is done by estimating the following GLM: 
 !! ! = constant +    !!"# ! [!!! !! − !! + !!!∆!!!,! + !!!∆!!!,!] + !!!controls + ε(t) 
 
Under the mean reversion hypothesis, the decision value of selling should be positively correlated 
with recent price changes because a recent price increase indicates a lower expected future return, 
leading to a higher decision value of selling. Neural activity in the vmPFC and vSt should 
therefore correlate positively with past price changes. Contrary to this hypothesis, we do not find 
any activity in the vmPFC that is significantly associated with these regressors.  
In summary, then, both the behavioral and the neural analyses cast doubt on the mean-
reversion hypothesis.      
 
 
!mpt.s
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V. Final Remarks 
 In this paper, we show that neural data obtained through fMRI techniques can be useful 
in testing theories of investor behavior. Specifically, we use neural data gathered from subjects 
trading stocks in an experimental market to test a “realization utility” theory of investor trading. 
While this theory can potentially explain the disposition effect as well as several other financial 
phenomena, it relies on an unusual assumption: that people derive utility directly from realizing 
gains. We identify the neural predictions of realization utility and find broad support for them in 
our data. Perhaps most striking of all, we find that, at the moment a subject issues a command to 
sell a stock at a gain, there is a sharp rise in activity in the ventral striatum, an area of the brain 
that, based on recent research in cognitive neuroscience, is known to encode feelings of 
subjective pleasure. 
We emphasize that the methods we present in this paper are hardly a substitute for 
traditional empirical methods in finance.  On the contrary, brain imaging techniques are simply  
complementary tools that can be used to test assumptions about investor behavior that are 
difficult to evaluate using field data or experimental data alone. In particular, we see neural data 
as a valuable resource when studying the more psychological dimensions of individual investor 
behavior, precisely because these may derive from variables that are only observable at the neural 
level.  
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Figure	  1.	  	  Sample	  screens	  from	  a	  typical	  trial	  in	  the	  fMRI	  experiment.	  	  Subjects	  saw	  the	  
price	  update	  screen	  for	  two	  seconds,	  followed	  by	  the	  trading	  screen	  for	  which	  they	  had	  up	  to	  three	  seconds	  to	  enter	  a	  decision	  (a	  blank	  screen	  was	  displayed	  in	  between	  in	  order	  to	  temporally	  separate	  neural	  activity	  associated	  with	  decision-­‐making.)	  The	  screens	  shown	  below	  are	  for	  a	  trial	  in	  which	  the	  subject	  owns	  a	  unit	  of	  both	  stocks	  A	  and	  B.	  	  The	  screens	  were	  displayed	  while	  subjects	  were	  inside	  the	  fMRI	  scanner,	  and	  decisions	  were	  entered	  with	  a	  handheld	  device.	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Figure	  2.	  	  BOLD	  measurements	  of	  neural	  activity.	  	  (A)	  Canonical	  hemodynamic	  response	  function	  that	  approximates	  the	  BOLD	  response	  that	  follows	  one	  arbitrary	  unit	  of	  instantaneous	  neural	  activity	  at	  time	  0.	  (B)	  Example	  of	  a	  path	  of	  neural	  activity	  together	  with	  the	  associated	  BOLD	  response.	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Figure	  3.	  	  Measures	  	  of	  the	  disposition	  effect	  (PGR-­‐PLR)	  for	  each	  subject.	  	  Standard	  error	  bars	  are	  computed	  as	  in	  Odean	  (1998)	  and	  the	  dotted	  line	  indicates	  the	  optimal	  level	  of	  the	  disposition	  effect,	  namely	  -­‐0.76.	  All	  subjects	  exhibit	  a	  disposition	  effect	  greater	  than	  the	  optimal	  level	  and	  a	  majority	  of	  subjects	  have	  a	  disposition	  effect	  that	  is	  significantly	  
positive.	  	  The	  figure	  indicates	  that	  there	  is	  significant	  heterogeneity	  in	  the	  size	  of	  the	  disposition	  effect	  across	  subjects	  (SD:	  0.32).	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Figure	  4.	  	  Total	  number	  of	  sell	  decisions	  by	  decision	  type	  and	  optimality.	  	  Realized	  gains	  and	  losses	  refer	  to	  decisions	  where	  subjects	  sold	  a	  stock	  trading	  at	  a	  gain	  (loss.)	  	  Paper	  gains	  (losses)	  refer	  to	  decisions	  where	  subjects	  decided	  to	  hold	  a	  stock	  trading	  at	  a	  gain	  (loss).	  	  The	  optimality	  measures	  show	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  our	  design:	  selling	  winners	  and	  holding	  losers,	  which	  leads	  to	  a	  disposition	  effect,	  are	  typically	  suboptimal	  decisions.	  	  Decisions	  are	  pooled	  across	  all	  subjects.	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Figure	  5.	  	  vmPFC	  activity	  reflects	  realization	  utility.	  Voxels	  that	  are	  shown	  in	  yellow	  all	  have	  a	  p-­‐value	  less	  than	  0.001,	  and	  only	  clusters	  of	  at	  least	  15	  significant	  voxels	  are	  shown.	  	  Color	  bar	  denotes	  t-­‐statistics.	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Figure	  6.	  Correlation	  between	  brain	  activity	  and	  measures	  of	  the	  disposition	  effect.	  Each	  data	  point	  in	  the	  figure	  represents	  a	  single	  subject.	  	  We	  find	  that	  activity	  in	  the	  vmPFC	  at	  the	  time	  subjects	  are	  offered	  the	  opportunity	  to	  sell	  a	  capital	  gain	  is	  highly	  correlated	  with	  their	  propensity	  to	  realize	  gains.	  	  We	  do	  not	  find	  a	  similar	  correlation	  between	  vmPFC	  activity	  and	  the	  propensity	  to	  realize	  losses.	  	  
A)	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  
B)	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Figure	  7.	  Direct	  tests	  of	  the	  realization	  utility	  hypothesis.	  Average	  activity	  in	  the	  vSt	  (Panel	  A)	  and	  vmPFC	  (Panel	  B)	  during	  trials	  when	  subjects	  were	  offered	  the	  opportunity	  to	  sell	  capital	  gains.	  The	  blue	  time	  series	  plots	  the	  average	  activity	  in	  trials	  where	  subjects	  realized	  capital	  gains,	  while	  the	  red	  time	  series	  plots	  the	  average	  activity	  in	  trials	  where	  subjects	  decided	  to	  hold	  capital	  gains.	  ***	  denotes	  p<0.001,	  **	  denotes	  p<0.01,	  *	  denotes	  p<0.05	  (paired	  t-­‐test).	  	  	  t=0	  corresponds	  to	  the	  instant	  at	  which	  the	  subject	  enters	  his	  trading	  decision	  on	  a	  hand-­‐held	  device.	  	  	  	  
A)	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Chapter 2 
Neural Measures of Regret and Repurchase Behavior 
	  
Economists have learned a great deal about the trading patterns of individual investors 
over the last two decades.  While standard models of trading behavior have had some success in 
explaining the decision making of individual investors, there remains a set of stylized facts that 
are hard to reconcile with a standard rational model of trading.  In this paper, we examine one of 
the most recently documented stylized facts about investor behavior, the repurchase effect, which 
belongs to this set of investor behaviors that are robust, yet difficult to understand using standard 
preferences and beliefs.  
We propose that the repurchase effect, which is the empirical fact that investors tend to 
repurchase stocks that have gone down in value since last sold more often that stocks that have 
gone up in value since last sold, is driven by a negative affective state of regret (Barber et al. 
(2011)).  .  In particular, we present a model of a regret-devaluation mechanism that provides a 
link between the affective state induced by prior stock returns and the subjective valuation that 
the investor applies to subsequent investment opportunities.  The main contribution of this paper 
is to test the regret-devaluation mechanism as the driver of the repurchase effect.  However, it is 
difficult to directly measure regret using a standard empirical data set, and this presents an 
obstacle for constructing empirical tests of any regret theory.  To circumvent this issue, we collect 
neural data that allows us to obtain measurements of regret, so that we can construct several 
empirical tests of our proposed regret-devaluation mechanism.  
We are able to construct sharp empirical tests of this mechanism by relying on two key 
characteristics of our experimental design.  First, we specify a price process in our experimental 
stock market that induces the optimal trading strategy to be the “opposite” of the repurchase 
effect, so that stronger repurchase effects lead to lower final earnings.  Under this design, if 
subjects exhibit a repurchase effect, then we can be confident that behavior is due to some 
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alternative belief or preference specification.  The second key characteristic of our design is that 
we temporally separate the events where subjects see news about stock returns from the events 
where subjects have the ability to trade.  This is critical because it allows us to isolate a potential 
regret signal in the brain, which we use to help predict the trading decision in the subsequent 
screen.   
We find that subjects do exhibit repurchase effects that are higher than an agent who 
trades to maximize expected final wealth.  We also find neural data that is consistent with the 
regret-devaluation mechanism.  In particular, we find that subjects encode a regret signal at the 
time when they see positive stock returns for assets they positively elected not to purchase in the 
past.  Stronger regret signals at this event predict a higher probability of a repurchase “mistake” 
during the next opportunity to buy the stock.  Finally, we are able to explain a portion of the 
cross-subject variation of the repurchase effect using the average neural regret signal for each 
subject.  Taken together, our behavioral and neural results provide strong evidence that the 
repurchase effect is driven by our proposed regret-devaluation mechanism.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides background on investor 
repurchase behavior and the psychology of regret and its impact on subsequent decision-making.  
Section III describes our experimental design and outlines the key behavioral and neural 
predictions of the regret-devaluation mechanism.  We give a brief overview of the methods used 
to collect neural data in Section IV, and we continue with presenting our behavioral and neural 
results in Section V.  We conclude in Section VI and discuss potential directions for future 
research.  
 
I. Background: Repurchase Behavior, Regret, and Inaction Inertia 
A. Repurchase behavior  
 One of the most recent empirical findings in the household finance literature is that 
individual investors exhibit a “repurchase effect:” they have a greater propensity to repurchase 
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stocks that have decreased in price since last sale, relative to stocks that have increased in price 
since last sale (Barber et al. (2011); Weber and Welfens (2011)).  This type of behavior is 
puzzling because stocks that have strong recent performance tend to continue performing well 
over the short term (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)) and individual investors could earn higher 
returns by instead repurchasing stocks that have strong recent performance.  Interestingly, it has 
been found that investors do typically purchase stocks that have strong recent performance, but 
this does not hold for stocks investors currently own (Odean (1998)).  This suggests that past 
ownership of a specific stock may affect subsequent repurchase behavior. 
Because the repurchase effect is not well-explained by a standard rational model of 
informed trading, (Barber et al. (2011)) suggest that regret may play a role in this type of 
behavior, noting however, that their “field data do not enable us to determine definitely the 
psychological mechanisms that drive these trading patterns.”  For example, one potential 
alternative theory that is consistent with this type of repurchase behavior is a belief in mean-
reverting prices: if a stock goes down after an investor sells at a high price, he may want to 
repurchase it because he believes the price will revert back to the high price.  Another theory is 
that the repurchase effect may arise from tax-motivated trading.  In contrast to the field data in 
(Barber et al. (2011)), the combination of neural and trading data that we collect in our 
experiment allow us to test a specific theory of regret and its impact on subsequent behavior that 
can explain the repurchase effect.    
B. Regret and Inaction Inertia 
 Research in psychology has documented an effect called inaction inertia: when 
bypassing an initial action opportunity decreases the likelihood that subsequent similar 
opportunities will be taken (Tykocinski et al. (1995); Tykocinski and Pittman (1998); Arkes et al. 
(2002); Kumar (2004)).  A simple example involving consumer choice is useful in illustrating this 
effect.  Suppose a consumer is faced with the opportunity to buy a pair of shoes on sale at $40 
that are regularly priced at $80.  Now suppose for an exogenous reason that the consumer does 
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not buy the shoes on sale at $40, and the next day is offered the shoes at a smaller discount of 
$50.  The inaction inertia effect occurs when the consumer has a lower propensity to buy the 
shoes at $50 on the 2nd day than he would had he not “missed” the initial, cheaper bargain.  In 
other words, a forgone opportunity has an impact on subsequent behavior30.  
One theory that psychologists have used to explain inaction inertia is based on a regret-
devaluation mechanism (Arkes et al. (2002)).  Using the above example, this theory says that the 
consumer experiences regret when he is confronted the second opportunity to buy the shoes at the 
higher price of $50 because he realizes he has “wasted” a more attractive opportunity in the past.  
This experienced regret then triggers a devaluation of the shoes, and hence results in a lower 
likelihood of purchasing the shoes during the second opportunity to buy.  (Arkes et al. (2002)) 
provide experimental evidence that is consistent with this theory, as they show that both (self-
reported) measures of experienced regret and changes in valuation mediate the link between the 
price change of a good and the likelihood of buying a good.   
We hypothesize that this regret-devaluation mechanism may in part be driving the 
repurchase effect that individual investors exhibit.  To be clear, we now identify the three steps by 
which regret-devaluation could be applied in a financial market setting.  Consider an investor 
who has a valuation v for a stock, and he has the opportunity to buy this stock at price p0 < v on 
day 0, but for an exogenous reason (e.g., liquidity concerns) the investors does not buy the stock.  
Because the investor has passed up this initial buying opportunity, he finds himself in a setting 
where the regret-devaluation mechanism applies as follows: 
1) Experienced regret: Suppose on day 1 the investor sees that the stock price has 
gone up to p1>p0 where p1<v.  The investor will now experience regret in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 The inaction inertia effect may seem similar to the well-known cognitive bias of “anchoring,” 
whereby humans have a tendency to rely too heavily, or “anchor,” on one piece of information 
when making decisions.  In our setting, the piece of information would be the first price offered.  
However, a critical difference between the two effects is that inaction inertia relies on a decision 
of inaction during the first buying opportunity to reduce the probability of buying on the second 
buying opportunity, whereas anchoring relies only on the presentation of the first buying 
opportunity, without any decision being made. 
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proportion to (p1-p0) because he has “missed out” on a profit of (p1-p0)>0 by 
not investing on day 0.  
2) Devaluation:  This experienced regret triggers a change in the investor’s 
valuation of the stock and this change is negatively correlated with (p1-p0).  
Since (p1-p0)>0, the investor’s new valuation of the stock is v*<v. 
3) Inaction: This lower valuation, v*, leads to a lower probability of buying the 
stock on day 1, compared to a scenario in which the investor did not 
experience regret from missing out on a profit.  That is, Pr(buy | value=v*, 
price= p1)< Pr(buy | value=v, price= p1) 
This regret-devaluation theory makes several specific predictions about the neural activity we 
should observe in our experiment.  We will develop these predictions in detail in the main text, 
but we briefly introduce them here.   
 First, an area of the brain called the ventral Striatum (vSt) has been shown to exhibit 
activity that correlates with regret or counterfactual signals (Coricelli et al. (2005); Lohrenz et al. 
(2007); Li and Daw (2011); Nicolle et al. (2011)).   In particular, there is evidence that this brain 
structure computes a signal during a stochastic outcome that is proportional to the difference in 
the outcome that the subject received and the outcome that the subject could have received had he 
acted differently in the past.  In our experiment, the vSt should encode the change in stock price 
when he is presented with this information, and importantly, this signal should be a function of 
the subject’s previous action associated with the stock: if the subject owns the stock, vSt activity 
should positively correlate with the change in price, and if the subject does not own the stock, vSt 
should negatively correlate with the change in price.   
 Our second neural prediction is that the magnitude of regret we measure using vSt 
activity should be proportional to the devaluation the subject applies to the stock.  A greater 
devaluation will lead to a lower probability that the subject buys on the next trading opportunity.  
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Therefore, we should observe, on a trial-by-trial basis, that a stronger regret signal should lead to 
a larger decrease in the probability of buying the stock. 
 Finally, those subjects who exhibit a stronger regret signal for a given price change 
should, on average, decrease their valuation of the stock more than subjects who experience a 
weaker regret signal for the same price change.  Hence, a subject with a stronger average regret 
signal over the course of the experiment should exhibit a lower average probability of 
repurchasing a stock that has recently increased in price, and should therefore exhibit a stronger 
repurchase effect.   
 
   
II. Experimental Design and Predictions 
 
A. Design 
Both the design and the data set used in our analysis were generated in (Frydman et al. 
(2011)).  Subjects are given the opportunity to trade three stocks –- stock A, stock B, and stock C 
-– in an experimental market. The experiment consists of two identical sessions separated by a 
one-minute break. Each session lasts approximately 16 minutes and consists of 108 trials. We use 
t to index the trials within a session.31 
 At the beginning of each session, each subject is given $350 in experimental currency 
and is required to buy one share of each stock so that all subsequent purchase decisions are in fact 
“repurchase” decisions. The initial share price for each stock is $100; after the initial purchase, 
each subject is therefore left with $50. Every trial t > 9 consists of two parts: a price update and a 
trading decision, each of which corresponds to a separate screen that the subject sees (Figure 1). 
In the price update part, one of the three stocks is chosen at random and the subject is shown a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  We split our experiment into two sessions in order to avoid running the fMRI machine for too long 
without a break, as this could lead to potential medical risks for the subjects.	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price change for this stock. Note that stock prices only evolve during the price update screens; as 
a result, subjects see the entire price path for each stock. In the trading part, one of the three 
stocks is again chosen at random and the subject is asked whether he wants to trade the stock. 
Note that no new information is revealed during this part.  
We split each trial into two parts so as to temporally separate different computations 
associated with decision-making. At the price update screen, subjects are provided with 
information about a change in the price of one of the three stocks, but do not have to compute the 
value of buying or selling the stock, both because they are not allowed to make decisions at this 
stage, and also because they do not know which of the three assets will be selected for trading in 
the next screen. At the trading screen the opposite situation holds: subjects need to compute the 
value of buying or selling a stock, but do not need to update their beliefs about the price process 
since no new information about prices is provided.  
Trials 1 through 9 consist only of a price update stage; i.e., subjects are not given the 
opportunity to buy or sell during these trials. We designed the experiment in this way so that 
subjects can accumulate some information about the three stocks before having to make any 
trading decisions. 
 Each subject is allowed to hold a maximum of one share and a minimum of zero shares 
of each stock at any point in time. In particular, short-selling is not allowed. The trading decision 
is therefore reduced to deciding whether to sell a stock (conditional on holding it), or deciding 
whether to buy it (conditional on not holding it). The price at which a subject can buy or sell a 
stock is given by the current market price of the stock. 
 The price path of each stock is governed by a two-state Markov chain with a good state 
and a bad state. The Markov chain for each stock is independent of the Markov chains for the 
other two stocks. Suppose that, in trial t, there is a price update for stock i. If stock i is in the good 
state at that time, its price increases with probability 0.55 and decreases with probability 0.45. 
Conversely, if it is in the bad state at that time, its price increases with probability 0.45 and 
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decreases with probability 0.55. The magnitude of the price change is drawn uniformly from {$5, 
$10, $15}, independently of the direction of the price change. 
 The state of each stock changes over time in the following way. Before trial 1, we 
randomly assign a state to each stock. If the price update in trial t >1 is not about stock i, then the 
state of stock i in trial t remains the same as its state in the previous trial, t-1. If the price update in 
trial t >1 is about stock i, then the state of stock i in this trial remains the same as in trial t-1 with 
probability 0.8, but switches with probability 0.2. In mathematical terms, if is 
the state of stock i in trial t, then  if the time t price update is not about stock i, whereas 
if the time t price update is about stock i, the state switches as follows: 
 
The states of the stocks are never revealed to the subjects: they have to infer them from the 
observed price paths. To ease comparison of trading performance across subjects, the same set of 
realized prices is used for all subjects. 
A key aspect of our design is that, conditional on the information available to subjects, 
each of the stocks exhibits positive short-term autocorrelation in its price changes. If a stock 
performed well on the last price update, it was probably in a good state for that price update. 
Since it is highly likely (probability 0.8) to remain in the same state for its next price update, its 
next price change is likely to also be positive. 
 At the end of each session, we liquidate subjects’ holdings of the three stocks and record 
the cash value of their position. We give subjects a financial incentive to maximize the final value 
of their portfolio at the end of each session. Specifically, if the total value of a subject’s cash and 
risky asset holdings at the end of session 1 is $X, in experimental currency, and the total value of 
his cash and risky asset holdings at the end of session 2 is $Y, again in experimental currency, 
si,t ! {good, bad}
si,t = si,t!1
! si,t+1=good! si,t+1=bad!
si,t=good! "#$! "#%!
si,t=bad! "#%! "#$!!
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then his take-home pay in actual dollars is 15 + (X+Y)/24.32 Subjects’ earnings ranged from 
$43.05 to $57.33 with a mean of $52.57 and a standard deviation of $3.35. 
 In order to avoid liquidity constraints, we allow subjects to carry a negative cash balance 
in order to purchase a stock if they do not have sufficient cash to do so at the time of a decision. If 
a subject ends the experiment with a negative cash balance, this amount is subtracted from the 
terminal value of his portfolio. The large cash endowment, together with the constraint that 
subjects can hold at most one unit of each stock at any moment, was sufficient to guarantee that 
no one ended the experiment with a negative portfolio value, or was unable to buy a stock 
because of a shortage of cash during the experiment. 
N=28 Caltech subjects participated in the experiment (22 male, age range 18 – 60).33 All 
subjects were right-handed and had no history of psychiatric illness, and none were taking 
medications that interfere with fMRI. The exact instructions given to subjects at the beginning of 
the experiment are included in the Appendix. The instructions carefully describe the stochastic 
structure of the price process, as well as all other details of the experiment. Before entering the 
scanner, the subjects underwent a practice session of 25 trials to ensure familiarity with the 
market software. 
 
B. Optimal trading strategy 
 We now characterize the optimal trading strategy for a risk-neutral Bayesian investor 
who is maximizing the expected value of his take-home earnings – from now on, we refer to such 
an investor as an “expected value” investor.  The optimal strategy of such an investor is to sell (or 
not buy) a stock when he believes that it is more likely to be in the bad state than in the good 
state; and to buy (or hold) the stock when he believes that it is more likely to be in the good state.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 In other words, we average X and Y to get (X+Y)/2, convert the experimental currency to actual dollars 
using a 12:1 exchange rate, and add a $15 show-up fee. 
33 One additional subject participated in the experiment but was excluded from further analyses because his 
head motion during the scanning exceeded a prespecified threshold, thereby interfering with the reliability 
of the neural measurements.	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Formally, let  be the price of stock i in trial t, after any price update about the stock, and let 
 be the probability that a Bayesian investor, after seeing the 
price update in trial t, would assign to stock i being in the good state in trial t. Also, let zt take the 
value 1 if the price update in trial t indicates a price increase for the stock in question; and -1 if 
the price update indicates a price decrease. Then  if the price update in trial t was not 
about stock i; but if the price update in trial t was about stock i, then: 
 
 
 
 
The optimal strategy for an expected value investor is to sell (if holding) or not buy (if not 
holding) stock i in trial t when ; and to hold or buy it otherwise.  This is because the 
expected price change on the next price update is given by  
Et[!pi,t+1 | qi,t,  !pi,t+1 " 0]= 0.6(2qi,t #1).  
We refer to this quantity as the net expected value (NEV) of buying.  Hence, a risk neutral subject 
will buy whenever NEV is positive (qi,t >0.5) and he will not buy whenever NEV is negative (qi,t 
<0.5). 
 Note that a trader who follows the optimal strategy described above will exhibit the 
opposite of the repurchase effect. If a stock performed well on the last price update, it was 
probably in a good state for that price update. Since it is very likely to remain in the same state 
for its next price update, its next price change is likely to also be positive. The optimal strategy 
therefore involves buying stocks that have recently increased in price, and not buying stocks that 
have recently decreased in price, hence generating the opposite of a repurchase effect.   
   
  
pi,t
qi,t = Pr(si,t = good | pi,t, pi,t!1,..., pi,1)
qi,t = qi,t!1
qi,t < 0.5
qi,t (qi,t!1, zt ) =
Pr(zt | si,t = good)*Pr(si,t = good | qi,t!1)
qi,t!1 Pr(zt | si,t!1 = good)+ (1! qi,t!1)Pr(zt | si,t!1 = bad)
=
(0.5+ 0.05zt )*[0.8*qi,t!1 + 0.2*(1! qi,t!1)]
qi,t!1[0.8*(0.5+ 0.05zt )+ 0.2*(0.5! 0.05zt )]+ (1! qi,t!1)[0.2*(0.5+ 0.05zt )+ 0.8*(0.5! 0.05zt )]
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C. Behavioral and neural predictions of regret-devaluation 
 We now lay out the predictions of the model whereby trading decisions are directly 
affected by the regret-devaluation mechanism. A useful variable we will use in this analysis and 
in our subsequent behavioral analyses is that of the foregone capital gain.  This is defined as the 
difference between the current price of the stock and the price at which the subject last sold the 
stock.  For example, if a subject sold Stock A in trial 19 at a price of $125, and now has the 
opportunity to repurchase the stock in trial 25 at a price of $105, the foregone capital gain is -$20. 
By design, this variable is always well defined (when the subject does not hold the stock) because 
we force subjects to buy all three stocks at the beginning of the experiment.   The repurchase 
effect in our experiment is therefore the tendency of subjects to buy stocks with negative 
foregone capital gains more often than stocks with positive foregone capital gains.  In order to 
quantify this effect, we use a methodology very similar to that of (Barber et al. (2011)).  Each 
time a subject has an opportunity to repurchase a stock, we place this opportunity into one of four 
mutually exclusive categories based on the purchase decision (buy or no buy) and the sign of the 
foregone capital gain (positive or negative).  We then compute the relative frequencies that a 
subject repurchases a stock based on the sign of the foregone capital gain.   
 In particular, we define two variables: the proportion of stocks that have increased in 
price since being sold that were repurchased (PDR) and the proportion of stocks that have 
decreased in price since being sold that were repurchased (PUR).  We compute a measure of each 
of these two variables at the subject level by calculating the following ratios:  
 
PDR = # of stocks down since being sold repurchased# of opportunities to repurchase stocks down since being sold  
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PUR = # of stocks up since being sold repurchased# of opportunities to repurchase stocks up since being sold  
 	   A repurchase effect arises when PDR-PUR>0.  In our experiment, the momentum that we 
build into the stock prices makes the repurchase effect a costly mistake.  To see why, consider a 
subject who sells a stock in period t at a price of s.  Now suppose the subject is offered the 
opportunity to repurchase the stock several periods later, at a price p<s.  The fact that the stock 
price has recently decreased over the last several period is likely because it is in the bad state, and 
since there is a high probability of the stock remaining in the bad state in the next period, the 
investor should not invest in this stock.  Hence, the optimal strategy dictates buying stocks with 
strong recent performance, and not buying stocks with poor recent performance.  This trading 
strategy will then result in the opposite of a repurchase effect.  With the specific price path that is 
used in our experiment, the optimal strategy will result in a PDR-PUR measure of -0.75.   
In contrast, if the regret-devaluation mechanism impacts a subject’s decision-making 
circuitry, then a subject who sees a price increase for a stock he does not own (and therefore one 
that he either sold recently or chose not to buy) will experience regret.  This regret will trigger a 
devaluation of the stock, leading to a lower propensity to buy the stock.   Because this stock has 
just gone up and because of the positive autocorrelation in price changes, this stock has likely 
also risen in price since the subject last sold.  Hence, the subjects will repurchase fewer stocks 
that have gone up since last sale than an expected value trader would.  This leads to our first 
prediction. 
 
Prediction 1 (Behavioral): For an expected value investor, the value of the PDR-PUR measure is 
given by -0.75. On the other hand, for a subject whose decision-making is affect by the regret-
devaluation mechanism, the value of PUR-PDR>-0.75.   
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 We now turn to the neural predictions made by the inaction inertia model.  As described 
in section II, an area of the brain called the ventral Striatum (vSt) has been associated with 
computing counterfactual or regret signals.  In particular, during the outcome of a stochastic 
event, the vSt has been shown to compute a signal that encodes the difference between what was 
received and what could have been received had the subject acted differently (Coricelli et al. 
(2005); Lohrenz et al. (2007); Li and Daw (2011); Nicolle et al. (2011)).  During the price update 
screen in our experiment, we therefore expect to see a neural signal in the vSt which satisfies two 
key properties: 1) the magnitude of the signal should be proportional to the size of the change in 
price and 2) the sign of the signal should be a function of asset ownership.  Formally, define an 
ownership function, O(t), which takes on the value of 1 if the subject owns the stock being 
updated in trial t, and -1 if the subject does not own the stock in trial t.  We then expect activity in 
the vSt to positively correlate with .	  	    
 
Prediction 2 (Neural): Activity in the vSt during a price update screen should positively correlate 
with the price change if a subject owns the stock.  Activity in the vSt during a price update should 
negatively correlate with the price change if the subject does not own the stock.  
 
In the rest of the analysis to follow, it will be useful to distinguish between the 
counterfactual or regret signals that occur at the price update screen, based on whether the subject 
owned the stock or not.  As the focus of this paper is on testing the regret-devaluation model, we 
will mainly be concerned with the counterfactual signal computed at the price update screen when 
the subject does not own the stock.  For the rest of the paper, we will refer to this signal as the 
inaction regret signal.   
Recall from Section II that under the regret-devaluation hypothesis, the amount of regret 
a subject experiences during a price update screen should be negatively correlated with the price 
O(t)!"p
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change.  Moreover, this experienced regret should be proportional to the devaluation the subject 
applies to the next trading opportunity.  A key implication of this model is that a stronger 
experienced regret signal during the price update screen on trial t should induce a stronger 
devaluation of the stock on the subsequent trading screen.   It follows that a stronger inaction 
regret signal should induce a lower probability of investing in the stock on the next screen.     
Additionally, the link between the experienced regret and the devaluation of the 
subsequent repurchase opportunity should be asset specific; that is, experienced regret about a 
rising price in Stock X should affect the probability of repurchasing only Stock X on the 
following trading screen.  In contrast, the regret-devaluation hypothesis makes no predictions 
about how experienced regret from Stock X should impact decision-making regarding 
repurchasing stock Y.  In particular, the regret-devaluation hypothesis does not stipulate that 
experienced regret for one stock will lead to a devaluation for all stocks.  We therefore formulate 
Prediction 3 as follows: 
 
Prediction 3 (Neural): Under the regret-devaluation mechanism, stronger inaction regret signals 
generated by a price increase about Stock X should lead to a lower probability of repurchasing 
Stock X on the following trading screen.  In contrast, stronger inaction regret signals generated by 
a price increase about Stock X should not affect the probability of repurchasing stock Y on the 
following trading screen. 
 
 The final prediction of the regret-devaluation hypothesis is aimed at explaining part of 
the cross-subject variation in the size of the repurchase effect.  Recall that the impetus of the 
regret-devalution mechanism is the experienced regret that is generated when a subject is 
confronted with news about a price increase for a stock he does not own.  If there is any cross-
sectional variation in the amount of experienced regret that is generated from a given price 
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increase, then this should help explain some of the cross-sectional variation we see in the size of 
the repurchase effect.  This leads us to prediction 4:   
 
Prediction 4 (Neural): Under the regret-devaluation hypothesis, a stronger inaction regret signal 
in the vSt should lead to a stronger repurchase effect, across subjects. 
 
 
III. fMRI data collection and analysis  
 
In this section, we provide a primer on how fMRI measures of neural activity are 
collected and analyzed. For more details, see Huettel et al. (2004), Ashby (2011), and Poldrack et 
al. (2011)  . 
 
A. fMRI data collection and measurement 
We collected measures of neural activity over the entire brain using BOLD-fMRI, which 
stands for blood-oxygenated level dependent functional magnetic resonance imaging. BOLD-
fMRI measures changes in local magnetic fields that result from local inflows of oxygenated 
hemoglobin and outflows of de-oxygenated hemoglobin that occur when neurons fire. fMRI 
provides measures of the BOLD response of relatively small “neighborhoods” of brain tissue 
known as voxels, and is thought to measure the sum of the total amount of neural firing into that 
voxel as well as the amount of neuronal firing within the voxel. 34 
One important complication is that the hemoglobin responses measured by BOLD-fMRI 
are slower than the associated neuronal responses. Specifically, although the bulk of the neuronal 
response takes place quickly, subsequent BOLD measurements are affected for up to 24 seconds.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Note that the neural activity measured by fMRI in a 1-mm3 cube (about the size of a grain of salt) 
represents the joint activity of between 5,000 to 40,000 neurons, depending on the area of the brain. 
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Figure 2 provides a more detailed illustration of the nature of the BOLD response. In particular, it 
shows the path of the BOLD signal in response to 1 arbitrary unit of neural activity of 
infinitesimal duration at time zero. The function plotted here is called the canonical hemodynamic 
response function (HRF). It is denoted by h(τ), where τ is the amount of elapsed time since the 
neural activity impulse, and has been shown to approximate well the pattern of BOLD responses 
for most subjects, brain areas, and tasks. 
Fortunately, the BOLD response has been shown to combine linearly across multiple 
sources of neural activity (Boynton et al. (1996)).  This property, along with a specific functional 
form of the HRF, allows us to construct a mapping from neural activity to BOLD response so that 
we can control for BOLD responses that are generated by neural activity over the previous 24 
seconds.  In particular, if the level of neural activity at any particular time is given by a(t), then 
the level of BOLD activity at any instant t is well approximated by  
 
   ! ! = ℎ ! ! ! − ! !"!! , 
 
which is the convolution between the HRF and the neural inputs. The integral can be interpreted 
in a straightforward way:  it is simply a lagged sum of all the BOLD responses triggered by 
previous neural activity. This is illustrated in Figure 2B, which depicts a hypothetical path of 
neural activity, together with the associated BOLD response. 
 We acquire two types of MRI data during the experiment in a 3.0 Siemens Tesla Trio 
MRI scanner with an eight-channel phased array coil. First, we acquire BOLD-fMRI data while 
the subjects perform the experimental task with a voxel size of 3 mm3.  We acquire data for the 
entire brain (~ 100,000 voxels) every 2.75 seconds.35 We also acquire high-resolution anatomical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 More precisely, we acquired gradient echo T2*-weighted echoplanar (EPI) images with BOLD contrast. 
To optimize functional sensitivity in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), a key region of interest, we acquired 
the images in an oblique orientation of 30° to the anterior commissure–posterior commissure line 
((Deichmann et al. (2003))).  Each volume of images had 45 axial slices.  A total of 692 volumes were 
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scans that we use mainly for realigning the brains across subjects and for localizing the brain 
activity identified by our analyses.36 
 
B. fMRI data preprocessing 
 
Before the BOLD data can be analyzed to test our hypotheses, it has to be converted into 
a usable format. This requires the following steps, which are fairly standard – see Huettel et al. 
(2004), Ashby (2011), & Poldrack et al. (2011)  – and were implemented using a specialized but 
commonly used software package called SPM5 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, 
Institute of Neurology, London, UK). 
First, images are corrected for slice acquisition time within each voxel. This is necessary 
because the scanner does not collect data on all brain voxels simultaneously. This simple step, 
which involves a nonlinear interpolation, temporally realigns the data across all voxels.  
Second, we correct for head motion to ensure that the time series of BOLD measurements 
recorded at a specific spatial location within the scanner was always associated with the same 
brain location throughout the experiment.37   
 Third, we realign the BOLD responses for each individual into a common 
neuroanatomical frame (the standard Montreal Neurological Institute EPI template). This step, 
called spatial normalization, is necessary because brains come in different shapes and sizes and, 
as a result, a given spatial location maps to different brain regions in different subjects. Spatial 
normalization involves a nonlinear reshaping of the brain to maximize the match with a target 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
collected over two sessions. The imaging parameters were as follows: echo time, 30 ms; field of view, 192 
mm; in-plane resolution and slice thickness, 3 mm; repetition time, 2.75 s. 
36 More precisely, we acquired high-resolution T1-weighted structural scans (1 x 1 x 1 mm) for each 
subject, which were coregistered with their mean EPI images and averaged across subjects to permit 
anatomical localization of the functional activations at the group level. 
 
37 BOLD measurements were corrected for head motion by aligning them to the first full brain scan  and 
normalizing to the Montreal Neurological Institute’s EPI template.  This entails estimating a six-parameter 
model of the head motion (3 parameters for center movement, and 3 parameters for rotation) for each 
volume, and then removing the motion using these parameters.  For details, see Friston et al. (1996).	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template.  Although the transformed data are not perfectly aligned across subjects due to 
remaining neuroanatomical heterogeneity, the process suffices for the purposes of this study. 
Furthermore, any imperfections in the realignment process introduce noise that reduces our 
ability to detect neural activity of interest. 
 Fourth, we also spatially smooth the BOLD data for each subject by making BOLD 
responses for each voxel a weighted sum of the responses in neighboring voxels, with the weights 
decreasing with distance.38 This step is necessary to make sure that the error structure of the data 
conforms to the normality assumptions about the error structure of the regression models, 
described below, that we use to test our hypotheses. 
 Finally, we remove low-frequency signals that are unlikely to be associated with neuronal 
responses to individual trials.39   
	  
	  
C. fMRI main data analyses 
 
The key goal of our exercise is to identify regions of the brain, given by collections of 
spatially contiguous voxels, called clusters, where the BOLD response reflects neural activity that 
implements the computations of interest. This is complicated by the fact that, since every voxel 
contains thousands of neurons, the BOLD responses can be driven by multiple signals. 
Fortunately, the linear properties of the BOLD signal allow for the identification of the neural 
signals of interest using standard linear regression methods. 
 The general procedure is straightforward, and will be familiar to most economists. The 
analysis begins by specifying two types of variables that might affect the BOLD response: target 
computations and additional controls. The target computations reflect the signals that we are 
looking for (e.g., an inaction regret signal). They are specified by a time series si(t) describing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Smoothing was performed using an 8 mm full-width half-maximum Gaussian kernel. 
39 Specifically, we applied a high-pass temporal filter to the BOLD data with a cutoff of 128 seconds.	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each signal of interest. For each of these signals, let Si(t) denote the time series that results from 
convolving the signal si(t) with the HRF, as described above. The additional controls, denoted by 
cj(t), are other variables that might affect the BOLD time series (e.g., residual head movement or 
time trends). These are introduced to further clean up the noise inherent in the BOLD signal, but 
are not explicitly used in any of our tests. The control variables are not convolved with the HRF 
because they reflect parameters that affect the measured BOLD responses, and not neural activity 
that triggers a hemodynamic response.40 
 The linearity of the BOLD signal implies that the level of BOLD activity in any voxel v 
should be given by !! ! = constant + !!!!!(!)! + !!!!! ! + !(!)! , 
 
where !(!) denotes AR(1) noise. This model is estimated independently in each of the brain’s 
voxels using standard regression methods.  
 Our hypotheses can then be restated as tests about the coefficients of this regression 
model: signal i is said to be associated with activity in voxel v only if !!! is significantly different 
from zero. 
 Two additional considerations apply to most fMRI studies, including the present one.  
First, we are interested in testing hypotheses about the distribution of the signal coefficients in the 
population, and not about individual coefficients. This requires estimating a random effects 
version of the linear model specified above which, given the size of a typical fMRI dataset, is 
computationally intensive. Fortunately, it has been shown that there is a straightforward shortcut 
that provides a good approximation to the full mixed effects analysis (Penny et al. (2006)).  It 
involves estimating the parameters separately for each individual subject, averaging them across 
subjects, and then performing t-tests. This is the approach we follow here. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 For example, linear trends are often included because the scanner heats up with continuous operation and 
this induces a linear change in the measured BOLD responses. 
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 Second, given that these tests are carried out in each of the ~100,000 voxels in the brain, 
there is a serious concern about false-positives, and multiple comparison corrections are 
necessary. Several approaches have been proposed in the fMRI literature to address this problem, 
many of which rely on the idea that purely random activations are unlikely to come in sizable 
clusters.41 Here, we follow a common approach in the literature, which consists of combining a 
sizable statistical threshold for the test in each voxel, given by p<0.001 uncorrected, together with 
a minimal cluster size of 15 voxels.  These two criteria, taken together, severely reduce the 
likelihood of false positives. 
 The analyses described so far involve searching for neural correlates of signals of interest 
across the entire brain and are therefore known as whole brain analyses. Another popular and 
very useful type of exercise, which we use here, is a “region of interest” (ROI) analysis.   Put 
simply, this analysis differs from a whole-brain analysis because it first restricts the set of voxels 
that is being analyzed. The most common types of ROI analyses involve 1) the measurement of 
signal strength in a prespecified ROI (in other words, in a prespecified subset of voxels), 2) 
computing the correlation across subjects between measures of signal strength in a particular ROI 
and behavioral or psychological measures, and 3) characterizing the time course of BOLD 
responses in an ROI for a particular event (e.g, seeing a price update screen.)  
 The measurement of signal strength in prespecified ROIs is a straightforward extension 
of the whole brain analysis. In this case, a general linear model is estimated only for the voxels in 
the ROI, and then a response estimate for the signal of interest is computed for every subject by 
averaging over the estimated coefficients over all of the voxels in the ROI. The distribution of 
average estimates for the group can then be compared across signals of interest using t-tests.  
  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 As noted earlier, a cluster is a set of spatially contiguous voxels. 
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IV. Results 
A. Behavioral predictions 
 We begin our test of Prediction 1 by computing the strength of the repurchase effect for 
each subject using the PDR-PUR measure described earlier.   We find that the average PDR and 
PUR across subjects are .301 and .337, respectively. This implies an average PDR-PUR value of  
-0.029, which is significantly higher than the optimal level of PDR-PUR=-0.75 (p<0.001).  At the 
individual subject level, all but 2 of 28 subjects in our experiment exhibit a repurchase effect that 
is greater than the optimal level, which is consistent with some of our subjects being affected by 
the regret-devaluation mechanism.  Moreover, Figure 3 shows there is significant variation in the 
size of the repurchase effect across subjects and suggests there are different types of traders.  6 
traders exhibit a significantly positive repurchase effect, 6 traders exhibit a significantly negative 
repurchase effect, while the remaining 16 subjects exhibit a repurchase effect which is not 
significantly different form zero. 
 One potential reason that we do not see more subjects exhibiting a measure of PDR-PUR 
above zero is because it may be difficult for subjects to recall the price at which they last sold a 
stock that they are considering repurchasing.  If this is the case, we may still see a preference for 
smaller forgone capital gains (the accumulation of price changes since last sale), without seeing a 
sharp discontinuity in preferences for foregone capital gains at 0.  We can test this by running a 
logistic regression of the buy decision on the foregone capital and the NEV of buying.   
Table 1 shows these regression results, and model 1 indicates that subjects do exhibit a 
preference for buying stocks with smaller foregone capital gains (p=0.002).  However, when we 
run another logistic regression decomposing the foregone capital gain into its two components 
(model 2), the current price and the price at which the subject last sold, we find that only the 
current price is a significant predictor of the purchase decision  (p<0.001).  The coefficient on the 
price at which the subject last sold the stock is positive, but not significantly greater than 0 
(p=0.24).  This suggests that since only the current price is displayed on the trading screen, 
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subjects may have a difficult time calculating the sign of the foregone capital without perfect 
recall of the price at which they last sold the stock.  Note also that the coefficient on NEV is 
positive in both regression specifications, suggesting that subjects are also (partially) tracking the 
optimal strategy.   
While the focus of this paper is on buying behavior, it is interesting to examine whether 
there is any relationship to the sell-side behavior of this same set of subjects.  In previous work 
with the same data set (Frydman et al. (2011)), we find that subjects exhibit significant 
disposition effects, which is the tendency of an investor to sell a stock with a capital gain more 
often than she sells a stock with a capital loss.  This effect is suboptimal in our experiment for the 
same reason that the repurchase effect is suboptimal in our experiment, namely, because of the 
short-term positive autocorrelation in price changes.  Figure 4 shows that there is indeed a 
correlation between buy-side and sell-side behavior, as subjects who have stronger repurchase 
effects tend to have stronger disposition effects.  In other words, subjects who have a high 
propensity to sell stocks with capital gains tend to have a low propensity to repurchase stocks 
with strong recent performance.  Such a subject in our experiment is therefore selling stocks with 
high expected returns and buying stocks with low expected returns.     
          
 
B. Neural Predictions 
We now turn to Prediction 2 which states that under the regret-devaluation mechanism, 
we should observe a neural signal in the vSt at the price update screen which correlates with the 
size of the price change.  Moreover, this signal should positively correlate with the price change 
when the subject owns the stock, and it should negatively correlate with the price change when 
the subject does not own the stock.  In other words, the vSt should encode a counterfactual signal 
representing the difference between what the subjects earned and what he could have earned had 
he acted differently on the previous asset-specific trading screen.   
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 We test this hypothesis by first estimating a general linear model of BOLD activity for 
each subject: 
 1               !! ! = constant + !!"!#$%& ! ∆!! [  !!!!!"# ! + !!!!!"  !"# ! ] + !!!controls + ε(t). 
 
Here, bv (t) denotes BOLD signal at time t in voxel v. Ipupdate(t) is an indicator function that equals 
one at the time when the subject is presented with a price update screen at time t.  ∆!!  denotes the 
price change at time t, and Iown(t) and Ino own(t) are indicator functions that equal one if the subject 
owns or doesn’t own the stock at the price update screen at time t, respectively.  Finally, the 
controls vector includes regressors that control for physical movement inside the scanner, 
session-specific effects, and any changes in neural activity that might be due to the decision 
processes from previous trading screens, which are not activations of interest for the hypothesis 
being tested.  Finally, inferences about the extent to which the signals of interest are encoded in a 
given voxel are made by carrying out a one-sided t-test of the individually estimated coefficients 
(i.e., !!! and !!!) against zero.  
 Although we can carry out these tests in all of the brain’s voxels, here we limit our search 
to voxels that belong to the prespecified anatomical area of the vSt. This area was identified using 
the AAL digital atlas of the human brain (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al. (2002)). Note that this 
restrictions makes our significance threshold of p<.001 uncorrected, together with a minimum 
cluster size of 15 voxels, even less likely to generate false positives than in the standard whole 
brain analyses to which it is typically applied. 
 Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the vSt exhibits activity at the time of a price 
update screen which correlates with the size of the price change.  In particular, Figure 5a shows 
areas of the brain where  !!! > 0  and Figure 5b shows areas of the brain were !!! < 0.  We find a 
cluster of 36 voxels in the left vSt and a cluster of 41 voxels in the right vSt where both !!! >
	  	  	  
81	  
0  !"#    !!! < 0.  Within this set of 77 voxels, the average  !!! =0.090 and the average !!! =-
0.058, and the magnitude of the counterfactual signal during the price update screen is 
significantly higher when subjects own the stock as compared to when they don’t own the stock 
(p=0.02).  The fact that !!! < 0 implies that when subjects are presented with a price update for a 
stock they do not own, the vSt encodes a signal which negatively correlates with the size of the 
price change.    
 We now turn to Prediction 3, which examines the key implication of the regret-
devaluation mechanism: experienced regret causes a devaluation of the subsequent repurchase 
opportunity, which then leads to a lower probability of repurchase.  Until now, this mechanism 
has only been tested using self-reported measures of experienced regret (Arkes et al. (2002)); 
here, we introduce a method which highlights the value of the neural data in directly measuring 
experienced regret so that we can assess its impact on subsequent trading decisions.   
Our design allows us to construct a novel test of this mechanism by exploiting exogenous 
variation in the ordering of specific stocks in the price update and trading screens.  Recall from 
the experimental design that there is a 1/3 probability that each stock is displayed on the price 
update screen, and there is a 1/3 probability each stock is displayed on the trading screen.  This 
allows us to perform tests about whether experienced regret from stock X (generated during the 
price update screen) affects the repurchase decision of stock X and only stock X.   We construct 
this test in two steps.  First, we partition trials where the subject sees a price update for stock X 
(an asset she doesn’t own) into three categories based on the trading opportunity in the 
subsequent trading screen: 1) trading screens where the subject has an opportunity to buy Stock 
X, 2) trading screens where the subject has an opportunity to buy stock Y≠X, and 3) trading 
screens where the subject does not have the opportunity to buy any stock (i.e., only has the 
opportunity to sell).  The second step is to estimate a GLM containing regressors that model these 
three types of trials:  
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(2) !! ! = constant + !!"_!"#_!"!#$%& ! ∆!!   !!!!!"#$ ! + !!!!!"##$%$&' ! + !!!!!"_!"" ! +!!"_!"#_!"#$%& ! !!"# !   !!!!!"#$ ! + !!!!!"##$%$&' ! + !!!controls + ε(t). 
 
With the above GLM, we are able to test the precise implications of prediction 3, by 
examining whether inaction regret signals in the vSt predict the stock-specific repurchase 
decision.  We perform an ROI analysis in the vSt42 to test whether activity in this area of the brain 
can predict the stock-specific repurchase decision.  Consistent with both parts of prediction 3, we 
find that the left vSt does indeed predict the subsequent repurchase decision, only when the 
trading screen asset is the same as the price update screen asset43.  Specifically, Figure 6 shows 
that within our left vSt ROI, !!! = 2.21   ! = 0.003  and !!! = 0.11   ! = 0.83  and that !!!>!!!   ! < 0.003 .  We do not find a similar effect in the right vSt, but the signal in the left vSt 
passes a Bonferroni test with two comparisons.   
It is important to note that GLM (2) above includes a control for the change in price, ∆!! , 
and we are still able to predict the stock-specific repurchase decision from the inaction regret 
signal.  This is important because it shows that there is additional predictive information in this 
signal beyond the price change itself, and hence provides evidence of the marginal value of the 
neural data.  It is also consistent with previous work in psychology (Arkes et al. (2002)) that 
experienced regret is a mediating factor of the inaction inertia effect.   
 Our final neural prediction is aimed at using the inaction regret signal to explain a portion 
of the cross-subject variation in the repurchase effect (Figure 3).  Building on our result from 
prediction 3 that activity in the left vSt is a significant predictor of the repurchase decision, we 
expect to see a correlation between the strength of the inaction regret signal in the left vSt and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 We define the vSt ROI as the set of voxels that are within 6 mm of the two voxels (bilateral) 
that exhibit the highest correlation with stimulus salience in (Zink et al. (2003)). 43	  One subject was excluded from this analysis because there were no trials where the subject had 
an opportunity to buy stock Y≠X, after seeing a price update for stock X.	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size of the repurchase effect across subjects.  Because the association between left vSt activity 
and the repurchase decision is present only for trials in which the price update asset was the same 
as the trading screen asset, we first compute a “restricted” measure of (PDR-PUR) for each 
subject i using only those trials where the price update screen asset is the same as the trading 
screen asset44.  We then run a regression of this restricted measure of (PDR-PUR) on the inaction 
regret signal, which is defined as the estimated !!  coefficient from GLM (1): (!"# − !"#)! = ! + !!!! + ! 
 After weighting each observation inversely proportional to the standard error of (!"# − !"#)!, we find that !=-1.81 (t-stat: -2.09, p=0.047) which is consistent with prediction 
4 that subjects with stronger inaction regret signals exhibit a stronger repurchase bias.  Figure 7 
displays a scatterplot of the inaction regret signal vs. (PDR-PUR).  It is interesting to note that the 
two subjects who are nearly tracking the optimal level of (PDR-PUR)=-0.75 have an inaction 
regret signal of almost 0 or slightly positive.  This suggests that the few subjects who are 
repurchasing optimally have very little sensitivity to news about returns on foregone investments.   
 
 
 
V. Final Remarks 
 In this paper we provide a model of investor behavior that yields a repurchase effect, 
which is a systematic trading pattern that has recently been documented in the class of individual 
investors {Barber, 2011 #130}.  Our model is based on a regret-devaluation mechanism, which is 
difficult to test using standard empirical data sets because regret is not directly observable.  We 
sidestep this issue by collecting neural data that allows us to directly measure regret and test for 
its effect on subsequent decision-making. The neural data strongly supports the regret-devaluation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  The	  unrestricted	  and	  restricted	  measures	  of	  (PDR-­‐PUR)	  have	  a	  correlation	  of	  0.46.	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mechanism as the driver of the repurchase effect.  While our concern in this paper is with a very 
specific behavioral implication of regret, the repurchase effect, there is a vast literature on models 
of regret in economics which may benefit from a similar style of empirical testing by using neural 
data to directly observe regret signals. 
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Table	  1.	  	  Determinants	  of	  Propensity	  to	  Buy.	  	  Logistic	  regression	  where	  dependent	  variable	  equals	  1	  if	  the	  subject	  bought	  on	  the	  trial	  and	  0	  if	  the	  subject	  did	  not	  buy	  (conditional	  on	  the	  opportunity	  to	  buy).	  	  Forgone	  Capital	  Gain	  is	  the	  difference	  between	  current	  price	  and	  last	  sale	  price.	  	  NEV	  is	  the	  expected	  future	  price	  change	  of	  the	  stock	  conditional	  on	  all	  previous	  information.	  	  Standard	  errors	  are	  clustered	  at	  the	  subject	  level.	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Figure	  1.	  	  Sample	  screens	  from	  a	  typical	  trial	  in	  the	  fMRI	  experiment.	  	  Subjects	  saw	  the	  
price	  update	  screen	  for	  two	  seconds,	  followed	  by	  the	  trading	  screen	  for	  which	  they	  had	  up	  to	  three	  seconds	  to	  enter	  a	  decision	  (a	  blank	  screen	  was	  displayed	  in	  between	  in	  order	  to	  temporally	  separate	  neural	  activity	  associated	  with	  decision-­‐making.)	  The	  screens	  shown	  below	  are	  for	  a	  trial	  in	  which	  the	  subject	  owns	  a	  unit	  of	  both	  stocks	  A	  and	  B.	  	  The	  screens	  were	  displayed	  while	  subjects	  were	  inside	  the	  fMRI	  scanner,	  and	  decisions	  were	  entered	  with	  a	  handheld	  device.	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Figure	  2.	  	  BOLD	  measurements	  of	  neural	  activity.	  	  (A)	  Canonical	  hemodynamic	  response	  function	  that	  approximates	  the	  BOLD	  response	  that	  follows	  one	  arbitrary	  unit	  of	  instantaneous	  neural	  activity	  at	  time	  0.	  (B)	  Example	  of	  a	  path	  of	  neural	  activity	  together	  with	  the	  associated	  BOLD	  response.	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Figure	  3.	  	  Measure	  of	  (PDR-­‐PUR)	  for	  each	  of	  the	  28	  subjects.	  	  Each	  black	  line	  represents	  2	  standard	  errors.	  	  All	  but	  2	  subjects	  exhibit	  a	  measure	  of	  (PDR-­‐PUR)	  that	  is	  significantly	  greater	  than	  the	  optimal	  level	  of	  -­‐0.75	  (denoted	  by	  the	  dashed	  horizontal	  line.)	  	  The	  figure	  indicates	  that	  there	  is	  significant	  heterogeneity	  in	  the	  size	  of	  the	  repurchase	  effect	  across	  subjects	  (SD:	  0.30).	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Figure	  4.	  	  Relationship	  between	  buying	  and	  selling	  behavior.	  	  Each	  blue	  point	  represents	  a	  subject.	  	  The	  horizontal	  axis	  measures	  the	  repurchase	  effect	  and	  the	  vertical	  axis	  measures	  the	  disposition	  effect.	  	  Similar	  to	  the	  repurchase	  effect,	  a	  positive	  disposition	  effect	  is	  also	  suboptimal	  in	  our	  experiment,	  where	  the	  optimal	  level	  of	  the	  disposition	  effect	  is	  -­‐0.76.	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Figure	  5.	  	  vSt	  encodes	  a	  counterfactual	  signal.	  	  	  A)	  Voxels	  in	  the	  brain	  which	  exhibit	  activity	  that	  positive	  correlates	  with	  the	  price	  change	  at	  the	  time	  when	  subjects	  receive	  news	  about	  an	  asset	  they	  own.	  	  B)	  Voxels	  in	  the	  brain	  which	  exhibit	  activity	  that	  negatively	  correlates	  with	  the	  price	  change	  at	  the	  time	  when	  subjects	  receive	  news	  about	  an	  asset	  they	  do	  not	  own.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  A)	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Figure	  6.	  	  Activity	  in	  vSt	  predicts	  trial-­‐by-­‐trial	  repurchase	  decision.	  	  	  Average	  activity	  in	  the	  left	  vSt	  during	  price	  update	  screen	  when	  asset	  is	  not	  owned.	  	  Stronger	  inaction	  regret	  signals	  are	  seen	  preceding	  failure	  to	  repurchase	  relative	  to	  repurchase,	  on	  those	  trials	  where	  price	  update	  asset	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  trading	  screen	  asset	  (RIGHT).	  	  There	  is	  no	  difference	  in	  inaction	  regret	  signals	  when	  assets	  are	  different	  on	  price	  update	  and	  trading	  screen	  (LEFT).	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Figure	  7.	  	  	  Inaction	  regret	  signal	  in	  vSt	  correlates	  with	  repurchase	  effect	  across	  
subjects.	  	  	  The	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  left	  ventral	  Striatum	  to	  price	  changes	  when	  a	  subjects	  does	  not	  own	  an	  asset	  (inaction	  regret	  signal)	  is	  negatively	  correlated	  with	  the	  size	  of	  the	  repurchase	  effect.	  	  Inaction	  regret	  signals	  are	  defined	  as	  the	  estimate	  of	  the	  !! 	  coefficient	  from	  GLM	  (1)	  in	  the	  text.	  	  Stronger	  inaction	  regret	  signals	  (more	  negative	  vSt	  sensitivity	  to	  price	  update)	  are	  therefore	  associated	  with	  stronger	  repurchase	  effects.	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Chapter 3 
Attention to Realization Utility Modulates the Disposition Effect 
	  
Individual investors face a daunting task when constructing a portfolio of stocks because 
of the vast amount of information available to them.  Attention is a scarce resource, and it is 
inevitable that investors will eventually deplete their stock of attention and disregard valuable 
information when trading.  A growing body of literature in finance suggests that these constraints 
on attention can have a systematic effect on investor behavior and asset prices (Hong and Stein 
(1999); Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003); Peng and Xiong (2006); Barber and Odean (2008); Cohen 
and Frazzini (2008); Dellavigna and Pollet (2009); Duffie (2010); Da et al. (2011)).  While much 
of this literature focuses on underreaction to firm news or strategic disclosure of information to 
investors, another implication of inattention is the manner in which an investor perceives the 
“attributes” of his own portfolio.  For example, in the case that an investor experiences a liquidity 
shock and is forced to sell a position in his portfolio, what attributes does the investor attend to 
when formulating the decision of which security to sell?    
  In this paper, we assume the investor allocates his attention to two general attributes of 
each security that he holds in his portfolio: the expected return and the past performance.  We 
focus on these two general attributes because standard theory predicts that investors should trade 
based on expected returns, but there is substantial evidence that investors also trade based on a 
stock’s past performance (Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001); Kaustia (2010)).  Our main question in 
this paper is whether an investor’s allocation of attention to each of these two attributes is fixed, 
or whether it can be modulated by the saliency of expected returns or past performance.  In 
essence, are investor preferences malleable to be more or less “forward-looking?” 
This question is important because if investors allocate attention to the most salient items 
on financial statements (Libby et al. (2002); Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003)), then the design of 
financial statements can have a direct impact on investor behavior.  To study this attention 
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allocation procedure, we have subjects trade in an experimental stock market and we manipulate 
the saliency of the expected return and the past performance of a stock.  We use the capital gain 
on the stock as the measure of the stock’s past performance, and as we describe in the main text, 
we use an optimal (Bayesian) prediction of the stock’s next period price change as a measure of 
expected return.   
We use a stock’s capital gain as its measure of past performance because there is a large 
empirical literature documenting that individual investors trade based on how well the stock has 
done since the investor purchased it (Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001); Kaustia (2010)).  While this 
trading behavior does not typically arise from a standard model (eg, power utility with i.i.d. 
returns), a recently developed preference specification, called realization utility, provides a 
theoretical foundation for the empirical link between the capital gain and propensity to sell 
(Shefrin and Statman (1985); Barberis and Xiong (2012)).  Realization utility is based on the 
assumption that investors derive positive (negative) utility directly from the act of selling capital 
gains (capital losses) on risky assets that they own. Contemporaneous experimental and 
neurobiological research provides evidence that is consistent with the idea that investors do have 
a direct preference for selling stocks with capital gains (Frydman et al. (2011)).  If investors have 
realization utility preferences in addition to standard preferences over consumption, it seems 
plausible that trading behavior should be driven by an investor’s attention to both capital gains 
and expected returns; that is, trading behavior should be affected by the saliency of the past and 
future.  
One particular implication of realization utility that we will focus on in this paper is the 
disposition effect, which is the empirical fact that investors have a greater propensity to sell stocks 
that have gone up in price since purchase, relative to stocks that have gone down in price since 
purchase45.  We focus on this effect for two reasons: 1) it provides a measure of the strength of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  See for example (Shefrin and Statman (1985); Odean (1998); Genesove and Mayer (2001); Feng and 
Seasholes (2005); Frazzini (2006); Jin and Scherbina (2011)). 
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realization utility preferences (Frydman et al. (2011)) and 2) it is a robust behavior that has been 
found to lower overall trading performance (Odean (1998); Weber and Camerer (1998)).  In 
particular, (Odean (1998)) finds that, on average, the winning stocks investors sell tend to 
outperform the losing stocks they hold by 3.4%.  This is consistent with the momentum found in 
equity returns, because winning stocks will on average continue to have higher returns than losing 
stocks over the short-term (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)).   It follows that if attention to 
realization utility can be manipulated, then we should be able to affect the size of the disposition 
effect and therefore the trading performance of the investor.     
Indeed, we are able to establish a causal link between attention to realization utility and 
the size of the disposition effect.  Our results can be useful for the optimal design of financial 
statements.  For example, brokerage houses can design regular financial statements that highlight 
expected returns, or they can decrease the salience of past trading performance.  One particular 
method of implementing the latter would be to decrease the saliency of the cost basis, so that less 
relative attention is focused on the capital gain of the stock.  In our experimental stock market, we 
implement this treatment and find that the disposition effect is significantly attenuated, and 
overall earnings are increased.  This is interesting because recent legislation enacted by the US 
government has mandated that the cost basis should effectively become more salient when 
investors are in the decision phase of selling an asset46.  Congress passed this cost basis 
legislation in order to increase tax compliance with capital gain laws, but a potential unintended 
consequence of such a law could be that investors now focus more on the cost basis when 
deciding whether to sell.  According to our experimental results, this will induce a higher 
disposition effect, and will lower overall average trading performance.  Interestingly, this should 
work to increase government tax revenue even more, since an investor’s optimal tax policy is to 
realize losses immediately and defer realizing gains far into the future in order to minimize the 
present value of the capital gains tax burden (Constantinides (1983)).                  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008	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Our results can also inform specific channels through which effective financial education 
can be implemented.  Many current forms of financial education, for example, disclaimers on 
mutual fund investments, stress that past performance should not be used to form beliefs about 
future returns.  However, our results show that besides this information channel, there is another 
potential mechanism through which past performance may influence trading decisions, namely, 
via a direct preference for realizing capital gains.  This additional preference-based mechanism 
should therefore also be taken into consideration when educating investors about the potential 
disadvantages of using past performance when trading.    
 
 
 
I. Theory and Experimental Design 
A. Design 
 
We now describe an experiment that we use to examine the attention that subjects pay to 
past performance and future returns, which is based on a design used in (Frydman et al. (2011)).  
All subjects are given the opportunity to trade three stocks – stock A, stock B, and stock C – in an 
experimental stock market. The experiment consists of two sessions separated by a two-minute 
break. Each session lasts approximately 16 minutes and consists of 108 trials. In this section, we 
use t to index the trials. The first session consists of trials t=1 through t=108, and the second, of 
trials t=109 through 216. We now describe the structure of the first session; the structure of the 
second session is identical to that of the first. 
 Before trial 1, each subject is given $350, in experimental currency, and is required to 
buy one share of each stock. The initial share price for each stock is $100; after this transaction, 
each subject is therefore left with $50. The majority of the trials – specifically, trials 10 through 
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108 – consist of two parts: a price update and a trading decision, each of which corresponds to a 
separate screen that the subject sees (see Figure 1). In the price update part, one of the three 
stocks is chosen at random and the subject is shown a price change for this stock. Note that stock 
prices only evolve during the price update screens; as a result subjects see the entire price path for 
each stock. In the trading decision part, one of the three stocks is again chosen at random and the 
subject is asked whether he wants to trade the stock. Note that no new information is revealed 
during the trading decision part.  
Trials 1 through 9 consist only of a price update part; subjects are not given the 
opportunity to buy or sell during these trials. The idea behind this is to let subjects accumulate 
some information about the three stocks before having to make any trading decisions. 
 Each subject is allowed to hold a maximum of one share and a minimum of zero shares 
of each stock at any point in time. In particular, short-selling is not allowed. The trading decision 
is therefore reduced to deciding whether to sell a stock (conditional on holding it) or deciding 
whether to buy a stock (conditional on not holding it). The price at which a subject can buy or sell 
a stock is given by the current market price of the stock. We now explain how this price is 
determined. 
 The price path of each stock is governed by a two-state Markov chain with a good state 
and a bad state. The Markov chain for each stock is independent of the Markov chains for the 
other two stocks. Suppose that, in trial t, there is a price update about stock i. If stock i is in the 
good state at that time, its price increases with probability 0.7 and decreases with probability 0.3. 
Conversely, if it is in the bad state at that time, its price increases with probability 0.3 and 
decreases with probability 0.7. The magnitude of the price change is drawn uniformly from {$5, 
$10, $15}, independently of the direction of the price change. 
 The state of each stock changes over time in the following way. Before trial 1, we 
randomly assign a state to each stock. If the price update in trial t >1 is not about stock i, then the 
state of stock i in trial t remains the same as its state in the previous trial, t-1. If the price update in 
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trial t >1 is about stock i, then the state of stock i in the trial remains the same as in trial t-1 with 
probability 0.8, but switches with probability 0.2. In mathematical terms, if is 
the state of stock i in trial t, then  if the time t price update is not about stock i, whereas 
if the time t price update is about stock i, the state switches as follows: 
 
The states of the three stocks are not revealed to the subjects: they have to infer them from the 
observed price paths. To ease comparison of trading performance across subjects, the same set of 
realized prices was used for all subjects. 
A key aspect of our design is that, conditional on the information available to subjects, 
each of the stocks exhibits short-term price continuation. If a stock performed well on the last 
price update, it was probably in a good state for that price update. Since it is highly likely 
(probability 0.8) to remain in the same state for its next price update, its next price change is 
likely to also be positive. 
 At the end of the first session, we liquidate subjects’ holdings of the three stocks and 
record the cash value of their position. As noted above, the second session is identical in structure 
to the first. Before the start of the second session – in other words, just before trial 109 – we again 
randomly assign a state to each of the three stocks, reset each share price to $100, give each 
subject a fresh $350 and require them to immediately buy a share of each of the three stocks. The 
first nine trials of the second session consist only of a price update, while the remaining trials 
have both a price update part and a trading decision part. At the end of the second session, we 
again liquidate subjects’ asset holdings and record the value of the cash proceeds. 
 We give subjects a financial incentive to maximize the final value of their portfolio at the 
end of each session   Specifically, if the total value of a subject’s cash and risky asset holdings at 
si,t ! {good, bad}
si,t = si,t!1
! si,t+1=good! si,t+1=bad!
si,t=good! "#$! "#%!
si,t=bad! "#%! "#$!!
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the end of session 1 is $X, in experimental currency, and the total value of his cash and risky 
asset holdings at the end of session 2 is $Y, again in experimental currency, then his take-home 
pay in actual dollars is 15 + (X+Y)/24. In other words, we average X and Y to get (X+Y)/2, 
convert the experimental currency to actual dollars using a 12:1 exchange rate, and add a $5 
show-up fee. Average total earnings were $30.20. Earnings (not including the show-up fee) 
ranged from $19.14 to $29.14 and the standard deviation of earnings was $2.58. 
 In order to avoid liquidity constraints, we allow subjects to carry a negative cash balance 
in order to purchase a stock if they do not have sufficient cash to do so at the time of a decision. If 
a subject ends the experiment with a negative cash balance, this amount is subtracted from the 
terminal value of his portfolio. The large cash endowment, together with the constraint that 
subjects can hold at most one unit of each stock at any moment, was sufficient to guarantee that 
no-one ended the experiment with a negative portfolio value, or was unable to buy a stock 
because of a shortage of cash during the experiment. 
Fifty-eight Caltech subjects participated in the experiment, and each subject was 
randomly assigned to one of three different experimental conditions.  Twenty subjects were 
assigned to the control condition where the price and cost basis (if the asset was owned) was 
displayed on both the price update and trading screens.  Eighteen subjects were assigned to the 
cost basis treatment, which was identical to the control condition, except that the cost basis was 
removed from the price update and trading screens.  Finally, twenty subjects were assigned to the 
forecast treatment, which was identical to the control condition, except that the expected next 
period price change, (as computed by a Bayesian agent) was displayed on both the price update 
and trading screens.  We refer to this variable as the optimal forecast, and the derivation of this 
variable is given in the next section.  Figure 1 depicts each of the two screens for the control 
condition and the two treatment conditions.   
The exact instructions given to subjects at the beginning of the experiment are included in 
the Appendix. The instructions carefully describe the stochastic structure of the price process, as 
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well as all other details of the experiment. Before beginning the first sessions, subjects engaged in 
a practice session of 25 trials to familiarize themselves with the market software. 
 
B. Expected Value Investors 
 
 In the environment we have just described, the optimal strategy for a risk-neutral 
Bayesian investor who is maximizing the expected value of his take-home earnings – from now 
on, we refer to such an investor as an “expected value” investor --  is to sell (or not buy) a stock 
when he believes that it is more likely to be in the bad state than in the good state; and to buy (or 
hold) the stock when he believes that it is more likely to be in the good state.  An expected value 
investor will therefore only be concerned with the expected return on a stock, and will not pay 
attention to previous performance.     
Formally, let pi,t be the price of stock i in trial t, after any price update about the stock, 
and let qi,t =Pr(si,t =good | pi,t, pi,t-1, pi,t,…, pi,1) be the probability that a Bayesian investor, after 
seeing the price update in trial t, would assign to stock i being in the good state in trial t. Also, let 
zt take the value 1 if the price update in trial t indicated a price increase for the stock in question; 
and -1 if the price update indicated a price decrease. Then qi,t = qi,t-1 if the price update in trial t 
was not about stock i; but if the price update in trial t was about stock i, then: 
 
 
 
  
As noted above, the optimal strategy for an expected value investor is to sell (if holding) 
or not buy (if not holding) stock i in trial t when qi,t <0.5; and to hold or buy it otherwise.  We can 
also compute the expected next period price change as a function of qi,t, which is given by 
 
qi,t (qi,t!1, zt ) =
Pr(zt | si,t = good)*Pr(si,t = good | qi,t!1)
qi,t!1 Pr(zt | si,t!1 = good)+ (1! qi,t!1)Pr(zt | si,t!1 = bad)
=
(0.5+ 0.2zt )*[0.8*qi,t!1 + 0.2*(1! qi,t!1)]
qi,t!1[0.8*(0.5+ 0.2zt )+ 0.2*(0.5! 0.2zt )]+ (1! qi,t!1)[0.2*(0.5+ 0.2zt )+ 0.8*(0.5! 0.2zt )]
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!! ∆!!,!!! !!,! ,∆!!,!!! ≠ 0 = 0.6 2!!,! − 1  
 
This variable is the optimal forecast.  For an expected value investor, the expected utility of 
selling stock i is then 0-0.6(2qi,t-1)= 0.6(1-2qi,t).  We refer to this quantity as the net present value 
of selling stock i in trial t, NEVi,t. 
 
C. Realization Utility Investors 
 
As described in the introduction, several studies haves documented the empirical 
regularity that investors have a greater propensity to sell stocks that have risen in price since 
purchase, relative to those that have fallen in price since purchase; in other words, investors 
exhibit a disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman (1985); Odean (1998); Frazzini (2006)).  While 
this type of behavior is hard to reconcile with a rational model of informed trading, a recent 
theoretical model based on the assumption that investors derive utility directly from the act of 
selling stocks, in addition to standard sources of utility based on consumption, can help explain 
the disposition effect.  This theory, called realization utility, assumes that investors derive a 
positive flow of utility precisely at the moment when selling a stock that has increased in value 
since purchase, and this utility is proportional to the capital gain on the stock (Barberis and Xiong 
(2009); Barberis and Xiong (2012)).  The psychological intuition behind this theory is that 
investors may think about investing in stocks as a series of episodes characterized by the name of 
the stock, the purchase price, and the sale price.  When investors sell a stock at a gain, they are 
creating a positive memory of their investment experience, and they feel good about this.  
Conversely, selling a stock at a loss creates a negative episode, one which may conjure negative 
emotions of regret and low self-esteem.  Because the variable that generates realization utility is 
the capital gain, investors who trade to maximize realization utility will pay attention to past 
performance via the capital gain.    
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Recent experimental work using brain imaging has confirmed the presence of such 
realization utility signals (Frydman et al. (2011)).  In particular, these authors allowed subjects to 
trade in an experimental stock market while their brain activity was monitored.  Subjects were 
found to have a strong disposition effect, and an area of the brain known to hedonic impact 
exhibited a spike in neural activity precisely at the moment when they realized a stock with a 
capital gain.  
If subjects in our experiment have realization utility preferences and they discount the 
future at a high rate, then we expect them to sell stocks with capital gains, and hold stocks with 
capital losses, more often than an expected value investor will.  In essence, subjects with “pure” 
realization utility preferences will only focus attention on past performance through the capital 
gain, and they will not pay attention to expected returns at the time of the sell/hold decisions.  In 
contrast, an expected value investor will only focus on expected returns, and will not pay any 
attention to his capital gains.  
 
D. Hypotheses 
 
Our first hypothesis is that investors are not simply one type or the other, but in fact have 
a hybrid preference structure over both realization utility and expected utility of future returns.  
That is, investors have preferences over realizing capital gains and they also have standard 
preferences over final consumption.  Such an investor will compute the sell/hold decision as a 
function of both the capital gain and the NEV.  One way to model the probability of selling is to 
assume it is a logistic function of both variables: 
 Pr !"##!,! = ! + !!!"#!,! + !! !!,! − ! + ! 
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Our hypothesis is that investors pay attention to both past performance and expected returns when 
computing the sell/hold decision, which we formulate as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Investors use both past performance and expected future returns when deciding 
whether to sell, which leads to: !! > 0 and !! > 0. 
 
 
The purpose of our experiment is not only to test this hypothesis, but moreover, to test whether !! 
and !! can be manipulated by introducing cues which trigger the desire to experience realization 
utility.  In particular, we run two treatments in which we test whether  !!!! increases relative to the 
control condition.  In the cost basis treatment we remove the cost basis from the decision screen, 
which decreases the salience of the net capital gain, thus shifting attention away from realization 
utility, and thus inducing a higher !!!!.  In the forecast treatment, we prominently display the 
optimal forecast of the price change, which should shift attention towards expected returns, and 
thus induces a higher !!!!.  
 
Hypothesis 2a: Removing the cost basis from the trading screen will increase the relative weight 
that subjects attach to expected returns:  !!!!!"#$%"&< !!!!!"#$  !"#$#  !"#$!%#&!. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Displaying the optimal forecast on the trading screen will increase the relative 
weight that subjects attach to expected returns:  !!!!!"#$%"&<  !!!!!"#$%&'(  !"#$!%#&! 
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II. Results 
 
A. Treatment effects on disposition effect size  
 
We now describe our method for calculating the disposition effect for each subject and 
then test for differences in this statistic across conditions. We follow a similar methodology to 
that of (Odean (1998)), where every time a subject is offered the opportunity to sell a stock, we 
classify this decision into one of four mutually exclusive categories: “realized gains”, “realized 
losses”, “paper gains” or “paper losses”. A decision classified as a realized gain (realized loss) if 
the market price of the stock is above (below) the purchase price, and the subject decides to sell 
the stock. A decision is classified as a paper gain (paper loss) if the market price of the stock is 
above (below) the purchase price, and the subject decides not to sell the stock. For each subject, 
we count the number of realized gains, realized losses, paper gains, and paper losses over the 
course of both experimental sessions and compute the Proportion of Gains Realized (PGR) and 
the Proportion of Losses Realized (PLR): 
PGR = # of realized gains# of realized gains + # of paper gains
PLR = # of realized losses# of realized losses + # of paper losses
 
For each subject, we measure the disposition effect using the difference between PGR and PLR.  
When the difference is positive (negative), the subject exhibits (the opposite of) a disposition 
effect. 
Figure 2 shows that subjects exhibit an average disposition effect that is significantly greater 
than the optimal level of -55% in all three conditions (p<0.001 for each condition.)   Both the 
forecast treatment and cost basis treatment significantly reduce the disposition effect relative to 
the control condition.  By removing the cost basis from the price update screen and the decision 
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screen (cost basis treatment), the average disposition effect decreases from 11.9% to -8.7% 
(p=0.01).  By displaying the optimal forecast on both screens (forecast treatment), the average 
disposition effect decreases from 11.9% to -16.9% (p=0.014).  While both treatment conditions 
reduce the severity of the disposition effect, the disposition effect is still significantly greater than 
the optimal level of -55% in both treatments.   
Figure 3 shows the number of decisions aggregated across conditions when the subject either 
sells a stock at a gain, or holds a stock at loss.  A realized gain is optimal when the NEV is 
negative, as the expected return is negative and so the investor should sell.  A paper loss is 
optimal when the NEV is positive, as the expected return is positive and so the investor should 
hold on to the stock.  The blue bars denote those decisions where the subject behaves according to 
the optimal strategy, and the red bars show those decisions where the subject fails to follow the 
optimal strategy.    It is clear that both the forecast treatment and cost basis treatment substantially 
reduce the number of paper losses, suggesting that subjects may be paying less attention to the 
capital loss they have accrued, and instead paying more attention to the negative expected return 
from holding a stock with a capital loss.  It is also interesting to note that in the forecast 
treatment, over half of all decisions to sell capital gains or hold capital losses are suboptimal, 
despite the optimal forecast being expliclty displayed on the trading screen.   
Figure 4 shows the disaggregated subject data by condition.  In the control condition, 45% of 
subjects (9 of 20) exhibited a disposition effect significantly above 0%.  In contrast, only 11% of 
subjects in the cost basis treatment (2 of 18) exhibited a disposition effect significantly above 0%.  
Similarly, only 10% of subjects in the forecast treatment (2 of 20) exhibited a disposition effect 
significantly above 0%47.  Figure 4 also highlights an important aspect of the experimental 
design: the disposition effect is a suboptimal behavior, indicated by the negative correlation 
between earnings and the disposition effect (p<0.001).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Within subject standard errors of the disposition effect are computed as in (Odean (1998)).  
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B. Effect of cost basis treatment on sell decision 
 
Our goal in this section is to investigate the mechanism through which the absence of the cost 
basis leads to a smaller disposition effect, and hence, a higher rate of optimal behavior.  Our 
model says that when subjects are offered the opportunity to sell a stock, the decision is computed 
by assessing the tradeoff between the accrued capital gain that generates realization utility 
(backwards looking) and the NPV of selling (forward looking).  It follows that if this causes 
subjects to place a higher relative weight on the NPV of selling, which we manipulate by 
decreasing the saliency of the cost basis, then the disposition effect should decrease. We test this 
by estimating a logistic regression of the sell decision on the capital gain and the NPV of selling, 
allowing for different sensitivities to each of these variables in the cost basis condition.   
 Panel A of table 1 indicates that the effect of the capital gain in the control condition is 
significantly positive (p=0.049), but the effect of the NPV is not significantly different from zero 
(p=0.32).  There is also no significant marginal effect of the cost basis treatment on the capital 
gain in computing the sell decision (p=0.54).  Critically, we find that the NPV is significantly 
more predictive of the sell decision in the cost basis treatment than in the control condition 
(p=0.05).  This suggests that subjects pay more relative attention to expected returns, not because 
they pay less attention to the capital gain, but instead because they pay more attention to the NPV 
of selling.  
This is important because it rules out the following alternative hypothesis:  subjects would 
like to cater to their realization utility preferences, but are unable to do so because of imperfect 
recall of the cost basis.  If this alternative theory held, then the effect of the treatment on the 
disposition effect would occur only through a diminished weight on the cost basis.  Panel B of 
table 1 provides an alternative specification of the model that splits the capital gain into its price 
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and cost components, and indicates that there is no differential effect of the cost basis in the 
treatment condition.  Instead, our main results are robust to this specification, and the key 
interaction effect is stronger (p=0.035). 
We also find that the cost basis does not significantly predict the sell decision in the control 
condition, although the effect is in the right direction.  This is likely attributed to a noisier 
estimate of this coefficient because of small variation in the cost basis over time.  For a given 
holding period, the price will, on average, change every third trial, but the cost basis will remain 
the same.  Therefore, we have variation in the cost basis only across different holding periods, 
whereas we have variation in the price also across trials.   
 
C. Effect of forecast treatment on sell decision 
 
We now report results from an analysis designed to understand the mechanism through which 
the forecast treatment lowers the magnitude of the disposition effect.  In essence, we replicate the 
regression in the above section, but use data only from the control group and from those 
participants in the forecast treatment.  We hypothesize that displaying the optimal forecast should 
shift attention away from realization utility preferences and towards the forward-looking expected 
returns.  Panel A of table 2 confirms that in the control condition, the capital gain has a significant 
effect on the propensity to sell (p=0.049), but the NPV of selling does not (p=0.32).  As 
hypothesized, we find that displaying the optimal forecast on the trading screen significantly 
increases the weight of the NPV (p=0.002), but there is no significant marginal effect on the 
capital gain (p=0.50).  Panel B of table 2 displays an alternative specification where we split the 
capital gain into its price and cost components, and we find that the price is a significant predictor 
of the propensity to sell (p=0.03), but the cost basis is not (p=0.30).   
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III. Discussion 
 
We find that subjects exhibit a preference for realizing capital gains and losses on risky assets 
they own and they also exhibit a preference for final consumption.  Additionally, the weights on 
these two components of a subject’s hybrid preference structure can be manipulated by the 
saliency of the capital gain and expected return.  This is exhibited most starkly in Figure 2, which 
shows that the disposition effect is much weaker when subjects are exposed to trading screens 
where the capital gain has a low degree of saliency.  This manipulation of behavior is likely due 
to a shift of attention away from realization utility and towards expected returns, and it is unlikely 
because subjects cannot readily compute the capital gain due to lack of information about the cost 
basis.  In other words, the effect on investor behavior we see is due to the manner in which 
information is displayed, and not due to the information that is known to the subject. 
       Our ability to change the size of the disposition effect through two simple manipulations 
of the display of information is interesting because the disposition effect has been found to 
decrease average trading performance (Odean (1998)).  In order to model this empirical fact, we 
design our experiment so that stronger disposition effects explicitly lead to lower overall earnings 
(Figure 4).  Together, this shows that we are able to systematically manipulate the trading 
performance of a subject through different types of portfolio displays. 
To conclude, we highlight two main implications of our results, one is theoretical, and the 
other is practical.  A theoretical implication of our results concerns the malleability of 
preferences.  We show that saliency and attention to specific objects in a portfolio has the 
potential to change the relative weighting of preferences and therefore impact investor behavior 
(Libby et al. (2002); Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003)).  In particular, we show that realization utility 
preferences may not be fixed and “hard-wired” but are subject to environmental cues that can 
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trigger a desire to realize stocks with capital gains.  Hence, a richer theoretical analysis of 
investor behavior incorporating attention as a state variable may prove useful in future research.    
On the practical side, regulators may use our results as a policy tool in order to influence 
investor behavior.  For example, investors with realization utility preferences will trade to realize 
capital gains and hold stocks with capital losses, which leads to a disposition effect that can lower 
overall trading performance.  If regulators stipulate that brokerage houses decrease the saliency of 
the capital gain by removing the cost basis from the regular financial statements (as in our cost 
basis treatment), this would likely attenuate the disposition effect, and could increase individual 
investor trading performance.      
Interestingly, the US government recently enacted a new cost basis legislation in January 
2011 which effectively makes the cost basis more salient and may have the unintended effect of 
shifting investors’ attention towards realization utility.  Specifically, this legislation mandates that 
investors must decide, at the time of trading, which cost basis method they will use when 
reporting capital gains for tax purposes.  Previously, investors decided this method after the 
trading decision, and so this legislation effectively increases the saliency of the cost basis during 
the decision phase.  Our experimental results suggest that this may have a systematic and 
detrimental effect on the trading behavior of some individual investors.   
This legislation introduces a natural experiment to test the effect of modulating attention to 
past performance on trading behavior.  In particular, a testable implication of our theory of 
attention modulation is that the new cost basis legislation should induce investors to pay more 
attention to past performance, and it should lead to a higher average disposition effect among 
individual investors starting in January 2011.  We leave this to future empirical research of the 
effect of government policy on individual investor behavior.   
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Table 1.  Panel A shows results from a logistic regression of the sell decision on the capital gain 
and NPV of selling.  C2 denotes a dummy variable indicating that the subject was a participant in 
the cost basis treatment.  Only subjects from the control condition and cost basis treatment are 
included in the model, and all standard errors are clustered at the subject level.  Panel B provides 
another specification of the model that splits the capital gain into its price and cost components. 
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Table 2.  Panel A shows results from a logistic regression of the sell decision on the capital gain 
and NPV of selling.  C3 denotes a dummy variable indicating that the subject was a participant in 
the forecast treatment.  Panel B provides another specification of the model which splits the 
capital gain into its price and cost components. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
!"#$%&' !"#$%&(
!"#$$%!%#&' ()*+, !"#$$%!%#&' ()*+,
)*+ !"#$% ,-./0 !"#&' ,-100
2"345"%&6"4# !"!!& ,-,708
!94:$ !"!!% ,-,.18
2;<5 (!"!!) ,-10=
2. !"'!* ,-,,/888 !")&' ,-.,.
)*+&8&2. !"'+& ,-,,188 !"'$' ,-,,188
2"345"%&6"4#&8&2. (!"!!, ,->,/
!94:$&8&2. (!"!!+ ,->=>
2;<5&8&2. !"!!& ,-.7>
:;#<5"#5 (+"!+ ,-,,/888 (+"+%$ ,-,,/888
?&;@&;A< 7B7. 7B7.
<5"#C"9C&$99;9<&:%D<5$9$C&"5&<DAE-&%$F$%
	  	  	  
116	  
Figure 1.  Sample screens from control condition and treatments.  Each trial in every 
condition consisted of a “price update” screen (2 seconds), followed by a 1 second ITI, then 
followed by a “trading” screen (3 seconds).    A) Control condition.  Price and cost displayed on 
both screens.  B) Cost basis treatment.  Cost is removed on both screens.  C) Forecast treatment.  
The optimal forecast of the asset-specific next period price change is displayed on both screens.   
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Figure 2.  Average Disposition Effects (PGR-PLR).  Average disposition effects are displayed 
for the control condition and the two treatment conditions.  Both of the treatments significantly 
reduce the size of the disposition effect relative to the control condition.  The optimal level of the 
disposition effect for an expected value maximizing agent is given in red is -55%, which is 
significantly lower than the average in any of the three conditions. 
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Figure 3.  Decisions to Realize Gains and Hold Losses.  The figure displays the total number of 
trials, across treatments, where subjects sold a capital gain or held a capital loss.  Data are color-
coded by whether the decision was optimal or sub-optimal.  Realized gains are optimal when the 
NPV is negative, and paper losses are optimal when the NPV is positive.  In each condition, 
including the forecast treatment where the NPV is displayed on the screen, over half the decisions 
to realize gains and hold losses are suboptimal.       
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Figure 4.  Disposition effect and earnings.  Each point represents a single subject, and data are 
presented by condition.  The negative relationship between the disposition effect and earnings 
highlights an important aspect of our experimental design, which is that the disposition effect is a 
suboptimal behavior.  This relationship arises because of the momentum, or positive short-term 
autocorrelation, in the stock price changes.   
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Chapter 4 
MAOA-L Carriers are better at making optimal financial decisions under risk 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent research using twin-genetic studies has shown that some of the variation across 
people in their willingness to take risks can be attributed to heritability [1-3].  Additional 
work has begun to show associations between specific genes and financial risk-taking 
behavior [4-7]. Although these studies have been very valuable in identifying particular 
genes that might be associated with risk-taking behavior, they have not been able to 
identify the neurocomputational mechanisms that mediate the impact of genes on 
behavior.  This is an important shortcoming since a growing body of work in behavioral 
neuroscience and neuroeconomics has shown that there might be multiple mechanisms 
through which genes could affect risk-taking behavior. In particular, genes may affect 
behavior by changing the value assigned to different risky options [8, 9], or they may 
affect behavior by changing the way in which the brain adjudicates between the options 
based on their values [10].  
 
In this paper we shed some light on how genes affect the psychological processes 
associated with risk-taking behavior by combining tools from behavioral genetics, 
neuroeconomics, and experimental economics. In particular, we use experimental choice 
data to estimate well parameterized computational models of financial behavior under 
risk that allow us to test for the impact of the genes encoding for monoamine oxidase-A 
(MAOA), the serotonin transporter (5-HTTLPR), and the dopamine D4 receptor (DRD4) 
have on the two computations described above.  Employing a computational model 
allows us to isolate the underlying psychological mechanisms that contribute to choice 
heterogeneity across these genes.  Consistent with previous results, we find that a specific 
polymorphism of the MAOA gene is associated with an increased propensity to take 
financial risk. Our computational modeling approach also allowed us to identify the 
specific mechanism responsible for this increased appetite for risk, which allows for an 
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improved interpretation of previous behavioral genetic results.  
 
We focus on these three genes because they have been the subject of various previous 
behavioral genetic studies, and because much of the behavioral neuroscience literature 
points to an important role of the serotonergic, dopaminergic and noradrenergic systems 
in decision-making [11-15]. 
 
Monoamine oxidase-A is an enzyme that regulates the catabolism of monoamines 
including serotonin, dopamine, norepinphrine, and epinephrine.  These monoamines 
function as neurotransmitters in the central nervous system.  Expression of monoamine 
oxidase-A in the brain has been shown to be influenced by the variable number of tandem 
repeats (VNTR) in the MAOA gene [16].  In particular, carriers of the 3.5 or 4 repeats 
(MAOA-H) allele exhibit higher expression of the enzyme, whereas carriers of the 2, 3, 
or 5 repeats (MAOA-L) allele are associated with lower enzymatic expression.  The low-
activity variant of the MAOA gene has been shown to contribute to aggressive and 
impulsive behavior in mice and humans [17, 18].  At the neuroanatomical level, MAOA-
L carriers show lower activity in regulatory prefrontal areas and increased functional 
connectivity between vmPFC and amygdala regions [19, 20].  In addition, genetic 
variation in the MAOA gene has also been linked to a susceptibility to psychiatric 
diseases including pathological gambling [21].   
 
The serotonin transporter (5-HTTLPR) encodes a protein responsible for the reuptake of 
serotonin at the synaptic cleft. A short variant has been associated with lower 
transcriptional efficiency of the gene promoter and higher levels of anxiety, harm-
avoidance, and financial risk-aversion [5, 22, 23].  A long variant of the gene is 
associated with higher transcriptional efficiency and thus higher reuptake of serotonin 
into the presynaptic neuron.  The serotonin transporter is also the target of many anti-
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firing and serotonin transmission.   
 
The DRD4 gene influences the function of dopamine D4 receptors, for which a particular 
repeat sequence leads to functional differences in ligand binding.  This gene contains a 
48-bp VNTR in exon III which contains 2-11 repeats; carriers of the 7-repeat allele have 
been shown to require higher levels of dopamine to produce a response of similar 
magnitude to those without the 7-repeat allele [24].  Behaviorally, carriers of the 7-repeat 
allele score higher on novelty-seeking personality tests and also exhibit higher rates of 
pathological gambling [25, 26].  A recent study of an all-male population has also shown 
that carriers of the 7-repeat allele are willing to take more financial risk in an investment 
experiment [4], and a similar mixed-gender experiment confirms these results [5].  
 
II. RESULTS 
 
90 male subjects were asked to make choices between 140 different pairs of monetary 
gambles. Each pair contained a certain option (CO) involving a payout of $c with 100% 
probability, and a risky option (RO) involving a gain $g and a loss $l with equal 
probability (see methods for details). Subjects cared about their choices because at the 
end of the experiment one trial was selected at random and the payouts associated with 
the selected option were implemented. We failed to obtain successful genotyping on 6 
subjects, and 1 additional subject was excluded because ex-post debriefing showed that 
he did not understand the instructions. As a result, our effective sample size is N=83. 
 
Basic behavioral results. We compared the frequency with which the risky option was 
chosen by the different genetic groups (Fig. 1). MAOA-L carriers accepted the RO in 
41% of trials while MAOA-H carriers accepted 36% of the risky options (n=83, t=1.70, 
p<.046, one-tailed). However, the DRD4 and 5-HTTLPR polymorphisms were not 
associated with differences in the propensity to accept the risky option.  DRD4 7R+ 
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carriers accepted 39% of the risky options, while non-carriers accepted 38% of the time 
(n=83, t=0.60, p=0.27, one-tailed).  Subjects that were homozygous for the short allele of 
the 5-HTTLPR gene accepted 37% of risky options, while carriers of the long variant had 
a 39% acceptance rate (n=83, t=-0.66, p=0.26, one-tailed).  We also examined a different 
categorization of the 5-HTTLPR genotype and found that carriers of the short allele and 
those that were homozygous for the long allele both accepted the risky option 38% of the 
time (n=83, p=0.58, one-tailed).  One-tailed test statistics were used for these basic 
behavioral tests because multiple previous studies have shown that these polymorphisms 
are associated with increased risk-taking. 
 
Basic computational phenotype. In order to investigate the psychological mechanisms 
through which the MAOA gene affects the propensity to take financial risks we estimated 
the parameters of a linear prospect theoretic model for each of the subjects based on their 
choices. The use of this model is justified by the fact that a growing body of behavioral 
and neuroimaging evidence suggests that most individuals make risky choices by first 
assigning a value to the different lotteries according to the rules of Prospect Theory (PT) 
[8, 27-29], and then comparing those values to make a choice.  
 
We assumed that subjects evaluated the gambles using a simple linear version of prospect 
theory in which the utility of taking the RO is given by 
U(RO)=pg - λ(1-p)l, 
and the utility of taking the CO is given by 
U(CO)=CO. 
Here g denotes the gain associated with the risky option, l denotes the loss, p denotes the 
probability of the positive payoff, and  is a parameter measuring the relative value that 
the individual assigns to gains and losses. Note that most PT models also assume that 
probabilities are weighted non-linearly [27, 29]. However, since our study only considers 
50-50 gambles, and previous studies have found that the probability distortion at p =0.5 
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is small [30], we ignore this aspect of the theory.  
 
We assume that the choices are a stochastic function of values that is described by the 
softmax function: 
Pr(accept RO)=(1+exp(-a (U(RO) – U(CO)))-1 , 
where a is the inverse-temperature parameter that controls the quality of the decision-
making process: when a=0 subjects choose both options with equal probability regardless 
of their associated underlying values; as a increases the probability of choosing the 
option associated with the largest value increases.  
 
The model has two free parameters for each subject,  and a, which we estimated using 
maximum likelihood (see methods for details). For technical reasons described in the 
Supplementary Methods, we were able to successfully estimate all of the parameters for 
the two computational models discussed in the paper for 64 of the 83 subjects. For this 
reason all of the computational results here and below are limited to this smaller sample. 
The estimate of λ was 1.520.11 (meanse). The estimate of a was 3.060.60. See Table S2 
for a full list of the individual estimates.  41 subjects were significantly loss averse (λ>1), 
21 subjects were loss neutral, and 2 subjects were significantly loss seeking (λ<1). The 
average level of λ is similar to that found in other behavioral studies of loss aversion [30, 
31].   
 
Note the relationship between the parameters of the model and the psychological 
processes that affect choice. The coefficient of loss aversion  measures the relative value 
placed on potential gains and losses. When  is low, subjects engage in risk-taking 
behavior by overvaluing gains relative to losses. The opposite is true for high . As a 
result, this coefficient is a good indicator of the impact that the valuation process has on 
risk-taking. In contrast, the coefficient a measures the facility with which subjects are 
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able to choose the option with the highest value. Thus, a is a good measure of the 
performance of the comparison or choice processes. 
 
Genetic effects on the valuation process. We first investigated the extent to which the 
impact of the genetic polymorphisms on risk-taking behavior can be explained by 
changes in the valuation process. We did this by first regressing the individually 
estimated loss aversion parameters on each gene polymorphism, including controls for 
ethnicity and school attended.  We found no significant results for MAOA (n=64, t=-1.33, 
p=.19, two-tailed), DRD4 (n=64, t=-.09, p=.93, two-tailed) or 5-HTTLPR (n=64, t=.22 
p=.82, two-tailed). We then ran a multivariate specification by including all three gene 
polymorphisms in the same model (which also included the ethnicity and schooling 
controls) and found no significant effects for MAOA (t=-1.33, p=.19, two-tailed), DRD4 
(t=-.03, p=.98, two-tailed), or 5-HTTLPR (t=.31, p=.76, two-tailed).  Finally, because the 
multiplicative nature of the loss aversion parameter may bias the estimate of the mean, as 
a robustness check we also ran a version of the multivariate specification using log(λ) as 
the independent variable. Again, we found no significant effects for MAOA (t=-.92, 
p=.36, two-tailed), DRD4 (t=-.06, p=.95, two-tailed), or 5-HTTLPR (t=.43, p=.67, two-
tailed). 
 
Genetic effects on the choice process. We then investigated the extent to which the 
impact of the genetic polymorphisms on risk-taking behavior can be explained by 
changes in the comparison process. We did this by regressing the individual-fit of the 
inverse temperature parameters on each gene polymorphism controlling for ethnicity and 
school population. We found no significant effects for MAOA (n=64, t=-.47, p=.64, two-
tailed), DRD4 (n=64, t=.66, p=.51, two-tailed), or 5-HTTLPR (n=64, t=-.84, p=.40, two-
tailed).  The multivariate specification including all three polymorphisms and controls 
also failed to find significant effects for MAOA (t=-.40, p=.69, two-tailed), DRD4 (t=.44, 
p=.66, two-tailed), and 5-HTTLPR (t=-.64, p=.53, two-tailed).  
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Advanced computational phenotype. Since our basic behavioral results show a 
statistically significant difference in risk-taking behavior for MAOA that could not be 
explained by the simple computational model described above, we decided to complicate 
the model slightly by allowing for the inverse-temperature parameter to differ for choices 
in which the gamble had positive net expected utility and those that had negative net 
expected utility.  In particular, we used the same equations to model the valuation of the 
RO and CO, but we allowed for an asymmetric stochastic choice function: 
Pr(accept RO)=(1+exp(-a+(U(RO) – U(CO)))-1 ,      if   U(RO)-U(CO)0  
Pr(accept RO)=(1+exp(-a-(U(RO) – U(CO))) -1,     if   U(RO)-U(CO)< 0  
The selection of this specification was motivated by the fact that, under the estimates of 
the basic model, on average subjects rejected a higher percentage (93.3%) of gambles 
among those with negative expected utility than they accepted (85.4%) with positive 
expected utility (n=64, t=-4.43, p<0.001, two-tailed).  This suggested that subjects might 
be using a different comparison process when making choices between these two types of 
risks.   
 
As before, we estimated the individual model parameters using maximum likelihood (see 
Table S3 and Fig. S3 for a description of the individual fits). The estimate of λ was 
1.49.10.  The median estimates of a+ and a-  were 1.97 and 2.25, respectively (see the 
Supplementary Materials for discussion on technical issues related to the estimation of 
these two inverse-temperature parameters and a justification for the use of the median 
statistic to describe the population.)  The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) value for 
the unconstrained and constrained (a-=a+) models were 5022 and 5058, respectively, 
indicating a better fit when allowing for asymmetric temperature parameters.  
 
Genetic effects on the comparator process of advantageous and disadvantageous risks. 
Fig. 2 displays logistic fits to the average group choices for each MAOA group, allowing 
for different slopes in the positive and negative EU domains. The net utility for each 
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gamble was computed using the model fits from the advanced computational model. Note 
that the logit curve summarizes the performance of the comparator process by relating the 
net utility of the risky option to the probability that it is chosen as steeper slopes of the 
logistic curve correspond to higher rates of optimal decision making. The figure shows 
that there were no differences when the RO had a lower value than the CO, but that there 
was a systematic difference when this was not the case:  MAOA-L carriers chose the 
optimal action more often than MAOA-H carriers when faced with advantageous risk. A 
formal statistical test confirmed the difference between the two groups (Fig. 3): MAOA-
L carriers accepted the risky option 6.4% more often than MAOA-H carriers (n=64, 
t=2.49 p=0.015, two-tailed) when the risky option had a positive net expected utility, but 
there was no significant difference in acceptance rates over the negative EU domain 
(n=64, t=.51, p=0.62, two tailed), in both cases controlling for ethnicity. Because the 
latter conclusion was justified by rejection of the null, we subsequently ran a more 
conservative statistical test by estimating the interaction effect between the MAOA 
genotype and a dummy for positive EU gambles; we found a positive coefficient on the 
interaction term, consistent with our previous test, although the result was slightly weaker 
(n=64, t=1.95, p=0.056, two tailed).  Note that our statistical test was constructed by 
integrating under each of the choice curves in the positive and negative EU domains, and 
thus acts as a non-parametric test of group differences between the a+ and a- parameters. 
Similar analyses for DRD4 and 5-HTT did not reveal any significant differences in choice 
behavior.    
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
The computational approach used in the paper allowed us to conclude that MAOA-L 
carriers are more likely to take a financial risk than their MAOA-H counterparts, but only 
when it is advantageous to do so given their preferences over risk. For disadvantageous 
gambles there was no difference between the two groups. This suggests that MAOA-L 
carriers perform better in the case of risky financial decision making since they exhibit an 
improved ability to select the optimal response when it is advantageous. Contrary to 
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previous findings in the literature [4, 5], we found no significant differences in either 
gambling tendencies or the computations associated with valuation or choice for the 5-
HTTLPR and DRD4 genes. 
 
Our results for MAOA are consistent with previous related behavioral genetic studies, 
although our computational approach provides novel insights about the mechanism 
through which this gene influences risky financial choice. Previous studies have found 
that MAOA-L carriers are more likely to exhibit aggressive and risky behavior [6, 18, 19, 
21].  Contrary to previous discussion in the literature [6, 19, 21], our results show that 
these behavioral patterns are not necessarily counterproductive [19, 21], since in the case 
of financial choice these subjects engage in more risky behavior only when it is 
advantageous to do so. This provides a cautionary tale on the interpretation of previous 
behavioral results related to MAOA, and on the common practice in the literature of 
relating genes to behavior without specifying and estimating a computational phenotype.   
 
The fact that the MAOA gene influences the catabolism of monoamines (such as 
serotonin, dopamine, norepinphrine, and epinephrine) also allow us to connect our 
findings with various other strands of the literature. Previous neuroscience studies have 
shown that humans with higher levels of norepinephrine typically choose the action 
carrying the highest immediate reward [11, 15].  Our results are consistent with this claim 
as monoamine oxidase is responsible for the catabolism of norepinephrine, and low 
activity carriers of MAOA will tend to have lower enzymatic activity and thus increased 
levels of norepinephrine.  A recent study which examined the cognitive effects of 
norepinephrine in mice found that pharmacologically manipulating norepineprhine levels 
downward resulted in decreased “immediate performance accuracy” [32], which is also 
consistent with our finding that MAOA affects the temperature parameters that control the 
accuracy of choices. 
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Monoamine oxidase also plays a role in breaking down dopamine. Therefore, 
dopaminergic transmission might also play a role in the computational phenotype 
identified here.   Consistent with our findings, a recent study in which in vitro 
dopaminergic levels were experimentally manipulated through L-DOPA and the impact 
on optimal choice behavior was measured [33] found that increased dopamine levels lead 
to more optimal choices in a simple learning task. 
  
The fact that we failed to find behavioral or computational differences between the 5-
HTTLPR and DRD4 genotypes is also consistent with the previous literature. Some recent 
studies have found significant effects of both of these genes on financial risk-taking 
behavior [4, 5], but other studies have failed to replicate these results. For example, a 
recent fMRI study found a significant effect of 5-HTTLPR on the framing induced choice 
biases, but it failed to find a link between the 5-HTTLPR polymorphism and financial risk 
taking [34].  Another study also failed to find any 5-HTTLPR associations between risk 
attitudes over the gain and loss domains [35].  The DRD4 gene has also been implicated 
in impulsive behavior and novelty-seeking in a variety of studies [25, 26], but these 
results have also not been consistently replicated [36, 37].  In particular, a larger meta-
analysis also does not find a significant association between the DRD4 polymorphism 
and impulsive or risky behavior [38].  One potential reason for our failure to identify a 
significant effect of 5-HTTLPR on financial risk taking is limited statistical power for this 
gene: the distribution of the key polymorphism was unbalanced in our subject population, 
with only 27% being homozygous for the short allele. 
As with any behavioral genetic study, it is also important to pay close attention to the 
behavioral specificity of the phenotype we define.  It is possible that the phenotypic 
difference we find for the MAOA-L polymorphism may arise from a more general 
cognitive effect, such as intelligence or numerical ability.  We do not have a sufficient 
battery of controls that can definitively rule out these broader psychological mechanisms 
nor do we have controls for potential environmental variables (eg, income) that could 
interact with the MAOA gene to produce the effect.  However, one advantage of 
estimating a computational phenotype is that it allows us to precisely identify the 
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parameter that is driving the heterogeneity in choice within the model.  If this 
heterogeneity were driven by a more general cognitive or environmental variable, then 
this mechanism should also mediate choice behavior in a manner consistent with our 
asymmetric result on optimal action selection.      
 
Our results suggest several natural directions for further research. First, future studies 
should investigate the neurochemical basis of decision-making to understand the 
quantitative relationship between norepineprhine, dopamine, monoamine oxidase, and 
optimal choice.  Our results provide support for the hypothesis that higher levels of 
norepinephrine and dopamine correspond to a greater level of action selection optimality, 
but further research must be conducted to fully understand this relationship [11].  Second, 
our results indicate the need for future genetic studies to specify a computational 
phenotype that separates the valuation and choice processes, as subjects with similar 
preferences might still make very different choices. 
 
IV. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
Subjects. 90 male subjects, ages 19-27, participated in the study. Subjects were students 
at Caltech (59) or at a nearby community college. We restricted our population to males 
to avoid gender as a confounding factor and to avoid difficulties in the analysis of the 
MAOA gene (males carry only one allele while females carry two). Subjects self-
reported ethnicity was as follows: 53 Caucasian, 13 Latin/Hispanic, 9 Indian, 3 African-
American, 3 Asian, and 9 other. However, we failed to obtain successful genotyping on 6 
subjects, and 1 additional subject was excluded because ex-post debriefing showed that 
he did understand the instructions. As a result, our effective sample size is N=83. The 
study was approved by Caltech’s Human Subjects Committee.  
 
Behavioral task. Subjects received twenty-five dollars for participating in the study. They 
were allowed to risk part of these funds during the following decision-making task. In 
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each trial they were shown a pair of gambles and had to choose one of them. One option 
involved certain nonnegative payoffs (e.g., gain $0 with probability 100%). We refer to it 
as the certain option (CO).  The other option involved a 50%-50% gamble between a gain 
and a loss (e.g., winning $7 and losing $4 with equal probability). We refer to it as the 
risky option (RO). Subjects made decisions in 140 different trials without feedback on a 
private computer. The order of the choices was randomized within subjects.  Table S1 
lists the entire set of payoffs used. 
 
Both options were displayed simultaneously on the screen until the subject made a 
decision. Subjects made a decision using a five point scale: 1=strongly reject the risk 
option, 2=weakly reject the risky option, 3=indifferent between both options, 4=accept 
the risky option, 5=strongly accept the risky option. For the purpose of the computational 
analysis, the responses were collapsed into a binary response (with 5 & 4 coded as 
accept, 1 and 2 coded as reject, and 3’s allocated randomly to the two conditions).  To 
make sure that we did not lose information when collapsing the choice data into binary 
responses, we estimated an ordered logistic regression and found that 95% confidence 
intervals for the interior cutpoints (responses 2, 3 and 4) overlapped.  This suggests that 
using the 5-point scale would not add significant information to the behavioral and 
genetic analyses performed in the paper.  Subjects failed to enter a response in 4% of the 
trials, which were excluded from further analyses. Subjects cared about the choices 
because one trial was selected at random at the end of the experiment and his choice for 
that trial was implemented. Average earnings were $28.    
 
Genotyping. Genetic data was collected from each subject using an Oragene DNA OG-
500 saliva collection kit. Six subjects were unsuccessfully genotyped for one or more 
genes and were dropped from all genetic analyses. 
5-HTTLPR was identified as follows.  The forward primer was labeled with 6FAM-5’-
GGC GTTGCC GCT CTG AAT GC-3’, the reverse primer was unlabelled 5’-GAG GGA 
CTGAGC TGG ACA ACC AC-3’, which yielded 484-bp (short) and 527-bp (long) 
fragments. Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) was performed in a total volume of 25 µL, 
containing 50 ng of DNA; 1µl of each primer(10µM stock); 1.5µl of (25mM)MgCl2; 2% 
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DMSO (v/v); 2.5 U Amplitaq Gold DNA polymerase (Applied Biosystems, Foster City, 
California); 2ul of Deaza dNTP (2mM each dATP,dCTP,dTTP,1mMdGTP,1mM deaza 
dGTP). Cycling conditions consisted of (1) an initial 12 min denaturation at 94°C; (2) 8 
cycles with denaturation for 30 sec at 94°C, varied annealing temperatures consisting of 
30 sec at 66°C (2 cycles), then 65°C (3 cycles), then 64°C (3 cycles), followed by 
hybridization for 1 min at 72°C; (3) 35 cycles with an annealing temperature of 63°C and 
the same denaturation and hybridization parameters; and (4) a final extension for 20 min 
at 72°C.  
 
MAOA was identified as follows.  The forward primer was labeled with VIC-5’-
ACAGCCTGACCGTGGAGAAG -3’, the reverse primer was unlabelled 5’-
GAACGGACGCTCCATTCGGA -3’. Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) was performed 
in a total volume of 10 µL, containing 25 ng of DNA; 0.5µl of each primer(10µM 
stock);10x PCR buffer 0.8µl, dNTP 0.8µl,DMSO 0.8 µl,25mM MgCl2 0.8 µl, 0.064 µl of 
Amplitaq Gold ( AppliedBiosystems).  Cycling conditions consisted of (1) an initial 12 
min denaturation at 95°C; (2) 35cycles of 94°C for 30sec, 59°C for 30sec, 72°C for 2min.  
 
DRD4 was identified as follows.  The forward primer was labeled with VIC-5’-AGG 
ACC CTC ATG GCC TTG -3’, the reverse primer was unlabelled 5’-GCG ACT ACG 
TGG TCT ACT CG -3’.  Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) was performed in a total 
volume of 10 µL, containing 25 ng of DNA; 0.5µl of each primer(10µM stock);Takara 
LA Taq 0.1 µl,5µl 2x GC Buffer II ,1.6 µl dNTP. Cycling conditions consisted of (1) an 
initial 1 min denaturation at 95°C; (2) 30 cycles of 94°C for 30sec, 62°C for 30sec, 72°C 
for 2min; (3) 72°C for 5min. In all cases the PCR products were electrophoresed on an 
ABI 3730 DNA analyzer (Applied Biosystems) with a LIZ1200 size standard 
(AppliedBiosystems), and Data collection and analysis used the Genemapper software 
(Applied Biosystems). 
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Genotype equilibrium.  Allele and genotype frequencies are given in Tables S4 – S7.  A 
Pearson-Chi squared test failed to reject the null hypothesis that the 5-HTTLPR gene was 
in Hardy-Weinberg Equilibrium (HWE) in our subject pool (2=0.98, df=1, p>0.32).  
Since males possess only one allele of the MAOA gene, HWE is trivially satisfied.  
Finally, because of its multiple allele structure [39], we used a Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo (MCMC) method to test the null hypothesis that DRD4 was in HWE.  The test 
failed to reject the null hypothesis (p=0.689). 
 
Computational phenotype. The parameters for the two computational models described in 
the results section were estimated by optimizing the non-linear likelihood function using 
the Nelder-Mead Simplex Method [40], as implemented in Matlab 2008b. We computed 
standard errors for the estimated parameters using parametric bootstrapping with a re-
sampling size of 500.  For each subject we estimated individual parameters from the 
choice data and then used the estimates to generate a set of 500 pseudosamples of choice 
data.  We then used the same MLE procedure described above to estimate the parameters 
in each of the pseudosamples. The standard error of the parameter estimate was then 
estimated by the standard deviation of this set of samples.     
 
We assessed the model fit of the unconstrained computational model by computing the 
percent of choices correctly predicted for each subject at individually fitted parameter 
values, which was 88.8% on average.  
 
For technical reasons explained in the Supplementary Materials, we failed to estimate one 
or more model parameters for 19 out of 83 subjects. The computational results described 
in the paper only apply to the 64 subjects for which all parameters were estimated 
successfully. 
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A potentially important simplification used in the computational models is the linearity of 
the value function. We tested the robustness of this assumption by estimating a non-linear 
version of the simple prospect theoretic model given by the following three equations: 
 
1. (1) U(RO)= pg ρ - λ(1-p)lρ 
2. (2) U(CO)=COρ                    
3. (3) Pr(accept RO) =(1+exp(-a (U(RO) – U(CO)))-1 .            
 
This model contains an additional parameter that allows for the possibility that value 
might be a non-linear function of the payoffs. We estimated the model using the same 
MLE procedure described above. However, due to insufficient concavity of the 
likelihood function, we failed to successfully estimate parameters for 5 additional 
subjects that we were able to estimate the model for under the constraint ρ=1.  Of the 
remaining subjects, average estimates of λ, ρ and a were 1.51, 1.03, and 2.95, 
respectively.  We ran a likelihood ratio test for each individual under the null hypothesis 
that ρ=1, and determined that we could reject a linear value function in 46 of 65 subjects 
at the 5% significance level.  Furthermore, a t-test on the distribution of the unconstrained 
estimates of ρ did not reject the null hypothesis that the average value of ρ in the 
population is 1 (p=.29)  Because of the lack of heterogeneity in ρ, and because including 
this extra parameter did not significantly improve the model fit, we focused the analysis 
in the paper on the simple and advanced versions of the linear prospect theory model. 
 
Estimation of advanced computational model. The advanced computational model is described by 
the following four equations: 
1) U(RO)=pg - λ(1-p)l, 
2) U(CO)=CO. 
3) Pr(accept RO)=(1+exp(-a+(U(RO) – U(CO)))-1 ,      if   U(RO)-U(CO)>=0  
4) Pr(accept RO)=(1+exp(-a-(U(RO) – U(CO)))-1,     if   U(RO)-U(CO)< 0  
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The first two equations describe the valuation process and the second pair of equations describes 
the probability with which subjects choose the option with the highest net expected utility. 
We used maximum likelihood to estimate the parameter vector 
! 
"=(λ, a+, a-) for each subject.  
This required maximizing the following likelihood function: 
! 
l(" | y, p) = yi log(F(p," ))+ (1# yi)log(1# F(p,"))
i=1
140
$
 
where 
F(p, 
! 
" )=(1+exp(-a+(U(RO) – U(CO)))-1 ,      if   U(RO)-U(CO)>=0 
F(p, 
! 
" )=(1+exp(-a-(U(RO) – U(CO)))-1,     if   U(RO)-U(CO)<0, 
 i indexes the trial number, y indicates the response, p describes the design matrix of the 
behavioral task, and 
! 
"  indicates the parameter vector to be estimated.  We used the Nelder-Mead 
Simplex Method as implemented in Matlab 2008b to obtain point estimates for each parameter.   
 
As described in the methods section, we failed to successfully estimate at least one parameters for 
19 out of 83 subjects that comprise our effective sample size.  9 subjects were dropped due to 
insufficient variation in responses, which makes estimation impossible.  8 subjects were excluded 
because their behavior was random, in the sense of being unresponsive to the underlying 
valuations options. 2 were excluded for failing to satisfy the basic “rationality” constraint that 
when the expected utility of the risky option is higher than the certain option, the risky option 
should always be accepted. Table S8 describes the sample sizes and explanations for all analyses 
in the main text. 
 
Estimation problems for randomless choice behavior. We failed to estimate parameters of the 
advanced computational phenotype for 9 subjects (6 MAOA-H and 3 MAOA-L) due to lack of 
variation in observed choices.  This type of complication arises when subjects always choose the 
highest value option without any noise, which corresponds to the case a=∞. This makes 
parameter estimation impossible since the resulting choice behavior can be generated using any 
sufficiently large temperature parameter a. This leads to a flat likelihood function in this range of 
the temperature parameters that makes maximization of the likelihood function over this range 
infeasible. This type of complication is more severe for the advanced computational phenotype 
because estimation will fail if subjects respond without noise in either the positive or negative EU 
domain. 
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Estimation problems for random choice behavior. On the other end of the spectrum from 
noiseless choice performance is random behavior.   We failed to estimate the parameters of 8 
subjects (5 MAOA-H and 3 MAOA-L) due to this problem. In particular, for these subjects the 
maximum likelihood procedure generated a nonsensical negative estimate for either a+ or a-. This 
problem can arise when subjects’ parameters induce valuations that lead to a positive net value 
for the risky option in only a small fraction of the 140 choice pairs, for which the subject 
responds sub-optimally within this small set of trials. 
 
About the identification of the temperature parameters: a+ and a- . The introduction of two 
temperature parameters in the advanced model makes the estimation problem more difficult than 
in the basic model. The fundamental problem is illustrated in Fig. S1, which shows that the 
fraction of trials in which the risky option has a positive net utility decreases rapidly with λ, 
which makes it difficult to obtain precise estimates of a+ and a- .  Intuitively, the econometric 
difficulty arises because the sample size of trials in the positive and negative EU domain is 
endogenously determined by λ.  When λ takes on an extremely high (low) value, the sample size 
of the positive (negative) EU domain becomes very small, which induces highly imprecise 
estimates of all computational model parameters.  This estimation problem is intensified when 
subjects respond using either random or purely randomless behavior, as described above.     
 
 
Example of estimation problems. Here we show that the estimation problems described above can 
arise even with simulated data in which we know that the underlying computational model 
applies. Consider a hypothetical subject with λ=2.5, in which case only 23% of trials (33 of 140 
trials) will have a positive net RO, a-=3, and a+ very large, so that she responds with noiseless 
choice performance in the positive EU domain. We simulated choice data from this hypothetical 
subject and attempted to estimate parameters using both the basic and advanced computational 
model.  For the basic computational model, the parameters are estimated correctly and the 
likelihood function is concave in a (Fig S4).  However, when estimating the advanced 
computational phenotype, the maximization algorithm does not converge and terminates the 
search procedure prematurely at: λ=2.38, a+=386, a-=208.  Fig S5 shows that this is because the 
likelihood function is not concave in a+; the likelihood surface is flat in the a+ dimension, and 
there is a continuum of parameter values that fit the data equally well.  This leads to a failed 
maximization procedure, and an inability to estimate the advanced computational model.   
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To compare this function with data generated from a subject who does not respond with noiselss 
choice performance, we generated a data set from another hypothetical subject with λ=2.5 and 
a+=a-=3.  Because this hypothetical subject does not respond with noiseless choice performance 
in the positive EU domain, we are able to successfully estimate the advanced computational 
model.  The likelihood function for this subject is plotted in Fig S6, which shows the function is 
concave in both dimensions, allowing for successful maximization.     
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Fig. 1.  Choice of the risky option by genetic group.  MAOA-L carriers accepted the 
risky optional significantly more often that MAOA-H carriers: 41.2% vs. 36.3% 
(p=0.046).  Differences in the acceptance rates for the 5-HTTLPR and DRD4 
polymorphisms were not significant.    46% of the risky options in our design had a 
positive net expected value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  
139	  
Fig. 2.  Propensity to choose the RO as a function of its net expected utility (using 
individually fitted PT parameters).  The single solid black curve in the negative net EU 
domain indicates there was no difference in acceptance rates across the MAOA 
polymorphism when the net EU was negative. However, the two dashed curves in the 
positive net EU domain show there was a systematic difference in the propensity to 
accept the RO: MAOA-L carriers (black) accepted the risky offer significantly more 
often than MAOA-H carriers (grey).  Net EU is partitioned into bins of length 0.5 and the 
average group acceptance rate within each bin is displayed for MAOA-L and MAOA-H. 
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Fig. 3. Propensity to choose the option with highest expected utility as a function of the 
MAOA polymorphism.  
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Fig. S1.  Number of experimental trials in which the RO had positive and negative net EU as a 
function of the underlying loss aversion parameter. 
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Fig. S2. MLE estimates of the loss aversion parameter under the basic and advanced 
computational models.   
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Fig. S3. Distribution of individual loss aversion estimates under the advanced computational 
phenotype.    
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Fig. S4. Log-likelihood function of basic computational model.   Choice data is simulated from 
hypothetical subject with λ=2.5, a-=3, and noiseless choice performance in positive EU domain.  
The likelihood function is plotted at λ =2.5.  The function is concave, allowing for maximization 
and successful estimation of the basic computational model.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lo
g	  
Li
ke
lih
oo
d	  
Va
lu
e	  
Inverse	  Temperature	  Parameter	  
	  	  	  
145	  
Fig. S5. Log-likelihood function of advanced computational model.   Choice data is simulated 
from hypothetical subject with λ=2.5, a-=3, and noiseless choice performance in positive EU 
domain.  The likelihood function is plotted at λ =2.5.  The function is flat in the a+ dimension, 
because of the noiseless choice performance in the positive EU domain.  This causes the 
maximization of the log-likelihood function to fail, and leads to estimation problems for the a- 
parameter as well. 
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Fig. S6. Log-likelihood function of advanced computational model.   Choice data is simulated 
from hypothetical subject with λ=2.5, a+=a-=3.  The likelihood function is plotted at λ =2.5.  The 
function is concave in both the a+and a- dimensions, which allows for successful estimation.  The 
region that maximizes the log-likelihood function is depicted in orange. 
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Table S1.  Binary choices used in the experiment.  CO indicates certain option.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gain Loss CO   Gain Loss CO   Gain Loss CO 
$12.00 -$24.00 $0.00  $2.00 -$3.50 $0.00  $4.00 -$1.50 $0.00 
$12.00 -$22.50 $0.00  $4.00 -$5.50 $0.00  $5.00 -$2.50 $0.00 
$10.00 -$20.00 $0.00  $6.00 -$7.50 $0.00  $10.00 -$7.50 $0.00 
$9.00 -$18.00 $0.00  $12.00 -$13.50 $0.00  $4.00 -$1.00 $0.00 
$12.00 -$21.00 $0.00  $2.00 -$3.25 $0.00  $6.00 -$3.00 $0.00 
$10.00 -$18.75 $0.00  $5.00 -$6.25 $0.00  $8.00 -$5.00 $0.00 
$8.00 -$16.00 $0.00  $10.00 -$11.25 $0.00  $12.00 -$9.00 $0.00 
$9.00 -$16.88 $0.00  $9.00 -$10.13 $0.00  $5.00 -$1.88 $0.00 
$10.00 -$17.50 $0.00  $2.00 -$3.00 $0.00  $9.00 -$5.63 $0.00 
$12.00 -$19.50 $0.00  $4.00 -$5.00 $0.00  $5.00 -$1.25 $0.00 
$8.00 -$15.00 $0.00  $8.00 -$9.00 $0.00  $6.00 -$2.25 $0.00 
$9.00 -$15.75 $0.00  $2.00 -$2.75 $0.00  $10.00 -$6.25 $0.00 
$10.00 -$16.25 $0.00  $6.00 -$6.75 $0.00  $8.00 -$4.00 $0.00 
$6.00 -$12.00 $0.00  $5.00 -$5.63 $0.00  $6.00 -$1.50 $0.00 
$8.00 -$14.00 $0.00  $2.00 -$2.50 $0.00  $9.00 -$4.50 $0.00 
$12.00 -$18.00 $0.00  $4.00 -$4.50 $0.00  $12.00 -$7.50 $0.00 
$9.00 -$14.63 $0.00  $2.00 -$2.25 $0.00  $8.00 -$3.00 $0.00 
$6.00 -$11.25 $0.00  $2.00 -$2.00 $0.00  $10.00 -$5.00 $0.00 
$5.00 -$10.00 $0.00  $4.00 -$4.00 $0.00  $9.00 -$3.38 $0.00 
$8.00 -$13.00 $0.00  $5.00 -$5.00 $0.00  $8.00 -$2.00 $0.00 
$10.00 -$15.00 $0.00  $6.00 -$6.00 $0.00  $12.00 -$6.00 $0.00 
$6.00 -$10.50 $0.00  $8.00 -$8.00 $0.00  $10.00 -$3.75 $0.00 
$9.00 -$13.50 $0.00  $9.00 -$9.00 $0.00  $9.00 -$2.25 $0.00 
$12.00 -$16.50 $0.00  $10.00 -$10.00 $0.00  $10.00 -$2.50 $0.00 
$5.00 -$9.38 $0.00  $12.00 -$12.00 $0.00  $12.00 -$4.50 $0.00 
$4.00 -$8.00 $0.00  $2.00 -$1.75 $0.00  $12.00 -$3.00 $0.00 
$8.00 -$12.00 $0.00  $2.00 -$1.50 $0.00  $2.00 $0.00 $1.00 
$5.00 -$8.75 $0.00  $4.00 -$3.50 $0.00  $3.00 $0.00 $1.00 
$6.00 -$9.75 $0.00  $5.00 -$4.38 $0.00  $4.00 $0.00 $2.00 
$10.00 -$13.75 $0.00  $2.00 -$1.25 $0.00  $5.00 $0.00 $2.00 
$4.00 -$7.50 $0.00  $6.00 -$5.25 $0.00  $7.00 $0.00 $3.00 
$9.00 -$12.38 $0.00  $2.00 -$1.00 $0.00  $8.00 $0.00 $3.00 
$5.00 -$8.13 $0.00  $4.00 -$3.00 $0.00  $12.00 $0.00 $6.00 
$4.00 -$7.00 $0.00  $8.00 -$7.00 $0.00  $12.00 $0.00 $5.00 
$6.00 -$9.00 $0.00  $9.00 -$7.88 $0.00  $12.00 $0.00 $4.00 
$8.00 -$11.00 $0.00  $2.00 -$0.75 $0.00  $13.00 $0.00 $5.00 
$12.00 -$15.00 $0.00  $5.00 -$3.75 $0.00  $13.00 $0.00 $6.00 
$4.00 -$6.50 $0.00  $10.00 -$8.75 $0.00  $19.00 $0.00 $8.00 
$5.00 -$7.50 $0.00  $2.00 -$0.50 $0.00  $22.00 $0.00 $10.00 
$10.00 -$12.50 $0.00  $4.00 -$2.50 $0.00  $23.00 $0.00 $10.00 
$6.00 -$8.25 $0.00  $6.00 -$4.50 $0.00  $25.00 $0.00 $9.00 
$9.00 -$11.25 $0.00  $12.00 -$10.50 $0.00  $25.00 $0.00 $10.00 
$2.00 -$4.00 $0.00  $5.00 -$3.13 $0.00  $26.00 $0.00 $10.00 
$4.00 -$6.00 $0.00  $4.00 -$2.00 $0.00  $26.00 $0.00 $12.00 
$8.00 -$10.00 $0.00  $8.00 -$6.00 $0.00  $28.00 $0.00 $13.00 
$5.00 -$6.88 $0.00  $6.00 -$3.75 $0.00  $30.00 $0.00 $12.00 
$2.00 -$3.75 $0.00  $9.00 -$6.75 $0.00     !
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Table S2. Individual parameter estimates in the basic computational model. 
 
ID ! a ID ! a
1 2.35 ±0.37 0.72 ±0.23 46 1.97 ±0.18 1.37 ±0.38
2 1.76 ±0.16 1.16 ±0.29 47 1.07 ±0.03 6.7 ±2.49
3 0.99 ±0.04 2.65 ±0.66 48 2.52 ±0.22 1.62 ±0.55
4 4.94 ±1.49 0.72 ±0.44 49 1.21 ±0.05 2.71 ±0.68
5 1 ±0.04 2.77 ±0.72 50 1.05 ±0.05 1.89 ±0.45
6 0.96 ±0.03 6.51 ±2.45 51 1.28 ±0.11 0.94 ±0.21
7 0.93 ±0.05 1.49 ±0.3 52 1.35 ±0.11 1 ±0.23
8 1.08 ±0.03 6.18 ±2.26 53 0.81 ±0.2 0.3 ±0.12
9 1.1 ±0.06 1.67 ±0.39 54 1.38 ±0.15 0.67 ±0.16
10 0.92 ±0.05 1.74 ±0.34 55 1.11 ±0.07 1.48 ±0.32
11 1.04 ±0.06 1.67 ±0.38 56 1.1 ±0.05 0.7 ±0.22
12 1.18 ±0.08 1.2 ±0.25 57 1.95 ±0.36 0.48 ±0.15
13 5.68 ±1.42 1.16 ±3.39 58 0.69 ±0.01 0.86 ±3.69
14 1.24 ±0.11 0.82 ±0.19 59 2.09 ±0.13 0.65 ±0.13
15 1.09 ±0.04 7.58 ±2.96 60 1.02 ±0 4.39 ±0.77
16 1.49 ±0.1 1.5 ±0.37 61 1.88 ±1.44 1.03 ±0.36
17 1.08 ±0.07 1.1 ±0.23 62 1.08 ±0 14.13 ±0
18 1.6 ±0.18 0.7 ±0.17 63 1.25 ±0.15 1.74 ±0.42
19 1.06 ±0.08 1.04 ±0.22 64 0.96 ±0.29 2.53 ±7.34
20 1.02 ±0.06 1.67 ±0.35
21 1.03 ±0.03 10.22 ±3.89
22 1.12 ±0.04 3.01 ±0.83
23 1.28 ±0.07 2.02 ±0.52
24 1.14 ±0.05 2.95 ±0.8
25 1.4 ±0.1 1.18 ±0.28
26 1.45 ±0.07 2.38 ±0.67
27 1.23 ±0.15 0.21 ±0.09
28 0.66 ±0.02 2.49 ±0.52
29 1.3 ±0.06 2.98 ±0.78
30 1.1 ±0.03 6.73 ±2.63
31 1.97 ±0.13 1.98 ±0.62
32 1.19 ±0.06 2.51 ±0.66
33 0.99 ±0.03 5.69 ±2.01
34 2.05 ±0.22 0.97 ±0.24
35 0.97 ±0.04 2.65 ±0.64
36 1.26 ±0.05 3.44 ±1.23
37 1.46 ±0.12 1.09 ±0.24
38 4.18 ±0.62 3.73 ±18.9
39 1.21 ±0.04 3.89 ±1.26
40 1.49 ±0.09 2.07 ±0.54
41 1.85 ±0.16 1.24 ±0.33
42 2.19 ±0.17 1.94 ±0.63
43 1.45 ±0.07 2.77 ±0.89
44 1.09 ±0.06 7.7 ±3.12
45 1.49 ±0.12 1.11 ±0.25
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Table S3. Individual parameter estimates for advanced computational phenotype 
 
 
 
ID ! a+ a- ID ! a+ a-
1 1.6 ±0.2 0.27 ±0.22 >100 ±14.25 46 2.02 ±0.29 1.6 ±2.26 1.19 ±3.79
2 2.63 ±0.37 15.61 ±9.13 0.43 ±0.15 47 1 ±0.07 4.62 ±1.73 >100 ±2.17
3 1 ±0.06 2.92 ±4.17 2.35 ±3.61 48 2.56 ±0.35 1.97 ±1.96 1.39 ±3.65
4 2.72 ±0.35 0.31 ±0.34 13.16 ±10.33 49 1.29 ±0.1 3.81 ±7.11 1.89 ±3.58
5 0.88 ±0.04 1.86 ±0.77 >100 ±2.13 50 1.29 ±0.07 12.41 ±15.4 0.94 ±0.35
6 0.99 ±0.03 >100 ±15.19 4.16 ±6.37 51 1.21 ±0.19 0.69 ±0.33 1.38 ±4.64
7 1.31 ±0.14 5.51 ±10.79 0.47 ±1.1 52 1 ±0.09 0.63 ±0.2 3.16 ±8.03
8 1 ±0.08 3.99 ±2.03 >100 ±0.4 53 0.91 ±0.96 0.37 ±2.7 0.16 ±6.06
9 1.13 ±0.09 2.06 ±3.32 1.35 ±1.6 54 1.36 ±0.34 0.65 ±0.91 0.7 ±2.44
10 0.97 ±0.07 2.38 ±0.98 1.22 ±1.99 55 1.09 ±0.11 1.39 ±0.53 1.64 ±4.11
11 0.88 ±0.04 1.12 ±0.33 >100 ±4.21 56 1.01 ±0.47 0.55 ±1.81 1.04 ±5.21
12 0.88 ±0.05 0.7 ±0.24 >100 ±6.15 57 1 ±0.25 0.14 ±0.16 2.49 ±5.78
13 5.5 ±1.36 1.14 ±0.71 1.26 ±15.26 58 0.54 ±0.4 0.65 ±1.69 9.25 ±8.63
14 1.16 ±0.29 0.63 ±3.41 1.16 ±0.7 59 2.4 ±0.57 0.99 ±0.91 0.47 ±1.63
15 1.13 ±0.03 33.74 ±15.31 5.1 ±4.2 60 1.14 ±0.05 >100 ±3.67 2.16 ±1.3
16 1.15 ±0.07 0.9 ±0.34 36.11 ±13.49 61 2.29 ±0.28 5.55 ±7.16 0.56 ±0.27
17 1.15 ±0.14 1.35 ±1.83 0.84 ±2.23 62 1 ±0.06 7.94 ±3.27 >100 ±0.61
18 1.92 ±0.41 1.25 ±1.58 0.45 ±0.43 63 1.27 ±0.11 1.96 ±1.86 1.53 ±3.34
19 1.49 ±0.21 3.04 ±6.95 0.39 ±1.08 64 0.92 ±0.04 2.93 ±2.73 6.43 ±8.76
20 1.12 ±0.1 2.77 ±4.76 1.02 ±0.74
21 1 ±0.04 8.25 ±4.7 34.44 ±13.85
22 1 ±0.05 2.05 ±0.87 >100 ±2.96
23 1.14 ±0.05 1.38 ±0.49 >100 ±13.24
24 1.14 ±0.07 2.95 ±4.85 2.96 ±5.77
25 1.34 ±0.18 0.95 ±0.49 1.6 ±6.79
26 1.35 ±0.09 1.9 ±1.16 4.71 ±9.33
27 1.92 ±0.11 0.75 ±3.41 0.09 ±0.7
28 0.71 ±0.04 3.58 ±3.22 1.3 ±1.4
29 1.14 ±0.06 1.99 ±0.79 >100 ±4.69
30 1 ±0.05 4.02 ±1.41 >100 ±5.66
31 1.6 ±0.14 1.25 ±0.54 >100 ±5.21
32 1.02 ±0.06 1.62 ±0.57 >100 ±6.48
33 1.03 ±0.05 >100 ±8.21 3.4 ±2.35
34 1.94 ±0.35 0.77 ±0.45 1.24 ±6.18
35 0.88 ±0.04 1.86 ±0.73 >100 ±3.16
36 1.32 ±0.09 5.34 ±8.46 2.36 ±3.67
37 1.69 ±0.27 1.44 ±1.39 0.73 ±2.62
38 4.44 ±1.04 71.41 ±10.07 1.9 ±17.73
39 1.14 ±0.05 2.91 ±1.24 15.11 ±11.66
40 1.91 ±0.13 11.62 ±8.5 0.84 ±1.37
41 1.49 ±0.12 0.74 ±0.3 >100 ±12.6
42 2.66 ±0.19 >100 ±8.19 0.96 ±1.52
43 1.58 ±0.12 6.77 ±10.87 1.63 ±1.44
44 1 ±0.27 4.62 ±1.87 >100 ±0.78
45 1.14 ±0.08 0.64 ±0.25 >100 ±8.72
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Tables S4. Allelic and genotype frequencies for 5HTT and MAOA for sample used in basic 
behavioral results (N=83).  “s” indicates the short allele of the 5HTT gene.  MAOA-L (MAOA-
H) indicates the low (high) variant of the MAOA gene. 
 
A) 
5HTT N % 
Allele    
S 83 50.00% 
L 83 50.00% 
Genotype    
s/s 23 27.38% 
s/l 37 44.05% 
l/l 23 27.38% 
 
B) 
MAOA N % 
Allele (bp-repeats)   
3 35 42.17% 
3.5 1 1.20% 
4 46 55.42% 
5 1 1.20% 
 Genotype    
MAOA-L 36 43.37% 
MAOA-H 47 56.63% 
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Table S5. Allelic and genotype frequencies for DRD4 sample used in basic behavioral results 
(N=83).  7+ denotes a carrier of the 7-repeat allele. 
 
DRD4     
Allele N % 
2 17 10.24% 
3 7 4.22% 
4 97 58.43% 
5 4 2.41% 
7 40 24.10% 
8 1 0.60% 
Genotype    
2/2 1 1.20% 
2/3 1 1.20% 
2/4 8 9.64% 
2/7 6 7.23% 
3/4 3 3.61% 
3/7 3 3.61% 
4/4 30 36.14% 
4/5 4 4.82% 
4/7 21 25.30% 
4/8 1 1.20% 
7/7 5 6.02% 
7+ 35 42.17% 
7- 48 57.83% 
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Tables S6. Allelic and genotype frequencies for 5HTT and MAOA for sample used in basic and 
advanced computational phenotype analyses (N=64).  “s” indicates the short allele of the 5HTT 
gene.  MAOA-L (MAOA-H) indicates the low (high) variant of the MAOA gene. 
 
A) 
5HTT N % 
Allele    
S 66 51.56% 
L 62 48.44% 
Genotype    
s/s 18 28.13% 
s/l 30 46.88% 
l/l 16 25.00% 
 
B) 
MAOA N % 
Allele (bp-repeats)   
3 28 43.75% 
3.5 0 0.00% 
4 35 54.69% 
5 1 1.56% 
 Genotype    
MAOA-L 29 45.31% 
MAOA-H 35 54.69% 
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Table S7. Allelic and genotype frequencies for DRD4 for sample used in basic and advanced 
computational phenotype analyses (N=64).  7+ denotes a carrier of the 7-repeat allele. 
 
DRD4     
Allele N % 
2 14 10.94% 
3 5 3.91% 
4 73 57.03% 
5 3 2.34% 
7 32 25.00% 
8 1 0.78% 
Genotype    
2/2 1 1.56% 
2/3 1 1.56% 
2/4 6 9.38% 
2/7 5 7.81% 
3/4 2 3.13% 
3/7 2 3.13% 
4/4 23 35.94% 
4/5 3 4.69% 
4/7 15 23.44% 
4/8 1 1.56% 
7/7 5 7.81% 
7+ 27 42.19% 
7- 37 57.81% 
 
 
 
 
 
Table S8. Summary of sample sizes.  “Basic behavioral results” refers to results from analysis 
shown in Fig 1.  “Basic & advanced computational phenotype” refers to results from all 
behavioral and genetic analyses using either the basic (2 parameter) or advanced (3 parameter) 
computational phenotype. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Initial Sample Size 90
Failure to genotype 6
Failure to understand instructions 1
Basic behavioral results sample size 83
Randomless Choice Behavior 9
Random Choice Behavior 8
Violate rationality constraint 2
Failure to estimate basic or advanced computational phenotype 19
Basic & Advanced computational phenotype sample size 64
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  Appendix:	  Experimental	  Instructions	  	  
Buying	  your	  stock	  
	  In	  this	  experiment	  you	  will	  be	  given	  350	  experimental	  dollars	  to	  invest	  in	  three	  different	  stocks.	  	  Your	  job	  is	  to	  choose	  when	  to	  buy	  and	  sell	  each	  stock,	  so	  that	  you	  earn	  the	  most	  money	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment.	  	  Throughout	  the	  experiment,	  you	  will	  see	  the	  price	  of	  each	  stock	  changing	  (more	  detail	  below),	  and	  you	  will	  use	  this	  information	  to	  decide	  when	  to	  buy	  and	  sell.	  	  When	  you	  sell	  a	  stock,	  you	  receive	  an	  amount	  of	  cash	  equal	  to	  the	  price	  of	  the	  stock.	  	  When	  you	  buy	  a	  stock,	  you	  receive	  one	  unit	  of	  the	  stock,	  but	  you	  must	  give	  up	  an	  amount	  of	  cash	  equal	  to	  the	  current	  price	  of	  the	  stock.	  	  The	  three	  stocks	  you	  can	  buy	  or	  sell	  are	  simply	  called	  Stock	  A,	  Stock	  B,	  and	  Stock	  C.	  	  To	  begin	  the	  experiment	  you	  MUST	  buy	  all	  three	  stocks,	  where	  each	  stock	  costs	  $100.	  	  Therefore,	  after	  you	  buy	  the	  three	  stocks,	  you	  will	  own	  one	  unit	  of	  each	  stock	  and	  have	  a	  total	  of	  $50	  remaining.	  	  For	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  experiment,	  you	  are	  only	  allowed	  to	  hold	  a	  maximum	  of	  1	  unit	  of	  each	  stock,	  and	  you	  cannot	  hold	  negative	  units	  (no	  short	  selling.)	  	  However,	  you	  can	  carry	  a	  negative	  cash	  balance	  by	  buying	  a	  stock	  for	  more	  money	  than	  you	  have,	  but	  any	  negative	  cash	  balances	  will	  be	  deducted	  from	  your	  final	  earnings.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Structure	  of	  the	  market	  
	  In	  the	  experiment,	  you	  will	  see	  two	  types	  of	  screens,	  a	  price	  update	  screen	  and	  an	  
action	  screen.	  	  In	  the	  price	  update	  screen,	  one	  stock	  will	  be	  randomly	  selected	  and	  you	  will	  be	  told	  if	  the	  selected	  stock	  price	  has	  gone	  up	  or	  down,	  and	  by	  how	  much.	  	  Note	  that	  you	  will	  only	  see	  an	  update	  for	  one	  stock	  at	  a	  time.	  	  You	  will	  not	  be	  asked	  to	  do	  anything	  during	  this	  screen,	  you	  will	  simply	  see	  information	  about	  the	  change	  in	  price.	  	  Following	  the	  price	  update	  screen,	  another	  stock	  will	  be	  randomly	  chosen	  (it	  may	  be	  the	  same	  one	  you	  just	  saw)	  and	  you	  will	  be	  asked	  to	  take	  an	  action.	  	  If	  you	  currently	  hold	  a	  unit	  of	  the	  stock,	  you	  will	  be	  asked	  if	  you	  would	  like	  to	  sell	  the	  stock	  at	  the	  current	  price.	  	  If	  you	  do	  not	  currently	  own	  a	  unit	  of	  the	  stock,	  you	  will	  be	  asked	  if	  you	  would	  like	  to	  buy	  a	  unit	  at	  the	  current	  price.	  	  	  	  The	  experiment	  will	  start	  out	  with	  9	  consecutive	  price	  update	  screens,	  and	  then	  you	  will	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  buy	  or	  sell	  after	  each	  subsequent	  price	  update	  screen.	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How	  the	  stock	  prices	  change	  
	  Each	  stock	  changes	  price	  according	  to	  the	  exact	  same	  rule.	  	  Each	  stock	  is	  either	  in	  a	  good	  state	  or	  in	  a	  bad	  state.	  	  In	  the	  good	  state,	  the	  stock	  goes	  up	  with	  55%	  chance,	  and	  it	  goes	  down	  with	  45%	  chance.	  	  In	  the	  bad	  state,	  the	  stock	  goes	  down	  with	  55%	  chance	  and	  it	  goes	  up	  with	  45%	  chance.	  	  	  	  Once	  it	  is	  determined	  whether	  the	  price	  will	  go	  up	  or	  down,	  the	  size	  of	  the	  change	  is	  always	  random,	  and	  will	  either	  be	  $5,	  $10,	  or	  $15.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  bad	  state,	  the	  stock	  will	  go	  down	  with	  55%	  chance,	  and	  the	  amount	  it	  goes	  down	  by	  is	  $5,	  $10,	  or	  $15	  with	  equal	  chance.	  	  Similarly,	  the	  good	  stock	  will	  go	  up	  with	  55%	  chance,	  and	  the	  amount	  it	  goes	  up	  by	  will	  either	  be	  $5,	  $10,	  or	  $15.	  	  	  	  The	  stocks	  will	  all	  randomly	  start	  in	  either	  the	  good	  state	  or	  bad	  state,	  and	  after	  each	  price	  update,	  there	  is	  a	  20%	  chance	  the	  stock	  switches	  state.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Stock	  price	  changes	  	   Good	  state	   Bad	  state	  
+	  	   55%	   45%	  
-­‐	  	  	   45%	   55%	  	  	  
State	  changes	  	   Good	  state	  today	   Bad	  state	  today	  
Good	  state	  tomorrow	   80%	   20%	  
Bad	  state	  tomorrow	   20%	   80%	  	  	  	  
Earnings	  and	  payout	  
	  You	  will	  play	  this	  market	  game	  TWO	  SEPARATE	  TIMES	  in	  the	  scanner.	  	  Each	  game	  will	  last	  approximately	  15	  minutes,	  and	  each	  game	  is	  independent	  from	  the	  previous	  one.	  	  This	  means	  when	  you	  start	  the	  second	  game,	  you	  will	  have	  to	  buy	  the	  three	  stocks	  at	  $100	  again,	  and	  the	  stocks	  will	  start	  randomly	  in	  each	  state	  again.	  	  	  	  Your	  earnings	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment	  will	  be	  equal	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  cash	  you	  accrued	  over	  the	  two	  scanning	  sessions	  from	  buying	  and	  selling	  stocks,	  plus	  the	  current	  price	  of	  any	  stocks	  that	  you	  own.	  	  	  	  
Earnings=cash	  +	  	  	  price	  A*(Hold	  A)	  	  	  	  +	  	  	  	  Price	  	  B*(Hold	  B)	  	  	  	  +	  	  	  	  Price	  C*(Hold	  C)	  
	  
	  Finally,	  your	  earnings	  will	  be	  converted	  using	  an	  exchange	  rate	  of	  12:1.	  	  That	  means	  we	  divide	  your	  earnings	  by	  12,	  and	  pay	  you	  this	  amount	  plus	  the	  $15	  show	  up	  fee.	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Button	  presses	  	  During	  the	  Action	  screens,	  you	  will	  either	  be	  given	  the	  option	  to	  “Buy?”	  or	  “Sell?”	  depending	  on	  whether	  you	  hold	  the	  stock	  or	  not.	  	  The	  LEFT	  (blue)	  button	  indicates	  “YES”.	  	  And	  the	  RIGHT	  (yellow)	  button	  indicates	  “NO.”	  	  You	  have	  three	  seconds	  to	  enter	  your	  response,	  otherwise	  the	  computer	  will	  randomly	  select	  a	  response	  for	  you.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
	  
